State v. Uganiza’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is well settled that before statements stemming from custodial interrogation may be offered against a criminal defendant at trial, the State must demonstrate that law enforcement officials gave certain warnings and followed specific procedures effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by article I, section 8 of our State constitution. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); in accord: State v. Paahana, 66 Haw. 500, 502 , 666 P.2d 592, 595 (1983); State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479 , 643 P.2d 541 (1982). If this is not done prior to or in the course of any subsequent interrogation, any statement made by a person in custody cannot be admitted against him at trial. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 99-100 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 266 , 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Ramones

2. “Basic to the privilege against self-incrimination is the right of an individual accused or suspected of a crime not to speak. This is because without the right to cut off police questioning, the inherently compelling pressures of in-custody interrogation operate to overbear free choice, the foundation of the privilege, and statements elicited after its invocation cannot be other than the product of compulsion. Miranda v. Arizona, [384 U.S.] at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Accordingly, if an individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during interrogation that he [or she] wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Id. at 473, 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627.... At this point he [or she] has shown that he [or she] intends to exercise the privilege. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kekona

3. “[I]f an individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during interrogation that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kekona