¶1The judgment in this case is reversed on. the authority óf Pearson v. Evans, 61 Ala. 416, and the cause is remanded. The written note or obligation, on which this suit is founded, did not conform strictly to the requirements •of section 3286. The consideration was not exclusively for advances obtained for the purpose of enabling the promisor to make a crop. A material portion of the consideration was an account due from the maker of the note to a third party, which the payee had in his hands for collection, and, under the above authority, this, being intentionally and knowingly included in the note, operated to vitiate it as a statutory crop-lien note for advances.
¶2dissenting. — I did not sit in the case of Pearson v. Evans. I dissent both from that opinion and from this. I do not think a crop-lien for advances should be vitiated, merely because some items of the claim are for articles for which the statute gives no lien. That error is frequently committed ignorantly and innocently. Between the parties, such error certainly should not vitiate. And outsiders, unless they are creditors who would be defrauded by simulated liability, are not injured, and of course are not defrauded. In the absence of fraud, I think such declaration of lien should stand good, to the extent the statute authorizes such lien to be declared.