676 F. Supp. 2d 640 - Goodell v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Pearce itself apparently involved different judges presiding over the two trials, a fact that has led some courts to conclude by implication that the presumption of vindictiveness applies even where different sentencing judges are involved. See, e.g., United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318 , 323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976). That fact, however, may not have been drawn to the Court’s attention and does not appear anywhere in the Court’s opinion in Pearce. Clearly the Court did not focus on it as a consideration for its holding. See Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 , 299 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 , 98 S.Ct. 897 , 54 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978). Subsequent opinions have also elucidated the basis for the Pearce presumption. We held in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), for instance, that the presumption derives from the judge’s “personal stake in the prior conviction,” id. at 27 , 93 S.Ct. at 1983 , a statement clearly at odds with reading Pearce to answer the two-sentencer issue. We therefore decline to read Pearce as governing this issue. See also n. 4, infra.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Goodell v. Williams