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673 So. 2d 903

Docket No. 95-01774.

Crossen v. Feldman

Cynthia Janine CROSSEN, Appellant, v. Randy M. FELDMAN, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1996-05-08

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“this case simply involves whether [Emma Posik and Nancy L. R. Layton] ... entered into a contract for support, which is something that they are legally capable of doing.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 695 So. 2d 759 - Posik v. Layton

Relies on Poe v. Estate of Levy · 562 So. 2d 852 - Stevens v. Muse

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1996-05-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently August 2015

6 state decisions

30199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Joseph C. Hood, Tampa, for Appellant.

¶2David J. Pettinato of Law Offices of Ronald S. Reed, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

¶3PATTERSON, Judge.

¶4Cynthia Crossen appeals from the trial court's order which dismisses count two of her counterclaim. We reverse.

¶5This case began when Randy Feldman filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking to be declared the father of Crossen's unborn child. Crossen brought a two-count counterclaim. Count one is an action for paternity pursuant to chapter 742, Florida Statutes (1993). Count two sought to enforce an oral contract between the parties that Feldman would support Crossen during her pregnancy and for a reasonable time thereafter in return for Crossen quitting her job during her pregnancy. Crossen in fact quit her job and thereafter Feldman refused to provide support because Crossen terminated their engagement to marry. Feldman answered the counterclaim and asserted as affirmative defenses the statute of frauds and that the claim was one for "palimony," which is not a recognized cause of action in this state. The trial court agreed with Feldman's "palimony" defense and dismissed count two without leave to amend.

¶6Without attempting to define what may or may not be "palimony," this case simply involves whether these parties entered into a contract for support, which is something that they are legally capable of doing. See Stevens v. Muse,562 So.2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Poe v. Estate of Levy,411 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). It was therefore error to dismiss count II of the counterclaim. Although argued by the parties, the issue of the statute of frauds is not properly before us because the trial court did not rule on it.

¶7Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate count two of the counterclaim.

¶8RYDER, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.

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