Jackson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “unconscious of the meaning of his words,”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Waldrop v. State · 824 So. 2d 804 - Grayson v. State

2. “"`"`[U]nless intoxication, in and of itself, so impairs the defendant's mind that he is "unconscious of the meaning of his words," the fact the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.' Carr v. State, 545 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). "The intoxicated condition of an accused when he makes a confession, unless it goes to the extent of mania, does not affect the admissibility and evidence of the confession, but may affect its weight and credibility.' Callahan v. State, 557 So.2d 1292, 1300 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 557 So.2d 1311 (Ala.1989)." "` White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala.Cr. App.1990).' " State v. Austin, 596 So.2d 598, 601 (Ala. Cr.App.1991). See also Rheuark v. State, 601 So.2d 135, 138-39 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). "`Indeed there was no evidence presented during the course of the trial that showed that the appellant was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. In order for a confession to be inadmissible based on the appellant's intoxication, the "`mind of the appellant must be substantially impaired when the confession was made.'" Mann v. State, 581 So.2d 22 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), quoting Cross v. State, 536 So.2d 155 (Ala.Cr. App.1988). See also Hubbard [v. State, 500 So.2d 1204 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 500 So.2d 1231 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 , 107 S.Ct. 1591 , 94 L.Ed.2d 780 (1987) ]; McCammon v. State, 499 So.2d 811 (Ala.C”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 824 So. 2d 804 - Grayson v. State · 698 So. 2d 1100 - Gaddy v. State

3. “"In Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d 443, 446 (Ala.1985), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed this issue, stating: "`It is improper for a trial judge to disclose to the jury that he made a preliminary determination that a confession was voluntary and therefore admissible. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 , 87 S.Ct. 1312 , 18 L.Ed.2d 341 (1967); United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.1965). In the case at hand, however, the trial judge made it clear to the jury that they were to ultimately determine whether the confession was voluntary. We agree, therefore, with the Court of Criminal Appeals that there was no prejudicial error, since the comments of the trial judge "did not imply that the jury should accept and believe appellant's confession based on the trial court's ruling that the statement was voluntary." "`.... "`Correctly stated, whether a confession was voluntary rests initially with the trial court; once the trial court makes the preliminary determination that the confession was voluntary, it then becomes admissible into evidence. Thereafter the jury makes the determination of voluntariness as affecting the weight and credibility to be given the confession. Lewis v. State, 295 Ala. 350 , 329 So.2d 599 (1976).' "....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 725 So. 2d 1003 - Price v. State · 698 So. 2d 1100 - Gaddy v. State