Harris v. Ballone’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As for the fourth claim, it is established that a person may not be incarcerated solely because he is insane (at least in the absence of any showing that an involuntary confinement is necessary to ensure his own survival or safety or to alleviate or cure his illness), see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 , 95 S.Ct. 2486 , 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), but we face the different question of whether a person may be incarcerated solely because he is dangerous. We hold that it is not a denial of due process for a person who has committed a criminal act to be incarcerated as long as he is considered dangerous. . . . Again, we think that the fact that an insanity acquittee has already been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed at least one dangerous act justifies the distinction Virginia has drawn. See United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 , 97 S.Ct. 788 , 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (upholding the use of a different standard for determining if insanity acquittees should remain committed than is used for other committed persons).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 127 Wis. 2d 364 - State v. Mahone

2. “[W]e face the ... question of whether a person may be incarcerated solely because he is dangerous. We hold that it is not a denial of due process for a person who has committed a criminal act to be incarcerated as long as he is considered dangerous. Nor do we think that this aspect of Virginia's scheme denies equal protection because a different standard ( i.e., insane and dangerous) is used for persons other than insanity acquittees. Again, we think that the fact that an insanity acquittee has already been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed at least one dangerous act justifies the distinction Virginia has drawn. See United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 [ 97 S.Ct. 788 , 50 L.Ed.2d 779 ]... (1977) (upholding the use of a different standard for determining if insanity acquittees should remain committed than is used for other committed persons).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 563 So. 2d 1138 - State v. Foucha