Brewer v. Ravan’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 11 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently April 2018 · most notably Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co. (1989), Price v. United States Navy (1994)
9 federal appellate · 11 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (§ 2 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (§ 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (§ 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 15 U.S.C. § 2614 (§ 15 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (§ 16 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (§ 20 of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976) · 28 U.S.C. § 2462 · 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Alternative Water Sources Act of 2000)
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. · Pauling v. McElroy · New York v. Shore Realty Corp. · Nishiyama v. Dickson County
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... CERCLA’s legislative history clearly indicates that medical expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or disease caused by an unlawful release or discharge of hazardous substances are not recoverable under section 9607(a). See Chaplin, 25 E.R.C. at 2011-12 (discussing legislative history of CERCLA on this issue); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F.Supp. 1348 , 1356 n. 10 (D.Del.1985). To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover the cost of medical testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the release, however, they present a cognizable claim under section 9607(a). See Inmont Corp., 584 F.Supp. at 1429-30 ; Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F.Supp. 370, 376 (W.D.Tenn.1985) (citing Inmont). See also Velsicol, 21 E.R.C. at 2121 (finding it “difficult to see how costs of identifying and determining how to allay the environmental problem presented” are not recoverable under section 9607(a)). Public health related medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to “monitor, assess, [or] evaluate a release” and, therefore, constitute “removal” under section 9601(23). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23). Because the term “response” is defined in section 9601(25) to mean, in part, “remove or removal,” costs incurred as a result of conducting such tests and screening are recoverable response costs under section 9607(a). See Inmont C”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage“imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.