McConnell v. Dixon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In 54 Am.Juris., ‘Trusts,’ 167, Section 218 it is stated: ‘A constructive trust, or, as it frequently is called, a trust ex maleficio, ex delicto, a trust de son tort, or an involuntary or implied trust is a trust by operation of law which arises contrary to intention and in invi-tum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice.’ And in Section 219, page 169 of the same work it is stated: ‘A constructive trust is substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment. It is raised by equity in respect of property which has been acquired by fraud, or where, although acquired originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person holding it.’ Pomeroy, Equity, Jurisprudence, Volume 1, Section 155, page 210 states: ‘Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice, where there was no intention of the party to create such a relation. * * * If one party obtains the legal title to property, * * * in any * * * unconscien-tious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity ca”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fuller v. Fuller

2. ““ * * * 'We commend the expression of Mr. Justice Collard in Meyer v. Smith ( 3 Tex.Civ.App. 37 , 21 S.W. 995, 997 ): “Mere delay in repudiating will not, in our opinion, have the effect of ratifying. It would be evidence, along with other facts, from which if it should be unreasonable, the jury might infer that there was a ratification.’” In 2 C.J. 510 it is said that: ‘as a general rule mere silence or delay will not be conclusive of ratification unless the rights of innocent third persons have been prejudiced thereby.’ See also 2 C.J.S. Agency § 57, p. 1127. * * * ‘This principle has not always been distinctly or expressly announced by the courts, but we think that it will be found that, in almost every well-considered case in which it has been held that there was an implied ratification by silent and merely passive acquiescence, the facts brought the case within the rule substantially as we have stated it.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kover v. Hufsmith