674 So. 2d 535 - Ts v. Jp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`In the CPA, our legislature clearly provided guidelines and standards for terminating parental rights based upon clear and convincing evidence. [§ 26-18-7, Ala.Code 1975.] Mindful of the serious nature of cases involving the termination of parental rights and the need to comply with the requirements of due process, our Supreme Court established a two-pronged test be to applied. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950 (Ala.1990). The court must determine whether grounds for termination exist, including, but not limited to, those specifically listed in § 26-18-7, and must also determine whether all viable alternatives to the termination of parental rights have been considered.... Furthermore, where the State or a nonparent seeks to terminate parental rights, the court must find that the child is dependent. Additionally, we note that the United States Supreme Court has held that, in a termination of parental rights proceeding, a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof satisfies the requirements of due process, while a lesser standard does not. "`A construction of the AAC that usurps and overrides the CPA, and that calls for the application of a lesser or different standard, is an unworkable, unjust, and unreasonable interpretation. More importantly, the imposition of a lesser standard would clearly be unconstitutional.'”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kap v. Dp · 857 So. 2d 125 - Ex Parte FP

2. “"The mother persuasively argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights without following the applicable provisions of the CPA [Child Protection Act], specifically § 26-18-7, in that it used an improper standard. While the best interest of the child is always a paramount concern in such cases, the trial court erred in applying the `best interest' standard to the question regarding the termination of the mother's parental rights. The termination of parental rights standard provided by the CPA, and the case law interpreting the CPA, should have been applied. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to apply the proper standard to reach a decision."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sw v. Walker County Dept. of Human Res. · 796 So. 2d 365 - TT v. State Dept. of Human Resources

3. “"A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that `all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be read together to constitute one law.' Florence v. Williams, 439 So.2d 83, 87 (Ala.1983). A court construing a statute must look not only to the language of the statute, but also to the `purpose and object of the enactment, and its relation to other laws and conditions which may arise under its provisions.' Siegelman v. Folmar, 432 So.2d 1246, 1249 (Ala.1983). Additionally, in construing a statute, the court's duty is to `ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent expressed in the statute, which may be gleaned from the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the purpose sought to be obtained.' Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So.2d 238, 248 (Ala.1992). Furthermore, if a statute is susceptible to two constructions, and one is workable and fair but the other is unworkable and unjust, the court assumes that the legislature intended that which is workable and fair. Ex parte Hayes, 405 So.2d 366 (Ala.1981)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mvs v. Vmd · M.V.S. v. V.M.D.