Jimenez v. Franklin’s Empirical Analysis
680 F.3d 1096 · 2012
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 1997E
Relies on Munoz v. County of Imperial · Riley v. Kurtz · Parker v. Conway · Shepherd v. Goord · Keup v. Hopkins
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“By waiting to raise the argument after the first appeal, defendants required the district court and plaintiff to deal with the case again and have forced our court to deal with a second appeal. We do not condone and cannot encourage that inefficient and uneconomical approach. Defendants knew everything they needed to know about their joint and several liability for the attorney fee award at the time of the prior appeal. If they wanted to challenge the joint and several liability, they should have done so at that time. They did not, so the challenge has been waived.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[D]efendants ... are now raising a new issue that they did not raise in their last appeal to this court. We need not and do not consider a new contention that could have been but was not raised on the prior appeal.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.