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68 N.C. App. 768

315 S.E.2d 731

Borders v. Newton

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1984-06-05

Relies on Marshall v. Miller · Hardy v. Toler · 47 N.C. App. 530 - Marshall v. Miller

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-06-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently August 2015 · most notably Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc. (1986), Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc. (1986)

24 state decisions

1801984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

HILL, Judge.

¶1 The plaintiffs first argue the court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of P. J. Newton and Newton Brothers Real Estate Company, contending there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider that the defendants committed fraud. We disagree. Although plaintiffs technically presented sufficient evidence of fraud, defendants were nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

¶2 In the present case, the same course of conduct gave rise to causes of action for fraud and unfair trade practices under G.S. 75-1.1. When the same course of conduct gives rise to a traditional cause of action as well as a cause of action for violation of G.S. 75-1.1, damages may be recovered either for the traditional cause of action or for violation of G.S. 75-1.1, but not both. Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 268 S.E. 2d 97 (1980), modified on other grounds and affirmed, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E. 2d 397 (1981). Having recovered treble damages for defendants’ violation of G.S. 75-1.1, plaintiffs were thereby barred from recovering additional damages for fraud. Id., see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E. 2d 342 (1975) (Huskins, J., concurring in result).

¶3 Plaintiffs contend the court erred in denying their claim for attorneys’ fees. The award of attorneys’ fees under G.S. 75-16.1 is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. We find no abuse of that discretion.

¶4*771 We have examined the remaining assignments brought forth by plaintiffs and find them without merit.

¶5 The judgment of the trial court is

¶6 Affirmed.

Judges WEBB and WHICHARD concur.
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