68 Md. App. 379 - Glenn v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 67 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Of the four basic types of murder, specific-intent-to-kill murder is the only one wherein there is a conscious and purposeful design to accomplish the death of the victim. None of the others contains, as a necessary element, any intent that the victim die. A depraved-heart murder is a mere general intent crime—the general intent to do the reckless, life-endangering act with wanton disregard of the human consequences. A felony-murder has no necessary specific intent that harm should come to a victim, let alone that the victim should die. There is merely a general intent to perpetrate a felony. Some felonies, of course, include lesser specific intents, but not an intent that death result. With respect to both depraved-heart murder and felony-murder, the death of the victim is not only unintended but sometimes not even reasonably foreseen. # * * * * In the case of intent-to-do-grievous-bodily-harm murder, on the other hand, the failure of that intent to establish ipso facto—by automatic operation of law—the intent to murder is not so immediately apparent. This is so because there is, in these cases, an actual harm specifically intended for the assault victim. Thus, this form of murder is a specific-intent crime rather than a mere general-intent crime. The critical distinction that needs to be made, however, is between the results specifically intended, not between the presence or absence of a specific intent. Although there is the purpose or design that the victim should suffer ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 76 Md. App. 433 - Earp v. State · 76 Md. App. 201 - Selby v. State

2. “I deliberately amputated the arms and legs of my enemy for the purpose of rendering him a quadriplegic for the rest of his long and miserable life. I did not remotely desire that a merciful death should intervene to frustrate my design. A fact finder, of course, need not believe such a statement, and probably would not. That is beside the point. The issue is: If the fact finder should explicitly find such a stated intent to be the fact, what would its legal significance be in terms of [murder]? The answer is ... [that society's response is that a death resulting from a defendant’s possession of such a mens rea is just as blameworthy and just as worthy of punishment as if there had been an actual intent to kill. It is an independent murderous mens rea in its own right and no mere pale reflection of the intent to kill.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thornton v. State · 70 Md. App. 456 - Sangster v. State

3. “Assault with intent to murder is, by its very wording, a specific intent crime. The obvious question is, “The specific intent to do what?” The obvious answer is, “The specific intent to bring about the death of the assault victim.” In terms of the clear and unambiguous meaning of words, it is inconceivable that there could be an intent to murder the victim that did not intend for the victim to die---- Intended murder, by definition, comprehends, inter alia, an intended killing, to wit, an intent to kill.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Abernathy v. State · 69 Md. App. 37 - Hall v. State