683 So. 2d 1021 - Windsor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'. . . . " 'Alabama, by statute, specifically protects the privilege against self-incrimination from comment by the prosecution. § 12-21-200 , Ala. Code 1975. A prosecutor must be extremely careful not to overstep the mark or to break with the established protocol regarding statements about that privilege. Musgrove , supra. To improperly comment on that privilege would be a clear violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, § 6, Ala. Const. 1901, as well as the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment as that Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. " 'In Ex parte Wilson , 571 So.2d 1251 , 1261 (Ala. 1990), this Court cited the standard endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: " ' "[A] statement by a prosecutor is improper if it was manifestly intended to be, or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on the ailure of the accused to testify.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ponder v. State · 824 So. 2d 1 - Thomas v. State

2. “'[Prosecution]: An intentional act — [the Judge] will tell you a person acts intentionally if his purpose is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. That intent, whether Mr. Harvey Lee Windsor pulled the trigger of that sawed-off shotgun or whether Colon Lavon Guthrie did it, is still there. The intent to kill. Intent is a state of mind — something that is rarely capable of positive proof. I expect the Judge will tell you that. If we could get into that mind over there and put out here what is in there, we would have no reason for a jury.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 683 So. 2d 440 - Payne v. State · 686 So. 2d 495 - Ivery v. State

3. ““This Court has stated that ‘it is the duty of the court to hear all the excuses and himself pass upon the same.’ Taylor v. State, 249 Ala. 130, 136 , 30 So.2d 256, 260 (1947) (citing Title 30, § 38, Code of 1940). However, that statement was made long before the Legislature enacted § 12-16-145, Ala.Code 1975 (Ala. Acts 1981, No. 81-788, p. 1381, § 6), which specifically provides that the presiding circuit judge may delegate to other court officials the judge’s authority to excuse jurors. Clearly, the intent was to ensure that the judge would not be overburdened with calls and letters from students worried about exams, travelers holding non-refundable tickets to exotic destinations, or others allowed to seek disqualification or an excuse or postponement by virtue of age, disability, or other reason. ‘Furthermore, in considering the qualifications of jurors, jury commissioners, [judges, and other properly designated officials] have the right [to], and should, consider the practical availability of prospective jurors.’ Kittle v. State, 362 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), rev’d on other grounds, 362 So.2d 1269 (Ala.1978). We hold that such a delegation of authority would therefore be proper under either plan of jury selection.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 65 So. 3d 452 - Yancey v. State