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← 68 F.3d 1420 - Haddon v. United States

Haddon v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

68 F.3d 1420 · 1995

Citation profile

63
cited by 63 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
March 2018
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 32 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 63 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2018 · most notably Osborn v. Haley (2007), Aversa v. United States (1996)

25 federal appellate · 32 district ·

380199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Federal Tort Claims Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 28 U.S.C. § 1442 · 28 U.S.C. § 1447 · 28 U.S.C. § 2679

Relies on Erie Co v. Tompkins · New Jersey v. New York · United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. · Green v. Bock Laundry MacHine Co. · Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.”
    18 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[C]onduct is “incidental” to an employee’s legitimate duties if it is “foreseeable.” “Foreseeable” in this context does not carry the same meaning as it does in negligence cases; rather, it requires the court to determine whether it is fair to charge employers with responsibility for the intentional torts of their employees. To be foreseeable, the torts must be “a direct outgrowth of the employee’s instructions or job assignment.” It is not enough that an employee’s job provides an “opportunity” to commit an intentional tort.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.