Feddersen v. Feddersen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he amount of property of each spouse, the circumstances surrounding the parties, the wife’s necessities, and the husband’s financial ability, the physical condition of the parties, the nature of their life together, and in these modern times the wife’s independence and ability to earn her own way, which must all be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion in awarding or denying alimony. Feddersen, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing Coman v. Coman, 492 F.2d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, the touchstone for alimony determinations is a finding of need of one party and the ability of the other to pay for those needs. See id.; see, also, Poe v. Poe, 409 F.2d 40, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1969) (“statutory authorization of alimony does not necessarily mean that a wife is entitled to such an award in every case”).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Berrios-Rodriguez v. Berrios · 266 F. Supp. 2d 385 - Armstrong v. Armstrong

2. “[w]henever a marriage is declared void or dissolved the court may, without regard to any determination that the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of one party or the other, further decree... for the recovery for a party determined to be in need thereof an amount of money in gross or in installments, as may be necessary for the support and maintenance of such party.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Berrios-Rodriguez v. Berrios · Grey v. Grey

3. “It is the responsibility of an appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the factfinder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data. Unless the reviewing court establishes the existence of either of these factors, it may not alter the facts found by the trial court. To hold otherwise would be to permit a substitution by the reviewing court of its finding for that of the trial court, and there is no existing authority for this in the federal judicial system, either by American common law tradition or by rule and statute.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Allen v. Allen