United States v. Symonevich’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 federal appellate · 10 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[w]e consider de novo whether an instruction embodied an error of law, but we review for abuse of discretion whether the instructions adequately explained the law or whether they tended to confuse or mislead the jury on the controlling issues.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Ackell · United States v. Cantwell

2. “The burden to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy lies squarely on the mov-ant.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29 , 37 (1st Cir.2009); Samboy, 433 F.3d at 161 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 , 88, 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998)); cf. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 , 95, 100 S.Ct. 2547 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (remanding a case that came to the Supreme Court”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Campbell · United States v. Porteous

3. “The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches may only be claimed where a defendant demonstrates that he or she personally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. See Rakas [v. Illinois ], 439 U.S. [128], 143-44, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421 [, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ]. As a general proposition, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his [or her] Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Id. at 134 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . In the context of a vehicle search, a passenger who has “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized,” has made no showing that he or she has a legitimate expectation of privacy in, for example, the area under the seat of the car in which he or she was “merely [a] passenger [ ].” Id. at 148 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . Under such circumstances, a vehicle search does not infringe upon the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the passenger lacks standing to challenge the search. (Emphasis ours).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Santiago-Ramos