In re Nantucket Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
677 F.2d 95 · 1982
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently January 2015 · most notably In Re Hiromichi Wada (1999), Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States (1997)
7 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (§ 2 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (§ 23 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act))
Relies on Richards v. United States · United States v. Menasche · United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. · Inhabitants of the Township of Montclair County of Essex v. Ramsdell · Illinois ex rel. Kennedy v. Hurley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The wording of [§ 1052(e) ] makes it plain that not all terms which are geographically suggestive are unregistrable. Indeed, the statutory language declares nonregistrable only those words which are ‘primarily geographically descriptive.’ The word ‘primarily’ should not be overlooked, for it is not the intent of the federal statute to refuse registration of a mark where the geographic meaning is minor, obscure, remote, or unconnected with the goods. Thus, if there be no connection of the geographical meaning of the mark with the goods in the public mind, that is, if the mark is arbitrary when applied to the goods, registration should not be refused under § 2(e)(2).””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The board’s test rests mechanistically on the one question of whether the mark is recognizable, at least to some large segment of the public, as the name of a geographical area. NANTUCKET is such. That ends the board’s test. Once it is found that the mark is the name of a known place, i.e., that it has “a readily recognizable geographic meaning,” the next question, whether applicant’s goods do or do not come from that place, becomes irrelevant under the board’s test, for if they do, the mark is “primarily geographically descriptive”; if they don’t, the mark is “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive.” Either way, the result is the same, for the mark must be denied registration on the principal register unless resort can be had to § 2(f).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“might develop a protectable good will in such a geographically descriptive name upon proof that the name ceased being informational to the public and came to indicate a source of goods. Thus, if a manufacturer located in Chicago were to display the name CHICAGO on his shirts, for example, it has been the law for over a century that he could prevent another subsequent use only if he could establish ‘secondary meaning’ in the term.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.