Volume 69 — Kansas Reports

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazbn, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Russell district court; Lee Monroe, judge.</p>

Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatrick, judge. STATEMENT. This was an action by the First National Bank of St. Marys to recover from W. H. Taylor and J. F. Taylor, commission merchants at Kansas City, the sum of $683.19, the proceeds of the sale of certain mortgaged cattle and hogs alleged to be in the hands of the Taylors, to which the bank asserted a right.

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Wills—Devise C.onslrued—Words “Heirs of His Own” Defined. A testator provided in his will that certain real estate devised to his four sons in equal proportions should not be sold until . the youngest child arrived at the age of majority, and that in case any one of them should die “ without heirs or legal representatives of his own” the survivors should take his portion of the estate equally. An infant son died after the death of the testator. Held, that the-words ‘‘heirs of hi>s own,” when applied to the children of the deceased, meant lineal descendants or issue, and that the mother of the deceased child did not inherit his share of the real estate devised in the will.</p> <p>2. -Estates not Repugnant—Not a Perpetuity. The terms of the will considered, and held, that the remainder over to the children of the testator is not repugnant to the estate previously granted; nor does the will create a perpetuity.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in quo warranto.</p>

<p>Error from Doniphan district court; William I. Stuart, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Rooks district court; Charles W. Smith, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Schools and School Districts—Lord's Prayer and Twenty-third Psalm A llowable. A public-school teacher who, for the purpose of quieting the pupils and preparing them for their regular studies, repeats the Lord’s Prayer and the Twenty-third Psalm as a morning exercise, without comment or remark, in which the pupils are not required to participate, is not conducting a form of religious worship or teaching sectarian or religious doctrine.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatrick, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Chase district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Lyon district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatrick, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatrick, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Mines and Mining—Natural Gas—Public Business, /the production and distribution of natural gas for light, fuel and power is a business of a public nature, the control of which belongs to the state. •</p> <p>2. Highways — Supreme Control by Legislature. In the control of streets, alleys and other highways the power of the legislature is supreme and unlimited, except so far as it may be restricted, by constitutional provisions.</p> <p>3. Mines and Mining—Natural Gas—Right of Eminent Domain. It is competent for the legislature to provide for the laying of pipes and mains in streets, alleys and public grounds in order to distribute natural gas and transport it to consumers, and for this purpose there may be an appropriation of private property under the sovereign power of eminent domain.</p> <p>4. Corporations—Titles of Acts Not Too Narrow. The act entitled “An act concerning private corporations”'(Gen. Stat. 1868, ch. 23; Gen. Stat. 1901, § 1245 et seq.) and the acts amendatory of section 88 of that chapter, including chapter 128 of the Laws of 1901, are not invalid because of the narrowness of their titles.</p> <p>5. -Natural Gas in Cities—Consent of Municipal Authorities Unnecessary. Corporations organized for the production and distribution of natural gas may avail themselves of the privilege given by section 1366, General Statutes of 1901, of laying gas-pipes through any street, alley or public ground of any city of the second or third class, without, obtaining the consent of the municipal authorities thereof.</p> <p>6. Mines and Mining—Gas-pipes in Streets—Provision for Compensation Unnecessary. The statute granting to gas companies the privilege of laying pipes in the streets, alleys and public grounds of a city is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that no provision is made for the payment of compensation to the city.</p> <p>7. -Injunction the Proper Remedy for Interference. Injunction is a proper remedy to prevent interference and obstruction in the exercise of the statutory privilege of laying gas-pipes, although such interference and distribution, to some extent, consists of arrests and criminal proceedings.</p>

Error from Neosho district court; L. Stillwell, judge. STATEMENT. In April, 1902, plaintiff in error bought from one J. W. Cole 138 acres of land, taking a special warranty deed therefor.

<p>Error from Cherokee district court; A. H. Skid-more, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Ford district court; Ed. H. Madison, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Railroads—Injury at Crossing—Pleading and Proof. Where the plaintiff sets up in his petition as grounds of recovery for injuries sustained in a collision with a railroad-train at a public crossing specific acts of negligence of the railroad company in failing to give warning of the approach of the train and in running at a high and reckless rate of speed, the trial court is not warranted in enlarging the issues and in submitting to the jury, as an additional ground of recovery, the negligence of the defendant in permitting buildings and cars to be placed and to remain on the right of way in such positions as to obstruct the view of the plaintiff when approaching the railroad-track.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY TEE COURT.</p> <p>1. Promissory Noth—Non negotiable — Payment to Payees after Assignment. The makers of a non negotiable note shipped cattle to the payees with directions to sell them and apply the proceeds to its payment. Before this the payees had discounted and assigned the note to a bank, without notice to the makers. The payees, after selling the cattle and crediting the proceeds to the account of the makers, wrote a letter to them stating: “ We applied the proceeds of your sale as directed, and will call in the note and obtain for you all the rebate possible on same.” Held, that, the promise of the payees to call in the note haying been made after the application of the money received from the sale of the cattle to the discharge of the indebtedness, it did not affect the validity of the payment of the note.</p> <p>2. -Payment before Maturity without Notice of Transfer, Payment by the makers of the amount of a non-negotiable note before its maturity to the payees thereof, and its acceptance by the latter, without notice of a transfer of the paper, will discharge the makers from all claims of the transferee.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Injunction—Prosecution of Actions in Other Courts. Courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain an action brought to enjoin the prosecution of a large number of actions in another court, where such actions are groundless, vexatious, and not prosecuted ■ in good faith.</p> <p>2. Foreign Corporation—Right to Sue in Kansas. An action by a non-resident corporation doing business in this state will not be dismissed because it has not technically complied with the provisions of section 1283, General Statutes of 1901, when ,an honest effort to comply has been made, and a compliance had so far as was possible.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatrick, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Republic district court; Hugh Alexander, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Limitation oe Action—Allegation of Absence not Demurrable. A petition upon an implied contract, which discloses a liability of more than three years’ standing, but which alleges that defendant has continuously resided out of the state since a time prior to the accrual of the cause of action, sufficiently shows that the statute of limitations may not have run to prevent the raising of that defense by demurrer.</p> <p>2. Principal and Surety—Action for Reimbursement after Dormancy of Judgment. A surety who, under legal compulsion, pays a judgment against his principal and himself, may maintain an action against his principal for reimbursement, although at the time of such payment the judgment could not in any manner have been enforced against the latter, on account of its having been dormant as to him for more than a year.</p> <p>3. - Joint Judgment Conclusive as to Liability of Principal. In an action against a principal by a surety who has paid a judgment rendered against both, the principal is concluded by the judgment from denying his original liability to the judgment creditor.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Schools and School Districts—Dismissal of Teacher—Act of Board Conclusive. Section 6184, General Statutes of 1901, provides for the employment of teachers and the manner of employing them in the district schools of the state. It also provides for the dismissal of teachers, the causes for which they may be dismissed, and the manner in which they may be dismissed; and where the district board, in conjunction with the county superintendent, dismisses a teacher, as provided by said section, such act of dismissal is final and conclusive, in the absence of fraud, corruption, or oppression.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Agency— Commission for Sale of Seal Estate. A broker employed to sell' land is entitled to his commission when he is the procuring cause of a sale and has produced a buyer who is ready, willing and able to pay the agreed price and to consummate the sale.</p> <p>- Change of Seasons by Owner after Action Begun. Where a party bases his refusal to consummate a sale of property in accordance with an alleged agreement upon one ground, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his position and defend such refusal upon another and wholly different ground.</p> <p>-Evidence Sufficient to Show Authority and Sale by Agent. Upon an examination of the testimony in the record, it is held, that it fairly tended to show the employment of an agent by the owner of land to procure a purchaser, and that the agent did produce a purchaser ready, willing and able to complete the purchase on the authorized terms.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Jury and Jurors—Special Finding Construed. When-the jury answers a special question, “We do not know,” such answer is in the negative as to one upon whom the burden falls.</p> <p>2. Railroads—Exemption from, Liability—Burden of Proof. Where a common carrier seeks to defeat a recovery because of an exemption from liability contained in its contract of carriage, the burden rests upon it of proving that the loss falls within the exemption provided for in such contract.</p> <p>3.,- Proof of Performance of Condition Precedent. Where the shipping contract contains a lawful provision requiring the shipper to do something as a condition precedent to recovery, the burden of showing the performance of such condition rests upon the shipper, and if he fail to show performance he cannot recover.</p> <p>4. -Immaterial Whether Condition Precedent be Pleaded. This rule applies not only to a case where it is made to appear during the progress of the trial that plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a shipping contract containing such condition, blit also to one where it has been counted upon in his petition or set out as defensive matter by the carrier.</p>

<p>Error from Lyon district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

<p>Syllabus by the court.</p> <p>1. Practice, Supreme Court—Statement of Contents of Case-made. A statement that the “foregoing case-made” contains all the evidence introduced at the hearing, made in the form of a certificate signed by the attorneys of plaintiff in error, immediately following the recital of the proceedings had in the case, and preceding the acknowledgment of service and the certificate of settlement by the judge, will be treated as a part of the case-made.</p> <p>2. Judicial Sale—Motion to Set Aside after Two Years. A sale of- real estate upon execution cannot be set aside upon a motion of defendant filed more than two years after confirmation, showing no reason for such delay, and presenting as grounds of relief only such matters as were necessarily involved in, and determined by, the order of confirmation.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cherokee district court; W. B. Glasse, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Breaking a Street-car Window, The wilful breaking of the window of a street-car in use upon a street-railway is not a violation of any of the provisions of section 2098, General Statutes of 1901.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in quo ivarranto.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Taxation—Liability of Mortgagor of Personal Property for Taxes. Section 4250, General Statutes of 1901, providing that “in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, the mortgagee of •personal property shall have the legal title thereto, and the right of possession,” wheré the chattel mortgage contains no stipulation as to the legal title of the property, will not relieve the mortgagor from liability for the payment of taxes assessed against the property in his nafne, the mortgagee having taken possession under the chattel mortgage prior to March 1.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Highways—Telephone Line Not an Additional Servitude. The construction and maintenance of a telephone line upon a rural highway is not an additional servitude for which compensation must be made to the owner of the land over which the highway is laid.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in mandamus.''</p>

Error from Rooks district Court; Charles W. Smith, judge. STATEMENT. Plaintiees in error, who were plaintiffs in the court below, are the five sons and one daughter, and heirs at law, of James T. Stroup, who died April 9, 1889. He was owner of 160 acres of land, for the possession of which this ejectment action was brought. Mr. Stroup was a widower when he died, and resided with the two minor children on the land.

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Practice, Supreme Court — Certification of Case after Expiration of Term of Office. In order that a trial judge out of office may have jurisdiction to settle and sign a case-made such authority must be preserved by some proper order. Such jurisdiction is not preserved beyond the period fixed for service of the case-made, including the time for suggestion of amendments, by an order directing that the case “be settled and signed on five days’ written notice by either party.”</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Title and Ownership—Foreclosure for Taxes— Unrecorded Deed•—Purchaser Pendente Lite. One who has withheld his deed to real estate from record until proceedings instituted by the county to foreclose a lien for taxes, under chapter 392, Laws of 1901 (Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 7718-7721), have resulted in a decree and sale of the land, is subject to the rules governing a purchaser pendente lite.</p>

<p>Error from Jewell district court; R. M. Pickler, judge.</p>

Error from Saline district court; R. P. Thompson, judge. STATEMENT. This was a proceeding in forcibly' entry and detainer. The case was tried originally before a justice-of the peace, and afterward on appeal in the district court. In the spring of 1901 S. J. Samuelson was the owner of two quarter-sections of land adjoining each other. He occupied one of the quarters as a homestead with his wife Christina. At the time mentioned plaintiff in error was living in Colorado.

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Railroads— Condemnation Proceedings—Pleading upon Appeal from, the Award. Where a bill of particulars has been filed in an action upon appeal from rhe award of commissioners assessing damages for the condemnation of a right of way for a railroad, it is not error to deny a motion to make such bill of particulars more definite and certain, even if it, in this respect, be not as perfect as an ordinary petition should be, provided it is not misleading.</p> <p>2. -Bight to Take Subjacent Minerals is in Owner of Fee, Except when Necessary for Support. By statutory proceedings to condemn a right of way for the construction of a railroad ' only an easement for that purpose is taken. There remains in the owner the fee to the premises, with a right to take all subjacent minerals therefrom, except such as may be necessary for surface support.</p> <p>3. - Value in Subjacent Minerals—Erroneous Instruction. In case of condemnation of a right of way for a railroad, where the value of the land condemned consists chiefly in the minerals found beneath its surface, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that the measure of damages to the owner for its taking is its fair market value.</p>

<p>Error from Saline district court; R. F. Thompson, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Sedgwick district court; D. M. Dale, judge.</p>

Error from Cowley district court; James Lawrence, judge. STATEMENT. This was an action against a physician for malpractice. Plaintiff below, Mary E. Oollins, was thrown against the side of a barn .by a vicious horse which she was trying to hold, and sustained a fracture of the left elbow and shoulder and a downward dislocation of the right shoulder. She was sixty'years old at the time.

<p>Error from Montgomery district court; Thomas J. Flannelly, judge.</p>

<p>Error from' Neosho district court; L. Stillwell, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William G. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>Error- from Allen district court; L. Stillwell, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT,</p> <p>1. Divorce and Alimony—Omission of Date in Journal Entry. The omission of the date of its rendition from the journal entry of a decree of divorce does not render such decree void by reason of the terms of section 5142, General Statutes of 1901.</p> <p>2. -Action in ■Kansas by Wife for Alimony—Divorce Granted Husband in Oklahoma—Bes Judicata. A wife brought her action for alimony in the district court of a county in •this state under the provisions of our statute authorizing the maintenance of such an action for any of the causes for which a divorce may be granted. Subsequently the husband brought an ■ action.against the wife for a divorce in the county of his residence in the territory of Oklahoma. In this action the wife personally .appeared and filed a cross-petition asking for a divorce and alimony, setting up as grounds therefor the same causes which she charged in her petition for alimony. The divorce action was tried before the action for alimony, and the court found the husband to be without fault and granted him a divorce upon the allegations of his petition. Held, that the wife could not thereafter maintain her action for alimony for the reason that the truth . of her causes therefor had been decided against her by the Okla- . homa court and was res judicata.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Action eor Death—Measure of Damages Where Parents Sue for Wrongful Death of Minor Son. In an action by the parents to recover damages for the death of a son based upon services during his minority, and upon benefits which they had expected to receive from him by way of support after he should have arrived at the age of majority, held, that it is error to instruct the jury that, in addition to the amount which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the loss of the son’s services during his minority, they are entitled to recover such reasonable amount as they may find that plaintiffs should recover as the pecuniary benefits which they might have reasonably expected to receive from the son after he should have reached his majority and during the time he should have continued to live; and held, further, that the parents’ right to recover for such expected benefits is limited to the life of the parents.</p>

<p>Error from Barton district court; Ansel R. Clark, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COUKT.</p> <p>1. Banks and Banking—Liability of Directors to Depositors— Not Released by Corrupt Practices of Cashier. A director.of an insolvent bank is not excused from the liability to a depositor 'therein imposed by sections 65 and 66 of the banking law of this state (Laws 1879, ch. 17, §§ 1, 2; Gen. Stat. 1901, §§171, 172), by showing that the insolvent condition of the bank was caused by the false, fraudulent and corrupt practices of the cashier, so adroitly concealed and covered up by him that such condition could not have been discovered by an examination into the bank’s affairs, when such director has wholly failed to make any examination into those affairs.</p> <p>2. -Duties of Directors to Make Frequent and Thorough Examination. It is the duty of directors to examine into the affairs of their banks with reasonable frequency and thoroughness, for the purpose of thereby acquainting themselves with their condition, and, where they fail so to do, they will be held liable to depositors, in case of insolvency, for deposits made with their assent; and this, even though by such examination the directors would not have discovered the insolvent condition of the bank.</p> <p>3. Attobney and Client—Champertous Contract Not a Defense. That an action is being carried on under a champertous- contract between the plaintiff and his attorney cannot be pleaded as a defense.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William G. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Reno district court; M. P. Simpson, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Libel—Eunuch. A newspaper publication stating that a man is a eunuch is actionable per se.</p> <p>2. -Petition Construed and Sustained. In an action for damages founded on the publication of a libelous newpaper article, an allegation in the petition that the printed language was used “of and concerning him, the said plaintiff,” imports that those who read it so understood.</p>

<p>Error from Marion district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Hamilton district court; William Easton Hutchison, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Butler district court: G. P. Airman, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Geary district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazjen, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Saline district court; R. R. Rees,* judge.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in habeas corpus.</p>

<p>• Appeal from Ness district court; Charles E. Lob-dell, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Rawlins district court; A. 0. T. Geiger, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE QOURT.</p> <p>Railroads—Right to Enjoin a Trespasser. One who constantly rides upon the rails of a railroad company’s track by means of A bicycle is a trespasser; his conduct is a continuing menace to the safety of public travel, and may be perpetually enjoined.</p>

<p>Error from Rice district court; Ansel R. Clark, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Osborne district court; R. M. Pickler, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Assault and Battery—Action- for Damages—Findings Construed. In an action to recover damages for assault and battery, where the jury returned a general verdict of one dollar for plaintiff, and by special findings allowed one dollar as punitive damages and allowed nothing for actual damages, and the special findings found no facts authorizing an allowance of punitive damages but did find facts authorizing an allowance of actual damages, and the assault was of such character as to entitle plaintiff to recover nominal damages, it is held, that it was error to render judgment for defendant for costs on the special findings of the jury.</p>

<p>Error from Montgomery district court; Thomas J. Flannelly, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Chase district court; Charles B. Graves, judge pro tern.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Corporations—Effect of Dissolution. After the dissolution of a corporation it no longer possesses power to do any business, maintain any action, or enforce any judgment theretofore rendered in its favor, except by virtue of some statute authorizing it or some principle of equity requiring it.</p> <p>2. Replevin—Judgment in the Alternative—Condition Precedent to Enforcement. In an action in replevin where the, defendant gave a redelivery bond and retained possession of the property in controversy, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of possession of the property,and, in the event of his inability to obtain such possession or defendant’s failure to deliver it, for the recovery of a certain sum, it is held, that it was the duty of the defendant to tender back the possession of the replevied property, and not the duty of the plaintiff to demand it, as a condition precedent to the enforcement of the money judgment.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Practice, District Court—Amendment from Conversion to Accounting Not Permissible. The petition in an action brought by a partnership to recover damages for the conversion of property belonging to it cannot be so amended, after dissolution of the firm, as wholly to abandon that action and to substitute a member' as plaintiff and state a cause of action in his favor for an accounting of the partnership business between such member and the defendant.</p> <p>2. Limitation oe Action—Provision When First Action Fails. An examination of the record in this proceeding shows that the petition in the first action could not have been so amended as to' make that action sufficiently of the nature of this one to save to this plaintiff the benefit of the year allowed for the commencement of a new action when the first one has failed otherwise than on its merits.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Fraudulent Conveyance—Limitation of Action. In an action by a creditor for relief on the ground of the fraudulent conduct of ' his debtor it is necessary to establish ignorance of the fraud until a time within the period limited for the commencement of an action, in order to remove the statutory bar.</p> <p>2. -Assignee Bound by Knowledge of Assignor. The assignee of a claim is chargeable with any notice .or knowledge of fraudulent acts on the part of the debtor affecting the collection of the debt which, the original debtor possessed.</p> <p>3. - Venue of Action—Power of Court to Enforce Decree. An action by a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of his debtor’s property may be maintained in any jurisdiction where the guilty parties may be found. In such a case the court does not act upon the land itself, but upon the parties to the fraud; and it not only has authority to declare the conveyance void as an obstruction to the enforcement of the creditor’s rights, but it has the further power to compel the defendants to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei sites, which they could voluntarily do, to give full effect to the decree.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Rooks district court; Charles W. Smith, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Riley district court; Sam. Kimble, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Atchison district court; B. F. Hudson,. judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Contract—Sale of Mineral Waters■—Mot Void for Want of Mutuality. A contract in which, one party agrees at a designated price to furnish certain mineral waters sufficient to supply the trade of a city, and the other party agrees, to furnish vessels for shipment, to pay all express, freight, and advertising expenses, ‘ ‘ to use his best endeavors to push the sale of said mineral waters ’ ’ in said city, and to pay the agreed price to the first party at certain times, is not void for want of mutuality of obligation.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Corporations—Trusteeship of Managing Officers. The managing officers of a corporation are not only trustees of the corporate entity and the corporate property, but they are to some extent, and in many respects, trustees for the corporate shareholders.</p> <p>2. Contracts—Fiduciary Relations of Vendor and Vendee—■' Presumption of Equity. When two parties occupy to each other a confidential or fiduciary relation, and a sale is made by one to the other, equity raises a presumption against the validity of the transaction. To sustain it the buyer must show affirmatively that the transaction was conducted in good faith, without pressure or influence on his part, and with express knowledge of the circumstances and entire freedom of action on the part of the seller.</p> <p>3. -Purchase of Stock by Manager ' of Corporation — Duty of Vendor. A director or managing officer of a corporation having knowledge of the condition of its affairs, because of the trust relation and the superior opportunities afforded for acquiring information must inform a stockholder not actively engaged in the management of the true condition of the corporation before he can rightfully purchase his stock.</p>

<p>Error from Marshall district court; Sam Kimble,. judge.</p>

Error from Lyon district court; Dennis Madden, judge. STATEMENT. This was an action in ejectment brought by Jennie Jones, the plaintiff in error, against T. H. Standiferd, Hiram Holt, and Malinda L. Holt, to recover possession of the northwest quarter of section 22, township 18, range 13, in Lyon county. Defendants had judgment in the court below.

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Descents and Distributions—Fraudulent Conveyance of Undivided Interest by Heir. Tke legal title to land occupied as a homestead descends, upon the death of the owner intestate, to his widow and children, who inherit thereby present and valuable interests which they cannot give away in fraud of their creditors.</p> <p>2. - Voluntary Conveyance by Insolvent Heir Out of Possession to the Mother in Possession Held Fraudulent. A voluntary conveyance of his interest by a son not occupying the homestead to the widow who has continued to occupy it, which has the effect of defrauding his creditors, will be set aside at the suit of a creditor in a proper proceeding for that purpose, and a lien will be declared thereon in its favor where the antecedent proceedings have created it.</p>

<p>Error from Butler district court; G. P. Airman, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COUBT.</p> <p>1. Taxation— Sufficient Description in Tax Deed. In a tax deed reciting the sale of several disconnected tracts, the use in the granting clause of the words “and each and every separate tract and parcel thereof,” in addition to the statutory form designating the property conveyed as ‘ ‘ the real property last hereinbefore described,” indicates a purpose to convey all of the land sold. •</p> <p>'2. -- Tax Deed Invalid upon its Face■—Limitation of Action. A tax deed which covers several disconnected tracts of land and fails to state the amount for which each separate tract was conveyed is invalid upon its face and may be set aside on that ground, even after the lapse of five years from the time it was . recorded.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William G. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Practice, Supreme Court—Extension of Time for Service of Case-made. When the court or judge orders an extension of time for serving a case-made under the proviso to section 1 of chapter 380, Laws of 1903, the requirements of the law are satisfied if the order of extension be filed with the clerk of the court. The filing of such order constitutes “notice of extension.”</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law—Eminent Domain—Act of 1874. Chap ter 112, Laws of 1874 (Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 6053-6055), entitled “An act to provide for opening private roads or highways,” is unconstitutional for the reason that it authorizes the taking of private property for private use.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COUKT.-</p> <p>Bond—Conversion of Insurance Premiums by Agent—Liability of Surety on Bond. Iri an action on the bond of an agent of an insurance company to recover the amount of certain collected and unremitted premiums it is error to sustain a motion to strike from the petition certain premiums charged in the account because collected outside the agent’s territory, where the language describing his territory is ambiguous and susceptible of different interpretations. Under such circumstances, whether the premiums were collected within the agent’s territory is a question of fact.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Railroads—Railroad Commission Act Construed. The law creating a board of railroad commissioners for this state, and providing for the enforcement of orders made by that tribunal, expressly preserves all other remedies existing by virtue of statutes or of common law for the redress of grievances of which the board may take cognizance.</p> <p>2, Statutory Construction—Judicial Construction in State of its Origin Not Absolutely Controlling. The rule that the judicial construction given a statute in the state of its origin follows it into the state of its adoption is not absolutely controlling in all' cases, and it cannot prevail against an express provision inserted in the statute at the time of its adoption, indicating a different legislative intention.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Insurance Policy—Condition of Title Waived by Knowledge ■ of Agent. Where a policy of insurance contained the condition that if the interest of the assured be or become other than the entire, unconditional, unencumbered and sole ownership of the property, the policy should be void unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed thereon, and such policy was issued by an agent having authority to issue policies of insurance and consummate the contract, and such agent at the time of the issuing of the policy had knowledge of an encumbrance upon the premises, but made no indorsement of it thereon, it is held, that the company waived the condition of the policy.</p> <p>2. -Mistake of Agent in Indorsing Payment Clause May be Corrected by Court. Where such agent, with full knowledge of the encumbrance upon the premises and the condition of the title, when sold upon deferred payments undertakes to indorse upon the policy a payment clause to protect the parties interested, and by mistake fails to make it sufficient, it is held, in an action • to recover upon .the policy, that such clause may be reformed to correct the mistake and to conform to the intention of the party making the same.</p>

<p>Error from Sumner district court; C. L. Swarts, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. ' Fire Insurance—Statement by Agent in the Application '■ Held Binding on the Company. A statement in a written ap- ■ plication for insurance, subsequently approved, that it is for indemnity for a term of years from a date named, is a sufficient embodiment in the application of an agent’s agreement that the insurance shall take effect on that day to satisfy a condition of ■ the application that the company will not be bound by any representation, agreement or promise of the agent not contained in the application itself.</p> <p>2. .-Instructions Held Sufficient. Criticisms of an instruc' tion to the jury held to be invalid.</p> <p>3V- Policy Not a Condition Precedent to Liability of Company. In the absence of a controlling provision of its bylaws, or an agreement of the parties to the contrary, a binding; contract of insurance with a mutual fire-insurance company may be consummated without the issuance of a policy.</p> <p>4. -Amount of Attorney's Fees Not a Question for the Jury. Under section 3410 of the General Statutes of 1901, providing that in certain suits against insurance companies the court in rendering judgment shall allow the plaintiff a reasonable sum as an attorney’s fee, to be recovered as a part of the costs; the amount of such award is not a question for the jury.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E.L. Fischer, judge.</p>

STATEMENT. The appellant and his brother, Tom Clark, were jointly charged by information with, the crime of murder in the first degree for the killing of one Owen Masten on or about April 17, 1903. Appellant demanded a separate trial, was convicted of murder in tbe second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment in .tbe penitentiary for the term of twenty-one years.

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COUBT.</p> <p>Cities and City Officers—Liability for Injuries to Firemen. A municipal corporation is performing a ministerial public duty in maintaining a fire station, and is liable in damages to an employee for personal injuries resulting from the neglect of the corporation to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which to work.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Corporations—Admission of Liability by President Not Binding. The president of a corporation has no authority, by virtue of his office, to bind the corporation by an admission of its indebtedness, such admission not being shown to have been made by him while engaged in the business of the corporation out of which the indebtedness grew or as a part of the res gestee. Evidence of it is merely hearsay, and its admission erroneous.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS' BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Insurance Policy—Failure to Mahe Proof of Loss in Time Not a Forfeiture. Unless an insurance policy in express terms provides for a forfeiture in case proof of loss be not made within sixty days after the fire, a forfeiture will not be declared by the court.</p> <p>2. -Negligence Must he Wilful and Fraudulent. Negligence of the assured sufficient to defeat a recovery on an insurance policy must be wilful, and of such degree as to amount to fraud.</p>

<p>■ Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Practice, Supreme Court—Limitation of Action. Where the court sustains a demurrer to one defense, and the trial proceeds , on the remaining defenses, the ruling on the demurrer constitutes such an order of the trial court that, to be reviewed, proceedings in error must be begun within one year thereafter.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Railroads—Liable Only to Consignees for Loss of Grain. Under section 6 of chapter 100, Laws of 1893 (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 5913), the right to recover from a railway company for loss of grain delivered to it for transportation is expressly restricted to the consignee, his heirs or assigns. Held, that in an action based on the statute the owner and. consignor of grain delivered to such carrier cannot recover for loss or shortage of grain received by it for shipment.</p> <p>2. -Doubt about Vitality Left in Act of 1S9S. In view of the decision in Railway Co. v. Simonson, 61 Kan. 802, 68 Pac. 653, 57 L. R. A. 765, 91 Am. St. Rep. 218, it is doubtful whether there is any vitality left in chapter 100, Laws of 1893 (Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 5938-5917). Can’ it be said that the legislature would have enacted the law with that part of section 6 omitted which makes the bill of lading conclusive proof of the amount of grain received by the carrier ?</p>

<p>Error from Jewell district court; R. M. Picklek, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Railroads—Injury at Crossing—Contributory Negligence Bars Recovery. One may not knowingly stand upon a railroad-track in a switch yard, or so near thereto as to be in an equally dangerous position, where he knows, or has reason to know, that cars may run at any time (another position being equally available), neglect to use his ordinary faculties to guard against danger, and, when injured through the negligence of the railroad company by a car passing along 'such track, recover damages. His contributory negligence bars such recovery. The facts in the case at bar bring the plaintiff within the rule stated.</p>

<p>Error from Reno district court; M. P. Simpson, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Office and Officers—Liability of Justice for Payment of Garnished Funds to Plaintiff before Time for Appeal had Expired. In an action before a justice of the peace a garnishee paid money into court, Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, from which, within ten days, defendant appealed. After judgment, and before the appeal was taken, the justice paid the money to the plaintiff. In the district court the plaintiff dismissed his action. The defendant then sued the justice for the amount paid by him to the plaintiff. Held, that the j ustice acted judicially in the matter, and cannot be held liable for the loss occasioned, however much he may have erred.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Schools and School Districts—Mandamus to Compel Director to Sign a Warrant. A proceeding in mandamus cannot be maintained against the director of a school district to compel him to sign a warrant drawn by the clerk on the treasurer for a teacher’s salary when there is a controversy over the right of the teacher to compensation, and when the director has not been ordered by a district meeting or the district board to sign the warrant.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Cities and City Oeeicers—Mandamus to Compel Tax Levy to Pay Judgment. The failure of a city to levy a tax for the payment of a judgment at the first opportunity after its rendition does not necessarily give occasion for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel such levy, where proceedings in error to review the judgment have been brought in good faith and without unnecessary delay, although no stay bond has been given.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Homestead and Exemptions—Action by Heirs against Creditors to Quiet Title. A defendant in an action by heirs to quiet their title is not prejudiced by a judgment that bars him from claiming an interest in the premises so long as they are occupied and impressed with a homestead character, when he, as a creditor of the •estate, is asserting no interest therein while that condition continues.</p>

<p>Error from Russell district court; J. H. Reeder, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Geary district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Ness district court; Charles E. Lob-dell, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Promissory Note—Action by Innocent Holder—Erroneous Instruction. Where, in an action by the holder on a negotiable promissory note, indorsed by the payee in blank, there is intérposed by the maker the defense that the note was obtained through the misrepresentation and fraud of the payee, and the further defense that the note, since its execution and delivery, has been materially altered, and there is no evidence connecting plaintiff with the fraud or showing knowledge thereof by him at the time of the purchase of the note, it is prejudicial error to instruct the jury upon the effect of fraud on the right of plaintiff to a recovery.</p>

<p>Error from Atchison district court; B. F. Hudson, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Criminal Procedure—Review of Motion Denied. The denial of a motion to require an election in a criminal case to be made more definite and certain will not be reviewed on appeal when the ruling was not brought to the attention of the district court by the motion for a new trial.</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors—Evidence Sufficient. Evidence examined and found sufficient to sustain a conviction.</p>

<p>Error from Lyon district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

Error from Douglas district court; C. A. Smart, judge. STATEMENT. This was an action by W. R. Hazen to recover rents alleged to have been wrongfully and unlawfully collected through a void receivership by Homer 0. Bowman, M. W. Van Valkenburg, Josie Webb, and Millie Nichols. At the trial the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law : “FINDINGS OF FACT. “1.

<p>Error from Marion district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Partition—Parol Agreement—Parties to it Estopped. Parties who have acquiesced in a parol partition of real estate, followed by exclusive possession, the payment of taxes, and the permanent improvement of the land, are estopped from, questioning it as void under the statute of frauds.</p> <p>2. -Effect and Disposition of a Life-estate after Partition by Owners of the Fee. The owners of a fee subject -to a life-estate may make an agreement dividing the land in severalty before the termination of the life-estate. Upon such partition the former cotenancy of the fee is at an end, and each one may then - take title to the life-interest in his own portion and hold the entire estate adversely to the others.</p> <p>3. -— Agreement by Minor is Valid unless Disaffirmed within a Reasonable Time. An agreement to partition land made by a minor is voidable only, and becomes binding upon a failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time after majority.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT,</p> <p>1. Practice, Supreme Court—Agreed Statement of Facts Not in the Record. An agreed statement of facts upon which a trial is had cannot be made a part of the record by inserting it in the journal entry of judgment preceded by the recital that the court made such agreed statement its findings of fact.</p> <p>2. --Extent of Review in the Absence of Agreed Facts. Where a case is tried upon an agreed statement of facts, and is ' brought to this court for review upon a record which does not include it, notwithstanding such omission an inquiry may be had into the question whether the judgment was warranted under the pleadings.</p> <p>3. Descents and Distributions-—-Constructionof Will—Disposition of Trust Fund. A will directed that the property of the testator be sold and the proceeds placed .with trustees, to be expended by them for the support and education of her two minor ohildren. It was fairly inferable that the trust was to end when the children became of age, but no provision was made for the payment to them of any surplus that might then remain. From the apparent value of the estate it was reasonable to believe that the testator assumed that if the children, or either of them lived to the age of twenty-one, its proceeds would be exhausted before that time. The will concluded with the words “and in the event of the death of each of said children, Donald Johnson and Kenneth Johnson, that in such an event the residue of my estate, whatever it may be, I give and bequeath to my brother, John Olson.” Kenneth Johnson died before his mother’s death, Donald shortly after. Held, that the unexpended portion of the estate goes to the testator’s brother, and not to the heirs of Donald Johnson.</p>

<p>Error from Anderson district court; C. A. Smart, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Coffey district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Conveyance— When a Deed is a Mortgage. A mortgage is a defeasible conveyance to secure the payment of a debt. Where there is no continuing debt, the execution of a deed with a simultaneous contract to reconvey upon the payment of certain sums of money by the grantor to the grantee within a specified time the payment of which is optional with the grantor, is a conditional sale and not a mortgage.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COUBT.</p> <p>1. Railroads—Injury to Employee — Notice to Company of Defective Apparatus Inferred. In an action against a railroad company for damages resulting from an injury caused by a patent defect in the original construction of the coupling apparatus of one of its own cars, notice to the company of the defect will be inferred.</p> <p>2. -■— Eislc Not Assumed Unless Knowledge of Danger he Shown or Imputed. A railroad brakeman whose duty requires him to couple cars does not assume the risk of injury from a defective coupling apparatus unless he knows, or from all the circumstances should know, the danger arising from its use.</p> <p>3. -Knowledge of Defect is Not Necessarily Knowledge of Danger. Contributory negligence in the use of a defective coupling apparatus cannot be imputed to a railroad brakeman merely because he knows it to be defective. In order to bar recovery, the danger of using the imperfect appliance must be so great and so apparent that a person of ordinary prudence would not encounter it.</p> <p>4. - When Choice of Dangerous Way Amounts to Negligence. If a workman have the choice of several ways in which to do his work, he will be negligent if he reject those which are safe for one which is dangerous; but he may adopt any one which a reasonably prudent man would adopt and not be negligent, although others may be absolutely safe.</p> <p>5. -Propriety of Employee's Method was a Question for the Jury. Under all the circumstances of this case, the propriety of the conduct of a brakeman in using his foot to control a refractory draw-bar while attempting to make a coupling should have been left to the jury to determine.</p>

<p>Error from Nemaha district court; William I. Stuakt, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Promissory Note—Maturity upon Default in Payment of Interest—Effect of Declaration of Option in Petition. A note secured by mortgage bore interest at the rate of six and one-half per cent, per annum and provided that the failure to pay any interest coupon should mature the entire debt, at the option of the holder, and it was stipulated that the note should draw interest after maturity at the rate of ten per cent, per annum. There was. default in the payment of interest, but the holder did not then elect to declare the whole debt due, nor until about a year afterward, when a foreclosure action was brought. In the petition the holder averred that it then elected to declare the entire debt due as of the time when default was made. Held, that the holder could not, by a mere averment, give its declaration of election a retrospective effect, thus making the entire debt to become due and to draw interest at the increased rate about a year before the option was in fact exercised.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Practice, Supreme Court—Technical Errors and Immaterial Exceptions Disregarded. In a criminal appeal to this court judgment will be given without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the appellant.</p>

<p>Appeal from Ellis district court; J. H. Reeder, judge.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William G. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>’SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Cities and City Officers—Notice of Application to Organize City of Third Glass Specified. In an application by the electors of a town or village to the board of county commissioners to organize a city of the third class notice of the presentation of the petition for organization must be published in a newspaper, if there be one printed in the town or village; if not, ten printed notices of such presentation must be conspicuously posted in the town or village, but the names of the signers of the petition to organize are not an essential part of the posted notices.</p> <p>2. - Typewriter Notices Sufficient. Notices printed on a typewriter are sufficient to meet the statutory requirements.</p>

<p>Appeal from Clark ¡district court; E. H. Madison, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Criminal Procedure—Insufficient Plea of Former Conviction.. It is not error to sustain a demurrer to a plea of a former conviction where the plea does not contain a complete record of the former proceeding.</p> <p>2. -Bight to Jury of Twelve May he Waived in Misdemeanors. In the prosecution for a misdemeanor the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the court,, may waive a trial by a full jury and consent to be tried by a jury composed of eleven persons, under section 5639 of the General-Statutes of 1901, which provides: “The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to-the court, except in cases of felonies.”</p>

<p>Appeal from Rush district court; Charles E. Lob-dell, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cherokee district court; W. B. Glasse, judge.</p>

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1.. Elections—Provision for State Contest BoardUpheld—Case Affirmed. The provision of the Australian-ballot law creating a. special tribunal for the settlement of disputes regarding nominations for public office, and making its decisions final, is not unconstitutional as granting judicial powers to executive officers, or as impairing the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. The case of Miller v. Clark, 62 Kan. 278, 62 Pac. 66á, is affirmed.</p> <p>2. --- Determination of Contest Board Final unless Prior Corrupt Agreement be Shown. A dispute over which of two persons is the regular nominee of a political party for a public-office can ordinarily be settled only by the special tribunal to-which the statute commits the determination of such questions, but if it be established that a majority of the members of such tribunal have entered into a corrupt agreement with one of the-parties to give him the decision, regardless of the merits of the-case, the courts will take jurisdiction of the controversy, and decide it, in a proceeding in mandamus to compel the certification of the proper name for printing on the official ballot.</p>

Original proceeding in mandamus. STATEMENT. This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel the city clerk of Osawatomie, a city of the second class, to register the name of plaintiff on the poll-books as a voter in said city. The agreed facts are the following : “1. That the plaintiff, L. L. Uhls, is a natural-born citizen of the United States, of the age of forty-seven years. “2.

Original proceeding in habeas corpus. STATEMENT. By this original proceeding in habeas corpus, the petitioner, E. B. Jewett, seeks to obtain his discharge from an alleged illegal detention.

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; Lewis A. Myers, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Reno district court; M. P. Simpson, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Rice district court; Ansel R. Clark, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; W. G. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatriok, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gillpatkick, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Marion district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Stafford district court; Ansel R. Clark, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Cowley district court; C. L. Swarts, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge..</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Cherokee, district court; A. H. Skidmore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Cherokee district court; A. H. Skidmore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Lyon district court; Dennis Madden, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte district court; E. L. Fischer, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Miami district court; W. H. SheldoN, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William: Gr. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Error from ■ Leavenworth district court; J. H. Gtllpatriok, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Kiowa district court; E. H. Madison, judge.</p>

<p>Error fi;om Marion district court; O. L. Moore, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Stafford district court; J. W. Brinokerhopp, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Allen district court; L. Stillwell, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Smith district court; R. M. Pickler, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. Hazen, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Butler district court; G. P. Aikman, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Anderson district court; Samuel A. Riggs, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Phillips district court; John E. Hamilton,. judge.</p>

<p>Error from Marshall district court; Sam Kimble, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Greenwood district court; G. P. Aikman, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Wyandotte court of common pleas; William G-. Holt, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Jackson district court; Marshall Q-ephart, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Douglas district court; O. A. Smart, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Saline district court; R. R. Rees, judge.</p>

<p>Error from Johnson district court; W. H. Sheldon, judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Clark district court; E H. Madison, judge.</p>

<p>Appeals from Cherokee district court; W. B. Glasse, judge.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in mandamus.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in mandamus.</p>

<p>Original proceeding in mandamus.</p>