¶1(concurring specially).
¶2Although I am troubled with the decision of the court in State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 1999), for the reasons set forth in my dissent in that case I do not agree that that decision only applies to guilty pleas, as the dissent in the present case suggests.
¶3Schminkeyinvolved the taking of an Alford plea in which the defendant refused to admit guilt. When this occurs, the court, before accepting the plea, must determine whether the evidence available to the State would be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict at trial. That is the same analysis that must be undertaken in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal. For this reason, Schminkeyis valid authority for the issue presently before the court.
¶4I believe Schminkeyfailed to recognize the strength of the inference that arises from taking an automobile without the owner’s consent. An individual’s intent is synonymous with what he wants to do. What he wants to do is usually motivated by and derived from the actor’s own best interests. It is in the best interests of one taking another’s automobile without permission that the vehicle not be returned to the owner because this may aid in the identification of the perpetrator.
¶5Notwithstanding my conclusions in this regard, I concur in the result because I am unable to find that the totality of the evidence in the present case, including the presumption to which I refer, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty on the greater charge. The defendant should be declared guilty of the lesser-included offense.