Costa v. Hall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 10 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This [the principle that a single justice’s explanation of her views as to why claims are not new and not substantial does not convert the decision into one on the merits] accords with our prior case law. In Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.2011), we held that where, unlike here, the Single Justice finds that a claim is “new” within the meaning of § 33E, a federal habeas court must accept this as a binding merits determination of newness and may not look behind the reasoning. Id. at 76 (“[A] determination that the issues are ‘new’ and simply not ‘substantial’ resolves the claims on the merits and does not signal procedural default.”). However, where, as here, the Single Justice finds a claim is neither new nor substantial under § 33E, this is a procedural bar to federal habeas review. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lee v. Corsini

2. “The Single Justice’s finding that neither of [the petitioner’s] ... claims presented “new and substantial questions” within the meaning of § 33E review constitutes an independent and adequate state ground.... The Single Justice’s finding of a lack of substantiality constitutes an independent and adequate state ground in and of itself and acts to bar federal review.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 9 F. Supp. 3d 137 - Bly v. St. Amand