69 Md. App. 199 - Gallagher v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Whether a covenant touches and concerns the land may be considered in terms of the burdens or benefits it imposes. Thus, the test is met if the performance of the covenant will ‘tend necessarily to enhance [the] value [of the land] ...,’ Whalen .... It will be noted that the ‘benefit’ and ‘burden’ tests are stated in the alternative; if either is met, the covenant may be one running with the land.... The City nevertheless argues that these covenants could not run with the land because they dealt with something not in esse — future restoration of the properties. This contention is based on Spencer’s Case. ... The Maryland cases, therefore, give critical effect to the presence or absence of language binding successors and assigns. If these words are present, as they are here, the covenant is one running with the land or the functional equivalent thereof. That is, when the performance of the covenant touches and concerns the land within the meaning of the ‘benefit or burden’ standard, it is deemed one running with the land, even when it deals with something not in esse, when the agreement expressly binds successors and assigns. Indeed, this reasoning is entirely consistent with the majority American view that makes no distinction between affir mative and restrictive covenants for the purpose of determining whether a covenant runs with the land.... ... That the covenants are to be performed in the future cannot, alone, defeat their characterization as covenants running with the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. County Commissioners of Charles County v. ST. CHARLES ASSOCIATES LTD.

2. ““1st. That when the covenant extends to a thing in esse, parcel of the demise, the thing to be done by force of the covenant is in a manner annexed and appurtenant to the thing demised, and shall run with the land, and shall bind the assignee, although he be not bound by express words; as if the lessee covenant to repair the houses, this is parcel of the contract, and extends to the supporting of the thing demised; but, because the covenant in that case was in respect of a thing which was not in esse at the time of the demise made, but to be newly built after, and therefore bound only the covenantor, his executors or administrators, and not the assignee, the covenant did not, by the law, annex. 2nd. But if the lessee had covenanted for himself and his assigns, that they would make a new wall upon some part of the thing demised, that forasmuch as it is to be done upon the land demised, that it should bind the assignee; for although the covenant doth extend to a thing to be newly made, yet it is to be made upon the thing demised, and the assignee is to take the benefit of it, and therefore shall bind the assignee by express words [emphasis in original].””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore

3. ““[I]t would be an illogical conclusion to hold that it was the intention of the original mortgagors to provide that their heirs, successors, or assigns should come into possession of the property and enjoy the benefit of the emoluments accruing therefrom, without at the same time incurring the obligations incident to its maintenance; or, stated differently, that it was the intention of the mortgagors to assume the whole obligation of the pay ment of taxes and charges, regardless of the passage of title in the mortgaged property to others. It might be added that it would be likewise illogical to conclude a similar intention on the part of the mortgagees, for the obvious reason that the covenant to pay, in itself, is dependent upon the financial responsibility of the covenantor, and that the passing of his title to the successor would correspondingly weaken and in many cases destroy the security of the covenantee, if the covenant did not follow the property.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore