Hosh v. Lucero’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 7 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Supporting our opinion that the BIA reasonably construed § 1226(c) is the description of the statutory scheme provided by the Supreme Court of the United States in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 , 123 S.Ct. 1708 , 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003). In Demore , the Court considered the constitutionality of § 1226(c) and, in upholding the statute, observed that “Congress adopted [§ 1226(c) ] against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” Id. (cita tions omitted). That backdrop included the fact that federal authorities suffered from a “near-total inability to remove deportable criminal aliens,” due in large part to the INS’s “failure to detain those aliens during their deportation proceedings” under the statutes previously in force, which gave the Attorney General broad discretion to release criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings. Id. at 519, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (citations omitted). Because “deportable criminal aliens who remained in the United States often committed more crimes before being removed,” id. at 518 , 123 S.Ct. 1708 , and because “[o]nce released, more than 20% of deportable criminal aliens failed to appear for their removal hearings,” id. at 519 , 123 S.Ct. 1708 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 1 (1995)), Congress endeavored to amend the immigration scheme that was in place before the passage of § 1226(c).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Orsino

2. “§ 1226(c) does not specify any consequence for the Government’s failure to detain a criminal alien immediately upon release, and therefore even if ‘the duty is mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later power to act.’ Thus although the Government would retain the ability to detain criminal aliens after a bond hearing under the district court’s reading of § 1226(c), Congress intended those aliens to be mandatorily detained without a bond hearing. The negligence of officers, agents, or other administrators, or any other natural circumstance or human error that would prevent federal authorities from complying with § 1226(c), cannot be allowed to thwart congressional intent and prejudice the very interests that Congress sought to vindicate.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 934 F. Supp. 2d 759 - Pujalt-Leon v. Holder

3. “we must defer to the BIA’s construction under Chevron for these reasons, and because this Court finds the BIA’s decision in Rojas to be controlling, the challenge by Hernandez to the timeliness of when he was taken into custody fails, and he is properly subject detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c). the BIA’s interpretation of § 1226(c) in Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government’s supposed failure to comply with a statutory requirement — when the statute does not specify a consequence for such noncompliance — does not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 934 F. Supp. 2d 759 - Pujalt-Leon v. Holder