Adams v. Thaler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “does not define “second or successive.” The Supreme Court has stated that the term “takes its full meaning from [the Court’s] case law, including decisions predating the enactment of [AEDPA].” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 , 943-44 [ 127 S.Ct. 2842 , 168 L.Ed.2d 662 ] (2007). “The Court has declined to interpret ‘second or successive’ as refer ring to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior § 2254 application.” Id. at 944 [ 127 S.Ct. 2842 ] For instance, in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 [ 120 S.Ct. 1595 , 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) ], the Court concluded that “[a] habeas petition filed in the district court after an initial habeas petition was unadjudicated on its merits and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a second or successive petition.” Id. at 485-86 [ 120 S.Ct. 1595 ]; see also Panetti 551 U.S. at 944-46 [ 127 S.Ct. 2842 ] (holding that “a § 2254 application raising a Ford [v. Wainwright]-based[ 4 ] incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is ripe” is not a successive petition); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 , 643-45 [ 118 S.Ct. 1618 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 ] (1998) (holding that a second-in-time federal habeas petition is not “successive” when it only raises a Ford claim that was previously dismissed as premature).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sepulvado v. Cain · In Re: Christopher Sepulvado

2. “Although we need not, and do not, address the impact of Martinez on the Texas habeas landscape, we note that Texas does not require a defendant to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only in state habeas proceedings, see Lopez v. Texas, 343 S.W.3d 137 , 143 (Tex.Crim.App.2011), and that ineffective assistance claims (particularly those, like Adams’s claim, involving trial counsel’s failure to object to jury instructions) are often brought on direct appeal, with mixed success.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ibarra v. Thaler

3. “[I]n denying Adams’s initial federal ha-beas petition, the district court correctly determined that Adams’s claims were procedurally defaulted pursuant to the then-prevailing Supreme Court precedent of Coleman. The Supreme Court’s later decision in Martinez, which creates a narrow exception to Coleman’s holding regarding cause to excuse procedural default, does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” under Supreme Court and our precedent to warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Diaz v. Stephens