677 So. 2d 539 - State v. Hamilton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In the instant case there was a specific and unambiguous plea struck by the State, the defendant and the court, as evidenced from the signed forms mentioned above. The defendant knew at all times that she had bargained to be charged as a twice instead of a thrice convicted felon in exchange for a 30 months sentence. Here the State did not renege, but the trial judge decided ex parte to impose a sentence of his choosing without regard to the contract confected by all the parties, including the trial judge, when he imposed a lesser sentence than agreed upon. Although in this case a specific agreement had clearly been reached, and the State and the defendant had fully and substantially performed on the State's side of the bargain, the State was aggrieved by the failure of the court to perform a promise upon which the State had relied to its tangible detriment. The consent of all parties was one of the requisites for a valid agreement, and the contract created obligations on all the parties to perform the contract in good faith. La.C.C. arts. 1823 - 1824. In the particular agreement here, the "cause" for the State's agreement was a guilty plea in return for the diminished culpability of the defendant under the habitual offender law along with a 2 ½ year sentence. When the trial court was requested to remedy this breach, the trial court failed to give the appropriate remedy, specific performance or recision of the contract, and denied the State's motion for reconsideration of sent”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 261 So. 3d 94 - State v. Lewis · 261 So. 3d 87 - State v. Lewis

2. “... [T]he District Attorney is the only official vested with the authority to engage in a plea bargain on behalf of the State. State v. Howard, 448 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1355 (La.1984). The trial court has no authority to enter into an ex parte plea agreement with a defendant or to enforce its terms. La. C. Cr. P. arts. 558 and 691. When a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); State v. Redfearn, 441 So.2d 200 (La.1983).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 735 So. 2d 746 - State v. Anthony

3. “The substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments lies in the legislative branch of government. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 , 109 S.Ct. 2522 , 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 695 So. 2d 1121 - State v. Lacoste