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674 F.2d 521

Docket No. 81-5011.

Wright v. Crowell

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted on Briefs March 16, 1982.

Decided March 19, 1982.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1982-03-19

2 counsel of record

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1982-03-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2000

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

170198219902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Norman Quincy Wright, pro se.

¶2William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants-ap-pellees.

¶3Before LIVELY and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶4PER CURIAM..

¶5This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which a Tennessee State prisoner sought damages from the Secretary of State of Tennessee and various election commissioners on the ground that he had been deprived of his right to vote. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that his constitutional claims had become moot by reason of a consent order entered in another district. On a motion to reconsider the district court found that the plaintiff had made no effort to vote in the May 6,1980 primary, that his original complaint referred to the November 1980 general election which was covered by the consent order previously referred to, and denied the motion for reconsideration.

¶6On appeal the plaintiff contends that his action was not rendered moot by the consent decree and that his constitutional right to vote in the May 6th primary was infringed. Though he has proceeded pro se from the beginning of this action, he also appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion for attorney fees.

¶7Upon consideration of the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties the court concludes that the district court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s claim for *522damages. We also affirm the holding of the district court that a pro se litigant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

¶8The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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