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← 674 F.3d 252 - Ignacio v. United States

Ignacio v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

674 F.3d 252 · 2012

Citation profile

23
cited by 23 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
February 2023
most recently cited

8 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Federal Tort Claims Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 2674 · 28 U.S.C. § 2680

Relies on Connecticut National Bank v. Germain · Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyer · Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. · Rubin v. United States · Crooks v. Harrelson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[t]he starting point for any issue of statutory interpretation ... is the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453 , 460 (4th Cir.2007). “In that regard, we must first determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute ... and our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Id. (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 , 752 (4th Cir.2007), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 415 , 129 S.Ct. 1079 , 172 L.Ed.2d 816 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We determine the ‘plainness or ambiguity of the statutory language ... by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345 , 354-55 (4th Cir.2009) (omission in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 , 341, 117 S.Ct. 843 , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- . . . . . "(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising ... out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution." 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “waives immunity whenever an investigative or law enforcement officer commits one of the specified intentional torts, regardless of whether the officer is engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.