Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

68 N.H. 379

36 A 16

Stavers v. Philbrick

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Decided December 5, 1895

Supreme Court of New Hampshire · decided 1895-12-05

Writ oe Entry. Pacts agreed. September 7, 1882, the plaintiff took from Alfred Stayers a mortgage of the demanded premises, conditioned to be void if Alfred should pay his promissory note of even date for $5,000, save the plaintiff harmless from his indorsement of Alfred’s other note for $10,000, and “pay at maturity all sums for which said John [the plaintiff] may be liable as the indorser of said Alfred.” The two notes specially described were never executed.

Relies on Elliot v. Sleeper · Richards v. Merrimack & Connecticut River Railroad · New-Hampshire Bank v. Willard

Cited in Anderson (1889)’s definition of “Keep”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1895-12-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently October 1987

6 state decisions

201895190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Carpenter, J.

¶1 The execution and delivery of the mortgage upon one day and the mortgagee’s assumption on the next day of the liability which it was intended to secure, must be regarded as parts of the same transaction. Until the indorsement of the note by the plaintiff, the mortgage, though previously delivered, had no legal existence. It and the liability it was made to secure took effect at the same instant. The plaintiff’s obligation to pay *380 the $4,000 note was not “made of contracted after the execution and delivery of the mortgage,” within the meaning of the statute. P. S., c. 139, s. 3; Weed v. Barker, 35 N. H. 386, 388; Richards v. Railroad, 44 N. H. 127, 137, 138.

¶2 If the mortgage was intended to secure future advances or liabilities to be thereafter incurred, and it is broad enough in terms to cover them, it is not for that reason rendered invalid as a security for debts or liabilities existing at the time of its execution. North v. Crowell, 11 N. H. 251; Johnson v. Richardson, 38 N. H. 353, 355; Page v. Ordway, 40 N. H. 253; Abbott v. Thompson, 58 N. H. 255.

¶3 The plaintiff’s liability as indorser of the note for $4,000 is sufficiently described in the condition. Benton v. Sumner, 57 N. H. 117; Barker v. Barker, 62 N. H. 366.

¶4 The condition of the mortgage has not been performed. The renewal of the note, or the substitution of another like note in its place, was not a payment, in the absence of an agreement to that effect. The note for $6,000 is, to the extent of $4,000, a mere change in form of the original indebtedness, and the plaintiff’s liability thereon as indorser is to the same extent a renewal or continuation of his original liability. It may be considered that by the non-payment of the $4,000 note at its maturity, there was a breach of the condition of the mortgage that has not been satisfied; or that the mortgage subsists as a security for the plaintiff’s indorsement of the substituted note to the amount of $4,000. Whichever view is taken, the plaintiff' is entitled to a conditional judgment for the sum of $4,000. Elliott v. Sleeper, 2 N. H. 525; Bank v. Willard, 10 N. H. 210; Williams v. Little, 12 N. H. 29; Cutter v. Emery, 37 N. H. 567, 577; Strachn v. Foss, 42 N. H. 43; Weymouth v. Sanborn, 43 N. H. 171, 172; Ladd v. Dudley, 45 N. H. 61, 65; Wood v. Lord, 51 N. H. 448, 454.

¶5 After the foregoing opinion was prepared, an amendment of the case was furnished, stating that “ there was a note for $5,000 such as is described in the condition of the mortgage from Alfred ” to the plaintiff, and that it has been paid. Consistently with the facts stated in the amendment, the note may have been executed and delivered at the time when the indorsement of the $4,000 note was made. If such was the fact, the result would not be affected. What effect it might have if it were made and delivered with the mortgage on the previous day, we are not now required to determine. Stearns v. Bennett, 48 N. H. 400; Abbott v. Thompson, 58 N. H. 255; Fessenden v. Taft, 65 N. H. 39.

¶6 Judgment for the plaintiff.

All concurred.
/68/nh/379 · .json · Public domain