Lloyd v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(b) Upon receipt of a record of proceedings under AS 12.55.165, the three-judge panel shall consider all pertinent files, records, and transcripts, including the findings and conclusions of the judge who originally heard the matter. The panel may hear oral testimony to supplement the record before it. If the panel finds that manifest injustice would result from failure to consider relevant aggravating or mitigating factors not specifically included in AS 12.55.155 or from the imposition of the presumptive term, whether or not adjusted for aggravating or mitigating factors, it shall sentence the defendant in accordance with this section. If the panel does not find that manifest injustice would result, it shall remand the case to the sentencing court, with a written statement of its findings and conclusions, for sentencing under AS 12.55.125. (c) The three-judge panel may in the interest of justice sentence the defendant to any definite term of imprisonment up to the maximum term provided for the offense or to any sentence authorized under AS 12.55.015.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Duncan v. State · Lowe v. State

2. “We think Lloyd’s suggested definition, obvious unfairness, is an accurate and permissible characterization of the manifest injustice standard. However, because this definition, like the manifest injustice standard itself, is highly subjective, it adds little substance to the statutory language. Similarly, we believe that Judge Buckalew’s [the sentencing judge’s] reference to a sentence that would “shock the conscience” is a subjective description that fairly characterizes the manifest injustice standard. We find it difficult, however, to see any substantial difference between Judge Bucka-lew’s characterization of manifest injustice and the definition proposed by Lloyd. If a judge believed imposition of a presumptive sentence would be obviously unfair, we think it highly likely that he would also find that such a sentence would shock his conscience. Conversely, a judge whose conscience was shocked by the prospect of imposing a presumptive sentence could be expected to find that the sentence would be obviously unfair.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State

3. “As the only state-wide body specifically charged with the responsibility of determining the existence of manifest injustice, the three-judge sentencing panel is in a unique position to establish a uniform approach to identifying cases in which manifest injustice would result from imposition of a presumptive term. The ability of the three-judge panel to function successfully, however, will depend upon an appropriate level of referral to the panel by individual sentencing judges.... [The panel will obviously be powerless to apply its policies to a case potentially involving manifest injustice if a referral is not ordered by the original sentencing judge. We recognize that the referral to the three-judge panel should occur only in exceptional cases. However, where the issue of manifest injustice appears to be a close one, we would urge sentencing judges to resolve any doubt in favor of a referral pursuant to AS 12.55.165.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Harapat v. State