Stephenson v. Rowe’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We are of opinion, and so hold, that the devise to the defendant Jesse C. Stewart of twenty-five acres out of a larger tract of 82 acres is void for vagueness and uncertainty in the description of the property attempted to be devised. The will furnishes no means by which the twenty-five acres can be identified and set apart, nor does the will refer to anything extrinsic by which the twenty-five acres can be located. The will fixes no beginning point or boundary. It is too vague and indefinite to admit of parol evidence to support it. There is nothing to indicate where or how the testator intended the twenty-five acres should be set apart out of the 82 acres in the home tract. The principle is firmly-established in our law that a conveyance of land by deed or will must set forth a subject matter, either certain within itself or capable of being made certain by recurrence to something extrinsic to which the instrument refers. It is essential to the validity of a devise of land that the land be described with sufficient definiteness and certainty to be located and distinguished from other land. The language in which the devise to Jesse C. Stewart is expressed contains no reference to anything extrinsic which by recurrence thereto is capable of making the description certain under the principle id cerium est quod certum reddi potest.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stephenson v. Rowe

2. “The only difference between this case and Hodges lies in the words ‘immediately surrounding.’ These fix no beginning point or boundary, however. They do not indicate how the 30 acres are to be separated from the other land, except by mathematical speculation. They are thus too vague and indefinite ‘to admit of parol evidence to support them.’ Id. Therefore, the trial court erred in implicitly ruling, as it must have to consider defendant’s parol evidence, that the devise was only latently ambiguous. A fortiori, the summary judgment based thereon also constituted error.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stephenson v. Rowe