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68 Minn. 81

Pfenninger v. Kokesch

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Decided April 26, 1897

Supreme Court of Minnesota · decided 1897-04-26

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Sibley county, Oadwell, J., refusing a new trial after a verdict for defendant.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““We have examined the record in vain for any evidence, introduced or offered, that these payments were made by the procurement of the defendant, or for him, or in his name, or that he ever ratified them as payments made for him or in his behalf.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Erickson v. Husemoller

““In order to prevent the running of the statute, a payment must have been made by the debtor in person, or for him by his authority, or for him and in his name without authority and subsequently ratified by him.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Erickson v. Husemoller

Relies on McMullen v. . Rafferty · Littlefield v. . Littlefield · Willoughby v. Irish

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1897-04-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 2010

8 state decisions

201897190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

MITCHELL, J.

¶1This action was brought on the joint and several promissory note of the defendant and his father, the former being surety for the latter. The cause of action against defendant was barred by the statute of limitations, unless the running of the statute had been interrupted by certain partial payments. All of these payments were made by the father. It is the law of this state that a partial payment by one of several joint and several debtors is inoperative to prevent the running of the statute as to the others. Willoughby v. Irish, 35 Minn. 63, 27 N. W. 379. In order to prevent the running of the statute, a payment must have been made by the debtor in person, or for him by his authority, or for him and in his name without authority and subsequently ratified by him. The mere fact that he has knowledge of payments being made by his co-debtor is not sufficient. McMullen v. Rafferty, 89 N. Y. 456; Littlefield v. Littlefield, 91 N. Y. 203.

¶2*82We have examined the record in vain for any evidence, introduced or offered, that these payments were made by the procurement of the defendant, or for him, or in his name, or that he ever ratified them as payments made for him or in his behalf. So far as appears, they were all made by the father on his own motion, and in his own behalf. The mere fact that after defendant knew that his father had made these payments he verbally promised to pay the balance would not amount to a ratification of the payments as having been made for him or in his behalf. Construed most favorably for the plaintiff, this was all that he offered to prove. Of course no verbal acknowledgment or promise is sufficient to take a case out of the operation of the statute. G-. S. 1894, § 5154.

¶3Order affirmed.

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