Manley v. Mayer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The subject of the dormancy and revivor of judgments has given rise to much discussion and disagreement. The decisions in this state have departed radically from the law as construed elsewhere even under similar statutes. . . . The statute does not undertake to define dormancy and does not apply the term to the condition arising upon the death of a party to a judgment. But in Kansas (as perhaps in no other jurisdiction) such condition is constantly spoken of as dormancy, and a long line of decisions have assimilated this condition to that of a judgment dormant for want of the timely issuance of execution, until they must be regarded as practically identical. . . . The analogy between the situation arising upon the death of a party to a judgment and the condition ordinarily known as dormancy must be determined in the light of the construction already given these statutes by this court. It is not clear whether the word ‘dormant,’ as applied to judgments, had originally or has ordinarily a well-defined technical meaning, but here it has by repeated use been given a definition broad enough to cover judgments that have not wholly lost their vitality, but which can not support an execution for want of necessary parties. . . . Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, in Kansas the death of a party renders a judgment dormant within the meaning of the statute.” (Manley v. Mayer, 68 Kan. 377, 394, 395, 396 , 75 Pac. 550 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Harvey v. Wasson

2. ““This last proceeding is not in so many words described as a revivor, but it is uniformly so designated in the decisions both in this state and elsewhere. A more significant fact is that the statute does not undertake to define ‘dormancy’ and does not apply the term to the condition arising upon the death of a party to a judgment. But in Kansas, as perhaps in no other jurisdiction, such condition is constantly spoken of as ‘dormancy’, and a long line of decisions have assimilated this condition to th'at of a judgment dormant for want of the timely issuance of execution, until they must be regarded as practically identical. It is held that a judgment dormant for want of execution must be revived, if at all, within the year (Angell v. Martin, 24 Kan. 334 ), and that this is true of a judgment a party to which has died (Scroggs v. Tutt, 23 Kan. 181 ); that, after the year has passed without revivor, neither judgment will support an action (Mawhinney v. Doane, 40 Kan. 676 . 17 P. 44 : Smalley v. Bowling, 64 Kan. 818 , 68 Pac. 630 ).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Perry v. Lebel

3. ““The subject of the dormancy and revivor of judgments has given rise to much discussion and disagreement. The decisions in this state have departed radically from the law as construed elsewhere, even under similar statutes. Our Code provides (section 425 [Gen. Stat. 1901, sec. 4875] ) that on the déath of a party to an action it may be revived in the name of his representative, but only if the order therefor is made within a year (sec. 433; Gen. Stat. 1901, sec. 4883) ; that if a judgment becomes dormant, it may be revived in the same manner (sec. 440; Gen. Stat. 1901, sec. 4890) ; that if either party to a judgment dies, his representative may be made a party to it in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions (sec. 439, Stat. 1901, sec. 4889).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Perry v. Lebel