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69 Ill. 306

Norton v. Allen

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided September 15, 1873

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1873-09-15

Lambert Tree, Judge, presiding. This was an application by the appellant, to have a judgment by confession, in favor of the appellee, set aside, and let in a defense to the merits.

Relies on Lake v. Cook

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-09-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently June 1934

4 state decisions

201873188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Chief Justice Beeese

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court:

¶2There is nothing in this case to warrant the interference of this court in behalf of appellant.

¶3The usual warrant of attorney to confess judgment, with attorney’s fee of thirty dollars in addition, was attached to the note. In the exercise of a sort of equitable jurisdiction over confessions of judgment by warrant of attorney, courts often set aside such judgments, in whole or in part, in order to let in a defense to the merits. But the court can fully protect the rights of the parties as well by staying all proceedings on the judgment, and permitting it to stand as security until the merits of the case are heard and determined. In this way, whatever lien the plaintiff may have is preserved, and the defendant protected from an execution. If the defense is successful, the judgment falls, otherwise it will be enforced. Lyon v. Boilvin, 2 Gilm. 629; Lake v. Cook, 15 Ill. 353.

¶4In this case the judgment was not set aside, but appellant was permitted to make his defense, and after a full investigation by the court, sitting as a jury, the amount due was established, and, as we think, in conformity with the proof.

¶5The warrant of attorney authorized a charge of thirty dollars for attorney’s fee, but the court allowed fifteen dollars only, and also deducted the interest claimed by appellant to be usurious.

¶6We can not see but that full justice has been done in the case, and, believing so, affirm the judgment.

¶7Judgment affirmed.

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