¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶2This appeal presents the question whether the law imposes upon the plaintiff a different duty of care in discovering a cause of action involving fraud or fraudulent concealment on the part of a professional than in other cases where the discovery rule is applied — primarily causes of action for professional malpractice. We hold that in both kinds of cases the same standard of reasonable diligence under the circumstances applies. As in other eases where we apply the discovery rule, the inquiry is highly fact-bound. Thus, the character of material statements and nondisclosure by the defendant as well as the existence of a relationship of trust between the plaintiff and the defendant, which are usual in cases involving fraud or fraudulent concealment, are properly taken into account by the trier of fact in evaluating the reasonableness of plaintiffs diligence.
¶3In September 1989, appellant, Patrick H. Diamond filed a complaint against his former attorneys, members of the firm of McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe,
¶4The court affirms the judgment on the ground that, applying the discovery rule, the complaint was filed outside the three-year limitations period.
¶5I.
¶6Diamond’s Claim and the Record
¶7The gist of Diamond’s allegations is that McGuire, Woods conspired with Judge Robert R. Merhige of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to have Diamond convicted in the criminal prosecution for tax fraud. McGuire, Woods allegedly did that to aid its long-time clients, Reynolds Metals, Inc. and the Reynolds family. Judge Merhige was motivated, according to Diamond, by loyalty to the Reynolds family, who had supported his nomination to the federal bench by President Johnson and with whom Judge Merhige had business dealings. Judge Merhige and McGuire, Woods were connected by virtue of legal work that the firm had done over a number of years for Judge Merhige. The conviction could be expected to benefit Reynolds Metals because Diamond had sued Reynolds Metals in federal court, claiming that Reynolds Metals had wrongfully exercised control over Diamond’s former employer, Robertshaw Controls Co., and caused him to be fired from his positions as vice president in charge of finance and director of Robertshaw. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the felony conviction in the criminal prosecution for tax fraud, in which McGuire, Woods allegedly conspired with Judge Merhige, could be used to impeach Diamond’s credibility in the civil suit.
¶8The factual issues in this ease and the evidence bearing upon them may be placed in three categories. First, there are the largely uncontested facts concerning the timing of events in Diamond’s civil and criminal matters. Second, there are the sharply disputed facts regarding when and how much information McGuire, Woods disclosed to Diamond concerning the firm’s work for Reynolds Metals and members of the Reynolds family. Third, there are the closely related and equally disputed matters of how much Dia*367mond knew about the work McGuire, Woods was doing for Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family, and when he knew it, apart from whatever information McGuire, Woods may have disclosed.
¶9A.
¶10The Facts Not Contested by the Parties
¶11The following are the apparently undisputed facts concerning the timing of events in Diamond’s civil and criminal matters: In April 1983, Diamond retained McGuire, Woods to represent him in a tax dispute with the Internal Revenue Service. He did so because his accountants had suggested the name of a McGuire, Woods partner, appellee Carle E. Davis. The tax controversy appears to have stemmed from Diamond’s reporting of losses resulting from his trading of commodity futures and stock options in 1980 as ordinary business losses instead of capital losses, as he had for previous and subsequent years. United States v. Diamond, 788 F.2d 1025, 1026-27 (4th Cir.1986). Diamond’s principal defense, pressed unsuccessfully by his McGuire, Woods attorneys, was that Diamond lacked the requisite criminal intent in that he believed in good faith that because of the extent of his trading efforts in 1980, he was engaged in a business, notwithstanding the fact that his trades were entirely for his own account. Id. at 1028.
¶12In May 1984, while the tax matter was pending, Diamond filed a suit in federal court in Wilmington against his former employer, Robertshaw, along with Reynolds Metals, David P. Reynolds, and Ralph S. Thomas. David Reynolds was chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Reynolds Metals and also chairman of the board of directors of Robertshaw. Ralph Thomas was a member of the board of directors of Reynolds Metals and president and chief executive officer of Robertshaw. In the suit, Diamond contended that Reynolds Metals, Reynolds and Thomas had conspired to acquire control of Robertshaw, while rebuffing other corporate suitors willing to pay a substantial premium over the price at which stock in Ro-bertshaw ordinarily traded. As part of an effort to acquire and preserve control over Robertshaw, Diamond contended that the defendants in the civil suit caused Robertshaw to fire him in November 1983.
¶13Meanwhile, Davis’s efforts to resolve the tax matter without criminal charges were unsuccessful and a trial appeared likely. At a May 1, 1985 meeting, Davis introduced Diamond to the two McGuire, Woods attorneys who would handle the criminal trial, appellee J. Waller Harrison and Roger Fry-drychowski. The case was ultimately assigned for trial to Judge Merhige. After receiving advice from his attorneys that a bench trial by Judge Merhige might be advantageous, Diamond waived his right to a jury. The case was tried to Judge Merhige, on September 27, 1985. Judge Merhige convicted Diamond of all the charges.
¶14Diamond ultimately retained McGuire, Woods to handle the appeal as well. On March 6, 1986, Frydrychowski argued the appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court affirmed the conviction in a published opinion dated April 22, 1986. Diamond, supra.Diamond then served a sentence in a federal facility in Danbury, Connecticut, and was released January 22, 1987. On September 19,1989, Diamond commenced this lawsuit in the Superior Court against defendants Davis, Harrison and several dozen other partners of McGuire, Woods, claiming that they conspired with each other and Judge Merhige to have Diamond convicted of tax fraud.
¶15B.
¶16Who Told Diamond What and When?
¶17Although the question of McGuire, Woods’s disclosures to Diamond is sharply disputed, the fact of the firm’s long-standing representation of Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family is not. In their answer to Diamond’s complaint, the appellees conceded that at the same time McGuire, Woods was representing Diamond in the tax matter, it also represented Reynolds Metals in “one or two” federal suits pending in Richmond. In a deposition, Davis testified that McGuire, Woods had been handling “special matters” for Reynolds Metals for many years before Diamond became a client. Harrison, a part*368ner at McGuire, Woods, testified that he learned of the firm’s representation of Reynolds Metals within a year or two of starting work at the firm. Frydrychowski testified to working on a Reynolds Metals matter while working on Diamond’s case. In an affidavit submitted in opposition to McGuire, Woods’s summary judgment motion, Diamond avers that a report by Reynolds Metals’ accountant shows that the company paid McGuire, Woods a million dollars while the firm was representing Diamond in his tax matter. The appellees have not produced any evidence controverting that figure.
¶18Central to Diamond’s claims, with respect to both the merits of his action and the time it accrued, is his contention that McGuire, Woods never informed him that it also represented Reynolds Metals. In a deposition, Diamond testified that in June 1984, Davis mentioned during a phone call that he had seen an article in the Wall Street Journal about Diamond’s civil action against Reynolds Metals, David Reynolds, Thomas and Robertshaw. In that same deposition, Diamond testified that it was not until spring 1985 that Davis first told him that he had prepared some tax returns for David Reynolds. Diamond denies that anyone at McGuire, Woods ever informed him that the firm had done work for Reynolds Metals or for other members of the Reynolds family.
¶19Diamond contends that he did not learn that McGuire, Woods had ever represented Reynolds Metals until November 1986, when he received, while incarcerated, a document filed by Reynolds Metals with the Securities and Exchange Commission during the previous month. He did not learn that there had been a simultaneous representation until early 1987, when he received a docket sheet from the federal district court in Richmond.
¶20The appellees take a different position on the disclosure issue. In his deposition, Davis testified that he did not learn that Diamond had a civil suit against Reynolds Metals until the complaint in the instant action was served on him in November 1989. Harrison stated during his deposition that he had told Diamond several times that McGuire, Woods had long represented Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family. He made those disclosures in response to Diamond’s repeated attempts to discuss the civil matter with him, which he refused. In his deposition, Diamond specifically denied that Harrison had ever informed him of the representation or that Harrison had ever refused to discuss his civil suit.
¶21Harrison also testified that Frydrychowski came to him a couple of months before the September 1985 criminal trial for tax fraud to ask whether the simultaneous representation of Diamond and Reynolds Metals was a problem. As he recalls, he told Frydrychow-ski that he did not think there was a conflict, but that he would consider the matter. For his part, Frydrychowski recalls bringing the matter to Harrison’s attention, but remembers Harrison indicating that it had been taken care of by the partnership. Frydry-chowski testified that he personally never told Diamond of McGuire, Woods’s representation of Reynolds Metals.
¶22Also pertinent to the disclosure issue is a meeting that took place on October 22, 1985, shortly after Diamond’s criminal trial. The purpose of the meeting was apparently so that Diamond’s criminal and civil counsel could discuss the advisability of an appeal in the criminal matter, as well as coordinate their respective efforts. Diamond, Harrison and Frydrychowski were present at the meeting, as were Harold E. Kohn and William Prickett, who were representing Diamond in his civil action.
¶23Harrison testified that at the meeting, he told either Kohn or Prickett or both that he could not discuss the civil matter because Reynolds Metals was McGuire, Woods’s client. Prickett, however, had no recollection of being told that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals, although he thought at the time of his deposition that it would have been important to him. Frydrychowski also *369did not recall any disclosure of the representation at the meeting. He testified that he left the October 22 meeting with a sense of the status of the civil suit because Diamond, Kohn and Prickett were “thinking out loud among themselves.” The record does not contain any evidence concerning Kohn's recollections of the meeting.
¶24C.
¶25McGuire, Woods’ Evidence
¶26The appellees based their motion for summary judgment on what they contended were undisputed facts concerning Diamond’s prior knowledge of McGuire, Woods’ simultaneous representation of Reynolds Metals. Specifically, they asserted that it was undisputed that Diamond knew more than three years before the date on which he filed his complaint that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals.
¶27The appellees relied principally on three documents that they had recently discovered in the files of Diamond’s civil attorneys, arguing that in light of those documents, Diamond’s statements denying such knowledge “are now known to be false.” The first document contains handwritten notes of a telephone conversation between Diamond and William B. Lytton, one of the attorneys representing him in his action against Reynolds Metals. The pertinent notes state:
IRS problem
[illegible] losses as Trade or Business Ordinary Losses.
difference of @ $50,000.
Carle Davis — Richmond, Va.
McGuire, Woods & Battle (also rep Reynolds Metals)
OK for us to talk w/ them.
¶28Lytton testified that the notes were in his handwriting. Although the notes appeared in the file between documents dated June 15, 1984 and August 9, 1984, Lytton could not say when the conversation took place or when he took the notes. He said he knew that he had spoken with Diamond about his tax problem, but he could not recall the particular conversation leading to the notes quoted above.
¶29The second document the appellees relied on is a letter Diamond sent to Kohn, who had represented Diamond in the action against Reynolds Metals, two weeks before the meeting in Washington between Diamond’s civil and criminal counsel:
Oct. 7,1985
Dear Harold,
I enjoyed the opportunity last Thursday to sit down with you and your associates and to bring you up to date on the new development in Richmond.
Although I of course agree with you that it is a setback (unless the Wilmington Jury believes the defendants had a part in it), I think we should view it in a wider context.
Since we first met in January, 1984 and I told you the story, we have had nothing but good news in the case:
[[Image here]]
We have ordered an expedited trial transcript [in the criminal case] and are now faced with the appeal process.
McGuire, Woods & Battle did a very good job at the trial, my problem wasn’t with them but with the judge.
On the appeal, we’ll have to point out evidence of bias by Merighe [sic], one of only 3 U.S. district court judges who sit in Richmond and possibly an inference of outside influence (Robertshaw or Reynolds).
Since these two items might cause problems for a firm that has to deal with Merighe [sic] every day and which represents Reynolds, would you consider it more effective if you take an active part in the appeal process, perhaps even arguing the appeal yourself?
Please let me know what your thoughts are on this subject.
¶30(emphasis added).
¶31The final document the appellees relied on accompanied a letter dated March 21, 1986 sent by Diamond to Kohn and Prickett. The letter addressed “certain information concerning Judge Robert Reynold [sic] Merhige which has just come to my attention.” One of those items of information was that Judge Merhige had been an executor of the estate of a member of the Reynolds family, J. Sar-*370geant Reynolds.
¶32In connection with his opposition to summary judgment, Diamond filed an affidavit attempting to explain how those documents could be consistent with his claim that he did not know that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals. With respect to Lytton’s notes, Diamond stated that he had spoken with Lytton and told him that he thought he was “well represented, and that my lawyer was Carle E. Davis of McGuire Woods, who must know his tax stuff because he’d done Reynolds’ taxes.” Diamond said in his affidavit that he thought he had specified “David Reynolds,” but was not certain because he would use the term “Reynolds” to refer to David Reynolds or Reynolds Metals or both. He explained that “in my mind, at least, Reynolds Metals was simply an extension of David Reynolds.” He further stated that he was sure he had never before seen nor been offered the opportunity to review Lytton’s notes. He specifically denied telling Lytton that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals.
¶33With regard to the October 7, 1985 letter, Diamond explained in his affidavit that he was concerned that if McGuire, Woods were to argue the bias issue on appeal, it might appear that Davis had acquired the ammunition through the tax work he did for both David Reynolds and Judge Merhige. He also appeared to say that he thought the vigor with which McGuire, Woods would press the issue might understandably be dampened by the fact that it had to practice before Judge Merhige every day. Diamond’s opposition and affidavit do not address the probate documents nor the two articles concerning Judge Merhige.
¶34II.
¶35The Legal Standard
¶36What constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law. See, e.g., Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College, 518 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C.1986). When accrual actually occurred in a particular case is a question of fact. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C.1984). We first address the legal question.
¶37The parties dispute the legal standard to be applied in determining when Diamond’s causes of action accrued. Diamond contends that McGuire, Woods’s fraud and fraudulent concealment of its wrongdoing delayed accru*371al of his cause of action until such time as he had something close to actual notice of that cause of action. He relies on several cases decided by the federal courts of this jurisdiction, starting -with Hobson v. Wilson, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 253, 255 n. 113, 737 F.2d 1, 35, 37 n. 113 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1843, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985). Under that line of cases, according to Diamond, “a defendant who has engaged in fraudulent concealment, in order to make out a defense based on the plaintiffs lack of due diligence, must show something closer to actual notice than the merest inquiry notice that would be sufficient to set the statute of limitations running in a situation untainted by fraudulent concealment.” Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 275 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 373, 866 F.2d 1480, 1491 (1989); see also Jones v. Meridian Towers Apts., 816 F.Supp. 762, 770-71 (D.D.C.1993) (describing Riddellas imposing a “heightened notice” standard for fraud cases). Based on those eases, Diamond contends that the limitations period could not have begun to run until he had “something closer to actual notice” of his cause of action. According to Diamond, only such a quantum of information could trigger a duty to investigate further McGuire, Woods’s role in his conviction.
¶38The appellees, on the other hand, contend that the same discovery rule we have announced for actions based on legal malpractice applies, regardless of any fraud or fraudulent concealment.
¶39Before turning to our discussion, we pause to set out an analytical framework and to *372define some critical terms. Common to both approaches are the ideas that (1) the statute of limitations in eases such as this begins to run when a plaintiff either has actual knowledge of a cause of action or is for some reason charged with knowledge of that cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has some duty to investigate to determine possible causes of action; and (3) if a plaintiff has not acquired actual knowledge of a cause of action only because of his failure to meet that duty to investigate, the plaintiff is nevertheless charged with that knowledge. The parties do not agree on (a) the level of actual or chargeable knowledge required to begin the running of the statute of limitations; or (b) the scope of the duty to investigate, which is sometimes expressed in two segments: (i) the quantum of knowledge required to trigger the duty to investigate, and (ii) the amount of diligence that must be exercised in conducting the investigation once it is triggered.
¶40For the sake of clarity, we use the term “notice” to refer to the quantum of knowledge required to commence the running of the statute of limitations in a particular case. There are two types of notice: “actual notice” is that notice which a plaintiff actually possesses; “inquiry notice” is that notice which a plaintiff would have possessed after due investigation. Cf. Clay Properties v. Washington Post Co., 604 A.2d 890, 895 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (defining terms in context of buyer’s knowledge of preexisting interest in real property). As we use the term, inquiry notice does not refer to the amount of information that triggers a duty to investigate, as suggested by Riddell, which we consider to be confusing. We prefer to place the term “inquiry notice” in parallel with “actual notice,” with both referring to the notice that starts the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, as we use the terms, in a given ease, both actual notice and inquiry notice of a cause of action are acquired by a plaintiff at a particular time; at what time either exists is a question of fact. Once either actual or inquiry notice is present, however, the statute of limitations begins to run as a matter of law.
¶41Under settled authority binding on this division, a plaintiff alleging fraudulent conduct by the defendant has a duty at all times to investigate matters affecting her affairs in a manner that is reasonable under the circumstances. The standard articulated in Riddell, requiring “something closer to actual notice,” has not, however, been addressed in any decision binding upon us, and we consider it on its merits. We decline to adopt the standard in Riddellas inconsistent with decisions that are binding upon us and the policies that motivate our accrual rules. We conclude instead that what constitutes notice of a cause of action for accrual purposes in cases such as this involving fraud, is the same as that which obtains in nonfraud cases, see Knight, supra note 4; Bussineau, supra.In all cases to which the discovery rule applies the inquiry is highly fact-bound and requires an evaluation of all of the plaintiff’s circumstances.
¶42A.
¶43The Discovery Rule and Inquiry Notice
¶44A review of the cases from this jurisdiction binding upon us demonstrates that a cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff has either actual notice of her cause of action or is deemed to be on inquiry notice because if she had met her duty to act reasonably under the circumstances in investigating matters affecting her affairs, such an investigation, if conducted, would have led to actual notice. What is “reasonable under the circumstances” is a highly factual analysis. The relevant circumstances include, but are not limited to, the conduct and misrepresentations of the defendant, and the reasonableness of the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant’s conduct and misrepresentations. Under our eases, the relevant facts may be such that it may be reasonable to conduct no investigation at all. Thus, whether an exhaustive investigation would have uncovered the claim is not necessarily relevant, unless the only reasonable investigation under the circumstances would have been an exhaustive one.
¶45The first reported case in which a court of this jurisdiction applied a tolling rule was *373Moses v. Taylor, 17 D.C. (6 Mackey) 255 (1888). In Moses, the plaintiff had lent the defendant certain bonds issued by the District of Columbia, so that the defendant could use them as collateral in obtaining another loan. Id. at 264. The defendant sold the bonds and retained the proceeds. Id.Although the lawsuit was filed after the statute of limitations had expired if counted from the time of the sale, it would be timely filed if the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff learned of the sale. Id. at 269, 279. The court held:
It is sufficient for us to say ... that while there is a conflict of authorities among the States, the Supreme Court has sufficiently stated its opinion that in the federal courts, either at law or in equity, [the plaintiffs tolling argument] is a valid [response] to the plea of the Statute of Limitations; that is to say, it holds it to be a good answer that the plaintiff did not bring his action sooner because the accruing of the cause of action had been concealed from him fraudulently by the defendant and therefore the statute ought not to run against him, except from the discovery of the wrong.
¶47The opinion does not cite the Supreme Court authority to which it alludes; however, in the reported argument of counsel, the plaintiff relied upon a line of cases starting with Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875). In Bailey, the Court described the doctrine of tolling for fraud as “the proposition that where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.” Id. at 348 (emphasis added). The Court held that the rule applied to cases in both law and in equity,
were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had been satisfied, transferred, or extinguished, if they ever did exist. To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure.
¶49In the same year that Moseswas decided, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in Jackson v. Combs, 18 D.C. (7 Mackey) 608 (1888), rejected a plaintiffs attempt to invoke the tolling rule. In Jackson, the plaintiff’s assignor had assisted the defendant in pressing a claim for compensation against the United States. Id.Prior to a final decision, the defendant expressed a desire to switch representatives. Id. at 609. Because the defendant had agreed to a contingency arrangement, the defendant agreed to compensate plaintiffs assignor by giving him a note payable upon the defendant’s receiving compensation from the government. Id.The defendant’s claim was ultimately allowed; however, the plaintiff did not learn of that fact until after the limitations period had run. Id. at 610. The court held that because the instrument imposed upon its maker no duty to inform the creditor of satisfaction of the condition precedent, and the note maker employed no artifice or misrepresentation to conceal the cause of action, there was no tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 612-13. Although not so explained in the opinion, the rationale appears to be that the plaintiff had no reasonable basis to rely on the maker to inform him of his cause of action; thus, as a matter of law, the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in protecting his rights. Id.
¶50*374Soon after Mosesand Jackson, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in an appeal from an equitable decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in which the Court addressed the diligence required of a plaintiff in a fraud action, where the defendant contends that the suit is untimely. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 518-19, 9 S.Ct. 594, 598, 32 L.Ed. 1005 (1889). The plaintiffs in Kilboum contended that the defendants, their agents for the purchase of real estate, had failed to disclose their interest in certain property the plaintiffs had purchased through the defendants. In addressing the defendants’ contention that the suit was barred by laches and the statute of limitations,' the Court said:
Reasonable diligence is of course essential to invoking the activity of the court, but what constitutes such diligence depends upon the facts of the particular case. Where a party injured by fraud is in ignorance of its existence, the duty to commence proceedings arises only upon discovery- We hold that the complainants moved with sufficient promptness upon discovering the fraud, and that although, reposing confidence in their agents, they may have neglected availing themselves of some source of knowledge they might have sought, the defendants cannot be allowed to say that complainants ought to have suspected them, and are chargeable with what they might have found out upon inquiry aroused by such suspicion.
¶52Thus, the Court expressly considered the question of reasonable diligence to turn on the facts of the particular case, including the confidence reposed by the plaintiff in the defendant.
¶53The next reported appellate case applying the discovery rule is Lewis v. Denison, 2 App.D.C. 387 (1894). Like Kilboum, Lewis concerned a real estate agent who breached his duty of loyalty to the plaintiff. Id. at 388. The agent had secretly represented both the plaintiff as seller and a third party as buyer in a transaction. Id. at 388-89. The defendant agent told the buyer that the plaintiff seller had agreed to a high price while telling the seller that the buyer had agreed to a low price. The real estate agent in fact pocketed the difference. Id.
¶54In Lewis, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was more precise in explaining the scope of the plaintiffs duty than the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had been in Mosesand Jackson. In reversing judgment as a matter of law for the defendant on statute of limitations grounds, the court said that “the bar of the statute of limitations will not commence to run in equity until the fraud has been discovered, or until such time as by the use of ordinary care it might reasonably have been discovered.” Id. at 391. The court further explained that the plaintiff bore the burden
¶55In P.H. Sheehy Co. v. Eastern Importing & Manufacturing Co., 44 App.D.C. 107 (1915), the court again applied the discovery rule, this time to what we later explained was a “constructive fraud.” Poole v. Terminix Co., 84 A.2d 699 (D.C.Mun.App.1951) (rejecting tolling in action for breach of implied warranty), aff'd, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 287, 200 F.2d 746 (1952), receded from in Ehrenhaft, supra, 483 A.2d at 1203 n. 17 (adopting discovery rule for contract and negligence actions). But see Adrian v. American Security & Trust Co., 211 A.2d 771 (D.C.1965) (rejecting claim of “constructive fraud” where bank merely negligently cashed unendorsed treasurer’s check payable to plaintiff). In P.H. Sheehy, the claimant, a wholesale grocer, complained that canned sardines it bought from the respondent were below the quality of the agreed exemplar. The claimant had not, however, discovered the poor quality until it received complaints from the retailers to which it subsequently sold the sardines. The suit would be untimely if the statute of limitations were to run from receipt of the sardines, but timely if the statute of limitations began to run from the retailers’ complaints.
¶56The court said that under those facts, “[t]he cause should have been submitted to the jury, with an instruction to the effect that the statute of limitations only began to run from the time when plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary diligence under all the circumstances of the case, ought to have ascertained the fact of the breach of the warranty.” 44 App.D.C. at 112. The court reasoned, “It cannot be said that a person should assert a right before he has knowledge of, or is chargeable with knowledge of, the [right].” The court explained that the claimant “must ordinarily have had such opportunity to ascertain his position as would be sufficient in the case of a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence under the circumstances of the case. He must be diligent in informing himself upon the true state of affairs, culpable ignorance being offensive both in equity and at law.” Id.(emphasis added).
¶57In cases binding on us, courts have repeated the ordinary, reasonable or due diligence standard first suggested by Mosesand Jacksonand then refined in Lewisand P.H. Sheehy.
¶58Thus, decisions binding on us hold that a plaintiff guilty of ordinary negligence in not *376earlier discovering a cause of action may not avoid the bar of the statute of limitations merely because a fraud or fraudulent concealment is involved. See Doolin v. Environmental Power Ltd., 360 A.2d 493, 497 (D.C. 1976) (holding that because alleged fraud related only to the legal interpretation of terms of a document conveying interest in land, the “alleged misrepresentation, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been ascertained at th[e] time” of the alleged fraud); Maddox, supra,160 A.2d at 800 (“[F]raud ... is not discovered when one’s prior knowledge is confirmed as correct by another.”); cf. Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 316 & n. 4, 414 F.2d 1210, 1212 & n. 4 (1969) (holding that there could be no tolling -because “[n]o person ... could reasonably rely on the representations allegedly made by or on behalf of’ the defendants). For example, in DistricP-Florida Corp. v. Penny, 62 App.D.C. 268, 269, 66 F.2d 794, 795 (1933), the court held that the plaintiff, who alleged he had been defrauded in a land transaction, was, as matter of law, on notice of the fraud because the information showing the fraud was available in the public land records at the time of the purchase. Under our prior decisions, the presence of a fraudulent misrepresentation does not excuse the injured party from acting reasonably to protect her interests.
¶59In evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiffs diligence, cases from this jurisdiction have long taken into account the confidential or fiducial relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. See Kilbourn, supra, 130 U.S. at 518-19, 9 S.Ct. at 598 (“although, reposing confidence in their agents, [the complainants] may have neglected availing themselves of some source of knowledge ..., the defendants cannot be allowed to say that complainants ought to have suspected them, and are chargeable with what they might have found out upon inquiry aroused by such suspicion”); Emmett, supra note 8, 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 55-57, 396 F.2d at 936-38 (holding that hospital’s improper refusal to release records to patient’s next of kin may toll statute); Searl v. Earll, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 156, 221 F.2d 24, 28-29 (1954) (holding that loan broker working on commission owed fiducial duty to borrower and therefore committed fraud by failing to disclose that lender was broker’s wife); Young v. Howard, 73 App.D.C. 340, 341, 120 F.2d 712, 713 (1941) (“The trustees [of a deed of trust securing a note held by the Bank] owed the Bank the continuing obligation of keeping it informed of action upon their part that would prejudice its rights.”). In evaluating the plaintiffs diligence, we have also taken into account deceptive actions on the part of the defendant, regardless of disclosures actually made. See William J. Davis, Inc., supra, 412 A.2d at 1193 (holding that information on plaintiffs pay stub did not place plaintiff on notice of wage claim in light of “positive steps” defendant employer took to lull and conceal cause of action from plaintiff).
¶60In none of those cases, however, did the court find it necessary to articulate a standard greater than negligence as part of the discovery rule that applies in actions where the cause of action has been concealed from the plaintiff by some wrongful conduct. Diamond, however, contends that we should adopt a rule that appears to demand less than reasonable care from the plaintiff where the plaintiff has been the victim of fraud. In the next section, we reject his suggestion.
¶61B.
¶62The “Heightened Notice” Standard (or “Something Closer to Actual Notice”)
¶63To support his contention that the standard of care imposed upon a plaintiff is lessened where the defendant is guilty of an act of fraud, Diamond points us principally to Riddell, supra,275 U.S.App.D.C. at 373, 866 F.2d at 1491. Riddellinvolved both federal and D.C. law and treated the two as identical. “The elements of fraudulent concealment [for tolling purposes] are the same, moreover (at least insofar as relevant to the facts of this case), in both federal and District of Columbia law.” Id.The court in Riddellcontrasted “mere inquiry notice,” which it said was sufficient to start the statute of limitations in the absence of fraud, with the amount of information required to trigger the plaintiff’s duty of diligence where *377there is such fraud, which it characterized as “something closer to actual notice.” Id. Riddell was incorrect as to District of Columbia law, as discussed in the previous section, and we find unpersuasive its application of federal law.
¶64The Riddell court relied on its decision in Hobson, supra,237 U.S.App.D.C. at 253, 737 F.2d at 35. Hobsondoes not, however, stand for the proposition stated in Riddell. The court in Hobsondid not address the plaintiffs’ exercise of due diligence, but relied on the jury’s finding that the plaintiffs did not fail to exercise due diligence. Hobson, 237 U.S.App.D.C. at 253, 737 F.2d at 35. The Hobsoncourt rejected whatever challenge there was to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning due diligence, stating,
When a plaintiff receives information sufficient to put him on inquiry notice, the statute of limitations will begin to run if the plaintiff does not reasonably exercise due diligence in conducting the inquiry. In other words, he is held to be on notice of all facts he could have learned through reasonably diligent inquiry. In this case, defendants, who had the burden of proving plaintiffs’ lack of due diligence, offered no evidence of what plaintiffs could have done to find out more about their claims, short of filing suit. As a result, the motions for directed verdict were properly denied if based on the plaintiffs’ failure of diligence, and the jury’s ruling is clearly reasonable.
¶65Id.at 253 n. 107, 737 F.2d at 35 n. 107.
¶66Instead, the Hobsoncourt addressed what it termed a proposition “often overlooked”: “The doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not come into play, whatever the lengths to which a defendant has gone to conceal the wrongs, if a plaintiff is on notice of a potential claim.” Id. at 253, 737 F.2d at 35.
¶67The Hobsoncourt discussed the evidence that it held showed as a matter of law that some of the plaintiffs had notice of their cause of action. In each case, the court based its decision on evidence of what the plaintiff actually knew, not what he should have known. Id. at 258, 737 F.2d at 40. The plaintiffs were held to have actual notice of the cause of action, in the sense that they actually knew facts sufficient to require them to bring their action. In the face of such actual notice, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment “d[id] not come into play” to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 253, 737 F.2d at 35.
¶68Hobson, in other words, does not provide a foundation for Riddell’s change in the discovery rule standard for cases involving fraud or fraudulent concealment. Thus, we turn to the reasoning in Riddell.
¶69Riddellattempted to justify its “more stringent standard” in the following passage:
The fraudulent concealment by its nature makes discovery of the true facts more difficult, in part because it obscures the significance of such information as comes to plaintiffs attention. Furthermore, the concealing defendant lacks the equity to command easier access to the defense, especially in view of the inherent evidentiary difficulty of determining whether particular but isolated facts should have put the plaintiff on inquiry notice of his claim.
¶70Riddell, supra,275 U.S.App.D.C. at 373, 866 F.2d at 1491.
¶71Thus, Riddellproffers three grounds on which to lessen the plaintiff’s duty of care: first, that the defendant’s actions have made the plaintiff’s task more difficult; second, that the defendant “lacks the equity” to benefit from his misconduct; third, that it is difficult to ascertain the reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct where the facts are murky or disjointed. We do not consider that these grounds justify departing from the long-used and workable discovery rule standard in favor of adopting a new “something closer to actual notice” standard.
¶72That a defendant’s actions obscured the relevant facts from a plaintiff is more appropriately taken into account as part of the circumstances to be considered in examining the reasonableness of the plaintiffs diligence. As we have noted in non-fraud cases to which we have applied the discovery rule, a factor to be considered in the discovery analysis is the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant’s expertise. Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1202; Burns, supra,409 A.2d at 617. As discussed above, we believe similar considerations come into play in fraud cases. See e.g. Kilbourn, *378supra 130 U.S. at 519, 9 S.Ct. at 598. The degree of reasonable reliance is likely to vary greatly from case to case. For example, where the plaintiff and defendant had been in a close, confidential relationship, the degree of reasonable reliance is likely to be much greater — and the reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff much less — than would exist where the parties had been in an adversary relationship.
¶73Riddell⅛ second policy argument is based on the defendants’ “lack of equity.” This court, however, has implicitly rejected the suggestion that the purpose of the tolling rule is to redress misconduct; the culpability of the defendant is immaterial. See Keener v. Walker, 256 A.2d 779, 781 (D.C.1969) (holding that even innocent misrepresentation, which was all that was alleged, could toll statute); Hodde v. Chaney, 139 A.2d 510, 512 (D.C.Mun.App.1958) (holding that action based on innocent misrepresentation tolled statute until discovery of defendant’s mistake). Indeed, in P.H. Sheehy, supra,the emphasis was on the rights of the plaintiff who acts reasonably, not on the misconduct of the defendant:
It cannot be said that a person should assert a right before he has knowledge of, or is chargeable with knowledge of, the same. He must ordinarily have had such opportunity to ascertain his position as would be sufficient in the case of a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence under the circumstances of the case.
¶7444 App.D.C. at 111. But cf. Peyser v. Owen, 73 App.D.C. 64, 65, 116 F.2d 298 (1940) (affirming dismissal of complaint as to negligent bank directors, where complaint did not allege that the appellee directors had profited from or concealed predecessor directors’ fraud the appellee directors’ negligently failed to detect).
¶75We think that a focus on the plaintiffs diligence, rather than on the defendant’s misconduct, is more appropriate given the purpose of statutes of limitation to protect defendants from stale claims — whether they be for fraud or other breaches of duty. In cases not involving fraud, we have emphasized balancing the right of the plaintiff to a remedy against the right of the defendant to be free of stale claims. Farris, supra note 9, 652 A.2d at 59, Ehrenhaft, supra,483 A.2d at 1202; Burns, supra,409 A.2d at 616. Because we strike a balance between plaintiffs and defendant’s interests whether the case involves fraud or not, there should not be any distinction in the standard of diligence required in either case. The passage of time makes it just as difficult for the defendant to prove the plaintiffs knowledge and lack of *379diligence in bringing a claim as it does to disprove meritless allegations. We do not think it appropriate to protect those careless of their rights at the expense of the right of the party accused to defend herself.
¶76The final ground offered by Riddell— that the reasonableness inquiry is too difficult where fraud is present — is not persuasive. We daily entrust to judge and jury the task of assessing the bounds of reasonable conduct in every manner of human endeavor. If, as is increasingly the case, the area is one beyond the ken of the average juror (or judge), then the parties must produce expert evidence to assist them in understanding the field. We think that there is no material distinction where the question is whether a plaintiff were reasonable in her investigation of matters affecting her affairs. Moreover, to the extent the Riddellcourt was concerned with the evidentiary difficulties posed to the parties, its concern was misplaced. The plaintiff is well-situated to discourse upon the scope of her knowledge concerning her cause of action; the defendant will likely prefer to litigate what the plaintiff should have known, as well as what the plaintiff did know, regardless of the evidentiary difficulties posed by the counterfaetual inquiry. Finally, it is not clear why the presence of fraud would make the hypothetical inquiry significantly more difficult than it is in other cases to which the discovery rule applies. Consequently, we reject the “it’s too hard” rationale as well.
¶77C.
¶78The Ingredients of Notice
¶79Up to this point we have not addressed what constitutes knowledge of a “cause of action.” Because prior decisions state the discovery rule with actual and inquiry notice in parallel — “knew or should have known”— it is clear that the facts sufficient to constitute knowledge of a cause of action are the same whether we are concerned with actual or inquiry notice. No case binding upon us, however, explicitly addresses in the context of an action involving fraud or fraudulent concealment what facts are sufficient to constitute such knowledge.
¶80In cases not involving fraud, we have addressed those facts that are legally sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice and start the period of limitations running. In Bussineau, supra,518 A.2d at 425, we said that there were three elements to the requisite knowledge: (1) an injury; (2) its cause in fact; and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. We noted that the discovery rule applies where “the relationship between the fact of injury and the alleged tortious conduct is obscure when the injury occurs.” Id. But see Farris, supra note 9, 652 A.2d at 55 (reversing dismissal on statute of limitations grounds where plaintiff alleged she had repressed memory of defendant’s sexual battery during her minority, while noting that there was no allegation that plaintiff did not know of abuse or its wrongfulness at the time of its occurrence). We observed that in many cases, knowledge of the cause in fact of an injury will be tantamount to knowledge of tortious conduct. Bussineau, supra,518 A.2d at 426. We also said, however, that there are
more difficult cases ... where the injury and cause-in-fact do not themselves provide evidence of negligence. This is particularly so when the professional reassures the lay client or patient that all is well and that things are proceeding as they should.
¶82In holding that knowledge of wrongdoing was required, we cited two considerations: (1) it is inconsistent with notions of justice to interpret accrual to occur before the plaintiff would reasonably know of any wrongdoing, id. at 428, and (2) an accrual rule that did not require knowledge of wrongdoing would encourage the filing of unfounded claims by plaintiffs seeking to protect their unknown rights. Id. at 431.
¶83Although Bussineauwas a medical malpractice action, we have since held that the quantum of knowledge required to trigger accrual is the same in legal malpractice cases. Knight, supra note 4, 553 A.2d at 1234. Bussineauitself noted that we had required knowledge of -wrongdoing in a case involving tort and contract claims. Bussineau, supra,518 A.2d at 428 (citing Ehrenhaft, supra,483 A.2d at 1202). We think *380that the reasoning of Bussineau, as interpreted and applied in subsequent eases has equal force in the context of fraud claims, where the relationship between the fact of injury and the tortious conduct may similarly be obscured, requiring, in addition, “some evidence of wrongdoing.” Id.Hence, we hold that the same knowledge requirement we have adopted in malpractice actions applies in cases involving fraud.
¶84That holding does not end the matter, for the standard of “some evidence of wrongdoing” is far from a precise one. In this ease, there remains one question regarding the requisite quantum of knowledge that must be resolved before we undertake to apply the law to the facts of this case: whether a plaintiffs knowledge of misconduct by one alleged coconspirator places the plaintiff on notice of claims against the other coconspirator. As we have not addressed that issue, we look for guidance from the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 84, 553 F.2d 220, 229 (D.C.Cir.1977), and Richards, supra note 10, 213 U.S.App.D.C. at 224-25, 662 F.2d at 69, the court held that the plaintiffs knowledge of wrongdoing on the part of one defendant did not cause accrual of his action against another, unknown defendant responsible for the same harm, unless the two defendants were closely connected, such as in a superior-subordinate relationship.
¶85We adopt the Circuit’s approach with the understanding that whether the relationship of the defendants is sufficiently close to cause accrual should generally be considered as a question of fact which may be imputed to the plaintiff by the same standard of reasonable diligence under the circumstances. In some circumstances, however, the relationship of the defendants, together with other facts, may establish as a matter of law that a reasonable plaintiff with knowledge of the misconduct of one would have conducted an investigation as to the other. If that investigation would, as a matter of law, have revealed some evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the other defendant, then the cause of action will have accrued as to both.
¶86D.
¶87A Single Standard for All Discovery Rule Cases
¶88We have in the past suggested that the discovery rule in cases involving fraud and fraudulent concealment is the same as in other cases to which a discovery rule ap*381plies.
¶89III.
¶90Summary Judgment
¶91When seeking summary judgment,
¶92[t]he moving party bears the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of a material factual dispute and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets its burden, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to show that such an issue exists in order to defeat the motion. However, if the moving party does not meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied even where the opponent comes forth with nothing. Sherman v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 866, 869 (D.C.1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
¶93We view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C.1994) (en banc). On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the record applying the same standard as the trial court. Id.; West End Tenants Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 725 (D.C.1994); see also Knight, supra note 4, 553 A.2d at 1233 (reviewing summary judgment on statute of limitations issue); Bussineau, supra,518 A.2d at 427 (same).
¶94This is where I part company with both my colleagues, because I believe that, on this record, summary judgment was improper. First, the record reflects genuine issues of material fact; second, application of the discovery rule standard to the undisputed facts does not entitle defendants to judgment as a matter of law on statute of limitations grounds. Thus, I would reverse and remand to the trial court.
¶95A.
¶96The Facts of Record for Purposes of Summary Judgment
¶97Construing the record in the light most favorable to Diamond, who opposes summary judgment, the following facts are deemed to be true for purposes of the summary judgment motion:
1. In April 1983, Davis began to represent Diamond in the federal tax fraud matter.
2. In spring 1985, Davis told Diamond that he had done some tax work for David Reynolds.
3. No one at McGuire, Woods ever told Diamond that McGuire, Woods had long done extensive legal work for Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family.
*3824. McGuire, Woods in fact had done extensive legal work for Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family, including work for the company worth about a million dollars while the firm represented Diamond.
5. Davis believed that the fact that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family was material information that should have been disclosed to Diamond.
6. Harrison and Frydrychowski had reason to believe that the fact that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family was material information that should have been disclosed to Diamond.
7. Diamond had no knowledge of the true scope of McGuire, Woods’s representation of Reynolds Metals and the Reynolds family until after September 1986.
8. Before September 1986, Diamond suspected Judge Merhige of participating in a conspiracy to convict him on criminal charges.
9. Diamond filed the present action against McGuire, Woods on September 19, 1989.
¶98The appellees urge that the documents from Diamond’s counsel’s files show that it is undisputed that Diamond had knowledge of the potential conflict at a time earlier than September 1986. They point to the use of the term “Reynolds Metals” in Lytton’s notes, as well as the term “represents” in both the notes and Diamond’s October 1985 letter to Kohn and Prickett. Furthermore, they contend that the probate documents demonstrate that Diamond knew at the latest by March 1986 that McGuire, Woods’s connection with the Reynolds family extended beyond Davis’s doing David Reynolds’ taxes. Although the appellees’ arguments concerning interpretation of these documents are not without merit, for the following reasons I believe that they are more properly directed to the trier of fact.
¶99In their brief on appeal, the appellees contended that “Lytton’s notes show, and Diamond has not denied, that Diamond knew in mid 1984 that McGuire, Woods represented Reynolds Metals.” That sentence contains three assertions, one concerning the scope of Diamond’s knowledge, another concerning when he had the knowledge, and a third suggesting, indirectly, the source of that knowledge. I address each in turn.
¶100Lytton’s notes do not demonstrate as a matter of law that Diamond knew of McGuire, Woods’s work for Reynolds Metals. Although Lytton acknowledged that the notes were in his handwriting, there is no testimony in the record that they accurately reflected what Diamond told him, or even that he made the notes during the course of the conversation. He did testify even after reviewing the notes that he could not recall the content of the conversation or when it took place. Given Diamond’s sworn denial of the accuracy of the notes, I cannot hold that they are conclusive of the issue.
¶101The contentions concerning the time of the conversation and the source of Diamond’s knowledge of a potential conflict are interrelated. At oral argument, apparently recognizing that Diamond’s affidavit in opposition to summary judgment did in fact deny the accuracy of the notes, the appellees contended instead that the affidavit was an impermissible attempt to contradict Diamond’s earlier deposition testimony. The appellees urged that because Diamond said he learned from Davis of the tax representation of David Reynolds in the spring of 1985, Lytton’s notes show Diamond must have had independent knowledge of McGuire, Woods’ representation of the Reynolds family and its interests.
¶102That contention rests upon a critical inference from the evidence in the record: that Lytton’s notes were of a telephone conversation that occurred in 1984. No one has testified to that fact, however. The notes themselves are undated. The appellees’ only basis for dating the notes to 1984 is, at best, their relative location in a stack of documents some seven or eight years after the notes *383were taken.
¶103The appellees find significance in the fact that both Lytton’s notes and Diamond’s October 1985 letter used the term “rep” or “represents” in connection with Davis’s and the law firm’s relationship to “Reynolds.” The trial court appears to have agreed, saying during oral argument on the summary judgment motion, “Represents doesn’t sound to me like a couple of tax returns.” Although I agree that the choice of words is not irrelevant, I cannot conclude that is it dispositive. In both the notes and the letter, the writer could have used the word “represent” or “rep” to mean either one limited matter or a broader-based professional relationship. What the word meant in this context is a question of fact. For example, we know from common experience that even attorneys who are responsible for a single matter speak of “representing” their client; the very word “attorney” implies acting in a representational capacity.
¶104The documents from the 1971 probate of J. Sargeant Reynolds’s will are similarly inconclusive. The age of the matter, its nature, and the de minimis amount of attorney fees evidenced by the documents render it debatable whether they should be perceived to contradict Davis’ earlier disclosure. At best, the information in the documents and Diamond’s knowledge of it are relevant to the determination by the trier of fact regarding the reasonableness of Diamond’s diligence under the standard articulated in the previous section.
¶105In short, in my view the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Diamond actually knew of any wrongdoing on the part of his attorneys prior to November 1986.
¶106B.
¶107Applying the Discovery Rule to the Undisputed Facts
¶108In my view, the undisputed facts do not warrant judgment in favor of the appellees as a matter of law on statute of limitations grounds. There is a genuine issue as to whether Diamond should, based on the undisputed facts of record, in the exercise of reasonable diligence under all of the circumstances, have conducted an investigation into the appellees’ representation of Reynolds Metal earlier than November 1986. I cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable person who had Diamond’s suspicions of bias on the part of Judge Merhige and his knowledge of the professional connection between Judge Merhige and defendants would have conducted an investigation that would have led to discovery of wrongdoing on the part of the appellees to Diamond’s detriment. The one bit of information concerning the connection between the appellees and Judge Mer-hige involved allegations of bias in favor of the appellees’ client. See supra note 7. Moreover, the professional lawyer-client connection between the appellees and Judge Merhige is not one that was so close, nor one that was kept so secret, that knowledge of *384their mere association should trigger an investigation. On the other hand, Diamond had relied heavily on McGuire, Woods to represent his interests in an important criminal tax fraud proceeding.
¶109I also cannot say, as a matter of law, that the undisputed fact that Diamond knew of apparently minor tax representations of a member of the Reynolds family by Davis should have triggered an investigation to discover a broader representation. In fact, the partial disclosure could fairly be viewed as cutting in favor of Diamond’s diligence, in that he was entitled to rely upon that representation from his attorney until such time as he had good reason to believe that it was false.
¶110I do not, of course, address the truth of Diamond’s claims nor the probability of their success were the case to go to trial. In fact, I have only assumed without deciding that there is sufficient evidence to support a judgment in his favor on the merits of his claims. This court’s decision must be based solely on the matters of record, including Diamond’s affidavit in opposition to summary judgment. Because we must in the present posture accept the truth of the evidence of record,
¶111. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, the firm was known as McGuire, Woods & Battle. In this opinion, the firm is referred to as McGuire, Woods.
¶112. We affirm dismissal of Diamond's claim to recover for unfair trade practices allegedly engaged in by McGuire, Woods. Diamond attempts to state a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C.Code §§ 28-3901 *366to -3909 (1991). Specifically, he relies on § 28-3905(k)(l), which provides:
Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia within the jurisdiction of the Department [of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs] may bring an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover or obtain any of the following:
(A) treble damages;
(B) reasonable attorneys' fees;
(C) punitive damages;
(D) any other relief which the court deems proper.
¶113(emphasis added).
¶114The jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs does not extend to professional services of lawyers. D.C.Code § 28-3903(c)(2)(C); see also Banks v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 634 A.2d 433, 437 (D.C. 1993) (noting that although the Act expressly excludes from its purview the professional services of lawyers, it does not exclude nonlawyers who purport to provide legal services). Hence, the scope of the cause of action created by § 28-3905(k)(l) is similarly limited.
¶115. Diamond does not appeal the dismissal of his claims for false imprisonment, statutory conspiracy under Va.Code § 18.2-499, -500(a) (1988), and unjust enrichment. At Diamond’s request, the trial court struck a claim under a theory denominated “tort of outrage.”
¶116. The parties appear to have assumed that a three-year limitations period applies to each of Diamond’s actions. Statutory and case authority supports their implicit agreement. See D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (1989) (contract); King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C.1978) (fraud); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 665 (D.C. 1990) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1233 (D.C.1989) (breach of professional duty); Thomas v. News World Communications, 681 F.Supp. 55, 73 (D.D.C.1988) (holding that limitations period for civil conspiracy established by limitations period for underlying tort).
¶117. In fact, Diamond said that he was not sure that David Reynolds was represented by McGuire, Woods, as opposed to by Davis individually. He explained that he knew that Davis and David Reynolds lived on the same street in Richmond because he had in the past sent Christmas cards to both of them and had by coincidence previously seen David Reynolds on that street. He therefore thought that Davis may have done the work as a sort of favor to a neighbor.
¶118. The filial relation between J. Sargeant and David Reynolds is not clear from the record. In Diamond's March 1986 letter, he drew a family tree showing J. Sargeant to be David’s son. In his brief, however, Diamond describes J. Sar-geant as David's nephew. The appellees do not make any representations concerning the relationship.
¶119. Also attached to Diamond's March 1986 letter were two newspaper articles concerning Judge Merhige. One article, dated March 20, 1986, reported that Judge Merhige had given a criminal defendant an -eighteen-month suspended sentence and five years' probation after he pleaded guilty to one count of tax fraud. Diamond perceived that article showed a bias on the part of Judge Merhige, because Judge Merhige had sentenced him to serve time on his two-count conviction.
¶120The other article, dated March 5, 1986, reported that ten lawyers had demanded that Judge Merhige recuse himself from a bankruptcy matter concerning A.H. Robins Co. The lawyers, who represented women with products liability claims against A.H. Robins, complained after Judge Merhige disbanded a creditors’ committee for their claims, on which nine of the ten had sat. The article described the lawyers as citing "a web of personal and business friendships that they say calls the judge's impartiality into question and requires his disqualification.” According to the article, A.H. Robins was and had been since 1975 represented principally by McGuire, Woods and Carle Davis, who according to the complaining lawyers, had served as Judge Mer-hige’s lawyer " 'on several occasions over a number of years.’ " The complaining lawyers said that ‘‘the prominence of the Robins company and the Robins family, together with the ‘interwoven nature' of the city’s lawyers and judges, should require that the case be assigned to a judge from outside Richmond.”
¶121. The appellees also contend that it is undisputed that Diamond had actual knowledge of his cause of action more than three years before he filed his complaint; hence, they contend that even under Riddell, Diamond’s action is barred. Their argument that Diamond had actual knowledge is premised on their contention that prior to September 1986 "Diamond had actual notice of every fact cited in his Complaint as supporting his allegations of wrongdoing." If the statement were accurate, it would, of course, mean that Diamond had actual knowledge of his claim more than three years before he filed the complaint. To support their assertion, however, the appellees show only that the evidence Diamond chose to plead in his complaint — not the facts he had to plead to state a claim — was known to him more than three years before he filed the complaint.
¶122The appellees’ reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it incorrectly assumes that Diamond’s complaint had to plead evidence known to Diamond from which the conspiracy he alleges could be inferred — that is, evidence sufficient to have put Diamond on notice of his claim. Under the Superior Court Civil Rules, however, the plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claims brought against them. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(a); Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C. 1985). A plaintiff need not plead his evidence at all. The point is that allegations of facts in a complaint sufficient to meet notice pleading requirements are not necessarily the same as evidence of timely knowledge of facts sufficient to infer knowledge of a cause of action. In Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 130 U.S.App.D.C. 50, 396 F.2d 931 (1967), the D.C. Circuit rejected an argument similar to the one the appellees now press. In Emmett, the plaintiff contended that the defendants’ refusal to release hospital records tolled the time for the plaintiff's malpractice action. Id. at 52, 396 F.2d at 933. The defendants pointed out that the plaintiff was able to file his action despite the fact that the records had not been released. Id. at 57, 396 F.2d at 938. The court rejected that argument, although it said that it "will deserve careful attention on remand,” because the plaintiff's conduct must be "viewed in the totality of all circumstances.” Id.
¶123Second, the appellees’ argument is not supported by this record. As discussed below, the record cannot be construed to establish as a matter of law that prior to September 1986, Diamond knew that his attorneys at McGuire, Woods had been less than candid with him regarding the extent of their potential conflict with the Reynoldses’ interest. Thus, the record does not establish that Diamond had actual knowledge of wrongdoing on the part of the appellees at that time.
¶124. There was during the nineteenth century some controversy over whether tolling for fraud or fraudulent concealment could apply in actions at law, as the doctrine originated in the English courts of equity, which had held that statutes of limitations do not apply to equitable actions. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F.Cas. 1303 (C.C.D.N.H. 1828) (No. 12,782) (discussing at length pertinent English and American authorities). We have explained that the word "accrue” as used in our statute of limitations is left undefined and therefore is a subject for judicial interpretation. D.C.Code § 12-301 (1989); Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 54, 62 (D.C.1994); Ehrenhaft, supra, 483 A.2d at 1198, 1201.
¶125. Because the issue of the burden of proof was not briefed by the parties and is not necessary to our decision, we express no opinion on the correct allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion. We note, however that several decisions of the D.C. Circuit have assigned to the defendant the burden of proof regarding the plaintiffs diligence. Riddell, supra,275 U.S.App.D.C. at 373, 866 F.2d at 1491; Hobson, supra,237 U.S.App.D.C. at 255 n. 113, 737 F.2d at 37 n. 113; Richards v. Mileski, 213 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 226, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (1981). The Hobsoncourt assigned the burden of proof to the party with the burden of pleading the matter. 237 U.S.App.D.C. at 255 n. 113, 737 F.2d at 37 n. 113 (“Because the District of Columbia characterizes due diligence as a defense [to a claim of fraudulent concealment], the burden of proof on that issue squarely rests with defendants, and the same analysis applies as under the federal doctrine.”). The court in Hobsonrelied upon Estate of Chappellev. Sanders, 442 A.2d 157 (D.C.1982), for its statement regarding District law. The question of burden of proof (or pleading, for that matter) was not at issue in Estate of Chappelle, however. Moreover, although the general rule may be that the party that asserts or pleads an issue must prove it, see Gilles v. Ware, 615 A.2d 533, 551 (D.C.1992) (Wagner, J., concurring) (citing cases), there are exceptions. See Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1249-50 (D.C.1990) (assigning burden of proof to defendant where defendant sought to avail itself of exception to remedial statute upon which plaintiff’s claim was based and facts were likely to be within defendant's knowledge). In addition, the principal purpose of the rules assigning the burden of pleading is to give the opposing party fair notice that a matter is in issue. See 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202, at 68-69 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8(a), which governs pleading of claims for relief); *375id. § 1270, at 414 (discussing Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8(c), which governs pleading of certain defenses). The allocation of the burdens of producing evidence and persuading the trier of fact turns on considerations different from who should give notice that a matter is in issue. See Riggs, supra, 581 A.2d at 1249-50.
¶126. We note that these decisions vary slightly in their phrasing. In particular, some cases use the phrase “should have discovered” while others express it as "could have discovered.” We think that the distinction is immaterial and the meaning intended the same in all the cases — to denote probable futurity resulting from a hypothetical act occurring in the past. In other words, both expressions are meant to refer to what likely would have been discovered had the plaintiff in fact exercised reasonable diligence under the circumstances. In this sense, the phrases merely express the requirement of causation — that is, the proposition that but for the plaintiff's want of reasonable diligence, she would have learned of her cause of action.
¶127. Although it concerns reasonable diligence in a somewhat different context, our en banc decision in Clay Properties, supra,604 A.2d 890, is instructive. In Clay Properties, the purchaser of a building contended that it had acquired its fee simple interest free of an unrecorded prior master lease on the building. Id. at 891. We reversed summary judgment in favor of the purchaser, holding that the finder of fact could find the purchaser had inquiry notice because the purchaser had previously entered into a lease agreement with the master leaseholder, which was not the owner of record. Id. at 897. We reasoned that "[b]e-cause the possibility of [the prior master lease] interest is inconsistent with a perfect right in him who proposes to sell, it cannot be said, without more, that a buyer of ordinary prudence would not inquire further to determine the nature of that interest.” Id.(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a purchaser cannot, as a matter of law, rely solely upon the representations of the seller concerning title, and expect its rights vis-á-vis third parties to be protected. Nevertheless, whether in particular circumstances the purchaser has acted reasonably and what would have been discovered had a reasonable inquiry been made are usually questions of fact. See id.at 899 & n. 23.
¶128. Although the court in Fitzgeraldwas applying the discovery rule to a federal civil rights claim, we find persuasive the court's reasoning on accrual:
Read into every federal statute of limitations, including the adoption of analogous local statute of limitations, is the equitable doctrine that in case of defendant’s fraud or deliberate concealment of material facts relating to his wrongdoing, time does not begin to run until plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence could have discovered, the basis of the lawsuit.
¶130. We do not perceive any tension between our holding in Estate of Chappelle, supra note 10, 442 A.2d at 158, that a defendant's concealment merely of his identity does not toll the statute of limitations, and our holding today, that knowledge of wrongdoing on the part of one defendant does not as a matter of law result in accrual of the cause of action with respect to others guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the- same transaction. Estate of Chappellearose out of an automobile accident. Although the defendant driver gave a false name and address to the decedent before fleeing the scene, the plaintiff had information concerning the owner of the car. Id. at 157. We held that under those facts the statute was not tolled. Id. at 158. In Estate of Chappelle, the concealment of the mere identity of the defendant did not amount to concealment of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. In Fitzgeraldand Richards, however, not only were the defendants' identities concealed, but the fact of their participation in the wrongdoing as well. The material distinction is that in cases such as Estate of Chappelle, the plaintiff knew of the existence of all the defendants guilty of the wrongdoing as a result of the wrongful act. On the other hand, in cases such as Fitzgeraldand Richards, where the plaintiff's injury is caused by the actions of several persons, and action on the part of some of those persons is not an apparently necessary cause of the plaintiff's injury, then knowledge of the wrongful conduct of fewer than all of the wrongdoers does not necessarily imply knowledge of all the wrongdoers. In such circumstances, it is not merely the identity of the unknown wrongdoers but their very existence that is concealed from the plaintiff.
¶131. This court has extended the discovery rale to many classes of cases, including medical, legal and architectural malpractice actions and products liability actions where the injury is a latent disease, but has declined to declare the rale applicable in all cases. Farris, supra note 9, 652 A.2d at 54 (citing cases).
¶132. Most, if not all, of these “facts” are actually hotly disputed by defendants.
¶133. This knowledge could not have come from McGuire, Woods, because Davis denied having ever made any disclosure to Diamond and Diamond was not introduced to the one McGuire Woods attorney who claims to have made any disclosure until Spring 1985.
¶134. Most of the documents in the stack appear to have been in chronological order, with the undated notes appearing between documents dated June 15, 1984 and August 9, 1984. However, there is no evidence in the record whether the relative location of the notes in the stack is the same as when they were filed and whether they were intended to be chronological.
¶135. The word "attorney” is derived from the past participle of the Middle French word “atomer," meaning to dispose or turn over. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 141 (1971). Thus, in its original sense, "attorney” meant simply a person to whom one gave responsibilities in the conduct of one’s affairs; that is, one who stood in for, or represented, another. The word retains that meaning when used in the phrase, "attorney in fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary 129 (6th ed. 1990).
¶136. Diamond refers to the partial disclosure as a "lulling” statement. I decline to use that term, because it is in this context a term of art and would tend to confuse the statute of limitations analysis. In the context of tolling of a limitations period, "lulling" refers to a situation in which the plaintiff knows of his cause of action, but the defendant, by sufficiently reliable promises and other conduct, intends to induce the plaintiff not to commence an action until time has run. See, e.g., Homblower v. George Washington Univ., 31 App.D.C. 64, 75 (1908) (recognizing doctrine where plaintiff said he was induced not to file suit by defendant's agreement to arbitrate dispute, but declining to apply it where plaintiff had taken no steps to proceed to arbitration and defendant took no steps to prevent it, thus defeating any inference that defendant intended to lull the plaintiff into inaction); see generally Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1135-36 (D.C.1987) (discussing equitable bases of rule and applying it to deny summary judgment).
¶137. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) provides for severe sanctions against parties filing affidavits in bad faith or for purposes of delay.