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← 686 P2D 541 - Engberg v. State

Engberg v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
8
states following
September 2020
most recently cited

24 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently September 2020 · most notably State v. Ramseur (1987), State v. Bey (1988)

24 state decisions

12019841990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Witherspoon v. Illinois · Furman v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Swain v. State of Alabama

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Automatically instructing the sentencing body on the underlying felony in a felony-murder case does nothing to aid the jury in its task of distinguishing between first-degree homicides and defendants for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. Relevant distinctions dim, since all participants in a felony-murder, regardless of varying degrees of culpability, enter the sentencing stage with at least one aggravating factor against them. [[Image here]] A comparison of the sentencing treatments afforded first-degree-murder defendants further highlights the impropriety of using the underlying felony to aggravate felony-murder. The felony murderer, in contrast to the premeditated murderer, enters the sentencing stage with one aggravating circumstance automatically charged against him. This disparity in sentencing treatment bears no relationship to legitimate distinguishing features upon which the death penalty might constitutionally rest.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “1. The Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 2. The offense was committed while the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 3. The Defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor; 4. The capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; 5. The age of the Defendant at the time of the crime; 6. Any other matter, any other aspect of the Defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense brought you during the trial of this cause which you, the Jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the Defendant.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “A defendant convicted of a felony murder, nothing else appearing, will have one aggravating circumstance "pending" for no other reason than the nature of the conviction. On the other hand, a defendant convicted of a premeditated and deliberated killing, nothing else appearing, enters the sentencing phase with no strikes against him. This is highly incongruous, particularly in light of the fact that the felony murder may have been unintentional, whereas, a premeditated murder is, by definition, intentional and preconceived.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.