Spear v. Tran’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “different in kind from that demanded in the petition.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Strickland v. Strickland · Arias v. Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC

2. “Default judgments arise out of the failure of the defendant to appear by answer or exception to refute the plaintiff's prima facie case after having had the due process opportunity to do so, i.e., service of process containing proper notice of what is at stake. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1701, 1702 and 1703. The theory of the default is that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff proves up a prima facie case at the default confirmation and the defendant does not carry this shifted burden by virtue of his failure to make an appearance on the record. Default is not based on the theory that "silence gives consent", i.e., the failure of the defendant to answer cannot be construed as agreement with the plaintiff's allegations dispensing with the necessity for proof of at least a prima facie case. Implicit in the LSA-C.C.P. art. 1703 requirement that the plaintiff prove up a prima facie case before judgment by default may be granted is the presumption that the defendant's failure to appear constitutes a tacit denial and opposition to the plaintiff's claim. In other words, if the defendant's failure to appear could be construed as some form of consent, there would be no need to require the plaintiff to prove up a prima facie case. [Emphasis added.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 712 So. 2d 223 - Succession of Mexic

3. “Defendant, Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Prudential), appeals the denial of its motion for a new trial seeking reversal of those portions of a default judgment ordering it to pay plaintiff... penalties and attorney's fees under LSA-R.S. 22:1220. We reverse. Kerry M. Spear and Thong Ngoc Tran were involved in an automobile collision on November 22, 1993. Ms. Spear sued Tran; his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; and Prudential, in its capacity as her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier. Ms. Spear settled her claim against Tran and State Farm and took a preliminary default against Prudential which she confirmed on December 15, 1995. The default judgment ordered Prudential to pay Ms. Spear its U.M. policy limits; plus a statutory penalty of $10,000, and $6,666.66 in attorney's fees for its arbitrary and capricious refusal to tender policy limits; together with interest on the entire sum. Prudential filed a motion for new trial, arguing that neither the record nor LSA-R.S. 22:1220 supports the imposition of a penalty and/or attorney's fees and the default judgment was improvidently granted as to those items. The trial court denied Prudential's motion. Prudential appealed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 727 So. 2d 640 - Spear v. PRUDENTIAL PROP. AND CAS. INS.