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← 672 A.2d 82 - Rippett v. Bemis

Rippett v. Bemis’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

51
cited by 51 later decisions
2
states following
June 2024
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 16 district · 23 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently June 2024 · most notably Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1997), Raymond Veilleux Kelly Veilleux Peter Kennedy v. National Broadcasting Company Alan Handel Fred Francis Raymond Veilleux Kelly Veilleux Peter Kennedy (2000)

6 federal appellate · 16 district · 23 state decisions

2401996200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Paul v. Davis · Hutchinson v. Proxmire · Young v. Masci · Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Recovery for slander per se requires no showing of special harm beyond the publication itself.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Lola Rippett challenges the summary judgment entered in favor of Defendant McAIevey on her Count II claim against him for intentional infliction of emotional distress and on her Count III claim against him for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Both counts are based on McAlevey’s publication of false and defamatory statements concerning Rippett. As we have previously stated, these statements constitute slander per se as a matter of law. If the statements alleged to be defamatory are privileged, there can be no recovery for the emotional distress allegedly sustained by Rippett for such recovery would undermine the privilege. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1036 (7th Cir.1978), rev’d on other grounds, 443 U.S. 111 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 , 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). If the statements alleged to be defamatory are not privileged, any damages sustained by Rippett are subsumed by award for defamation. If defamation is proved, compensatory damages may include the elements of mental suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, effect on reputation and loss of social standing so far as they have been proved and may reasonably be presumed. Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Me.1985). The court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of Detective McAIevey on Rippett’s Count II claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and her Count III claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.