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← 686 F.3d 197 - In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation’s Empirical Analysis

686 F.3d 197 · 2012

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
April 2020
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 9 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 45 (§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914) · 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1292 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 35 U.S.C. § 271

Relies on Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States · Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation · Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe MacHinery Corp. · La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. · Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First, requiring plaintiffs to show that no class member benefited from the challenged conduct in the form of greater profits is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanover Shoe . In Hanover Shoe , the Supreme Court permitted antitrust plaintiffs to seek overcharge damages rather than lost profits damages precisely because proving lost profits was too complicated and burdensome. 392 U.S. at 493 , 88 S.Ct. 2224 ; Bogosian [v. Gulf Oil Corp. ], 561 F.2d [434] at 456 [ (3d Cir. 1977) ]. The same logic applies equally, if not more strongly, in the class certification setting because under defendants’ proposed approach, plaintiffs would not only have to assess their own lost profits but also those of potential class members. Moreover, because Hanover Shoe sets the amount of the overcharge as plaintiffs’ damages, all of the class members have the same financial incentive for purposes of the litigation—ie. proving that they were overcharged and recovering damages based on that overcharge. See 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1768 (3d ed. 2005) (“[A] potential conflict between the representatives and some class members should not preclude the use of the class-action device if the parties appear united in interest against an outsider at the beginning of the case.”). Defendants have not pointed to any plausible scenario in which the class members might seek conflicting forms of relief.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “While a fraud action at common law requires the plaintiff to prove reliance, there is no corresponding requirement in 6 Del C. § 2513.”). . Although ING advertised to the Proposed Class through multiple media, including emails, newsletters, monthly sales statements, direct mail, and the ING website, the content of these advertisements was uniform. (See D.I. 84 at 9 (listing uniform content of advertisements)) Defendant points to a variety of communications that contained non-uniform information about the Rate Renewal offer, but these advertisements were all disseminated outside the Class Period. (See D.I. 85 ¶ 7) The materials disseminated during the Class Period are uniform in that they did not disclose that the Rate Renewal is subject to change or that there were qualification requirements. (See id., Ex. B (compiling advertisements disseminated during Class Period)) . Even if it was later discovered that there were material differences among the communications, ING’s records establish which members of the Proposed Class received which ads and, therefore, the Court could modify the class definition or create subclasses based upon which ad was received. (See D.I. 47, Ex. 4 at 98:9-99:6; id., Ex. 3 at 181:13-17) . Specifically, the Court notes that to the extent there would be any individualized damages inquiries, such inquiries would go to the “quantum of damages, rather than the fact of injury,”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “a plaintiff suffers an antitrust injury where it is overcharged for a product, regardless of whether it can show lost profits”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.