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← 685 F.3d 396 - United States v. Mathur

United States v. Mathur’s Empirical Analysis

685 F.3d 396 · 2012

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
3
states following
December 2020
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Crawford v. Washington · Gideon v. Wainwright · Hill v. Lockhart · Teague v. Lane

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) that the Supreme Court recognized a new right; (2) that the right ‘has been ... made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review 5 ; and (3)that [the movant] filed his motion within one year of .the date on which the Supreme Court recognized the right.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(a) General Time Limitations. (1) First Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.... [N]o petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged unless it alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant’s excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice. (2) Second or Subsequent Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, no second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than one year after the latest of: (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right has been newly recognized by either of those Courts and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases on collateral review; or (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence; [[Image here]] (c) These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein. [Emphasis added.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “While grounded in Strickland, we still conclude Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law. Before Padilla , most state and federal courts had considered the failure to advise a client of potential collateral consequences of a conviction to be outside the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. “[Ejleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia have held that lawyers need not explain collateral consequences [under the Sixth Amendment].” All of these courts—including our own—thought the rule if Padilla was not dictated or compelled by Court precedent. It goes without saying these are some of the “reasonable jurists” we must survey to determine if Padilla is a new rule.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.