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← 684 So. 2d 93 - Lanier v. State

684 So. 2d 93 - Lanier v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
3
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

41 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably Wells v. State (1997), 708 So. 2d 18 - Underwood v. State (1998)

41 state decisions

210199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sigmond v. United States · Thomas v. United States · Green v. Missouri · Morris Mechanical Enterprises, Inc. v. United States · Rheuark v. Shaw

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." With respect to the factor of prejudice,... for prompt appeals [the Court will consider]: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[A] showing of prejudice is necessary to make out a claim of a denial of a speedy appeal.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “The refused Instruction D-10 completely omitted an essential requirement[ ] of the statute; that is, that in addition to the killing being without malice, it absolutely required that it be “in the heat of passion.” There is an alternative in the statute wholly disconnected with the requirement that the killing be “without malice in the heat of passion;” and that is that it can either be “in a cruel or unusual manner” or “by the use of a dangerous weapon without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense.” It is therefore inescapable that assuming appellant to have been entitled to a manslaughter instruction, the submitted D-10 was erroneous and properly refused. It did not require an essential element of manslaughter, statutorily required; that is, without malice, in the heat of passion.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.