Appeal, from a decree of the probate court, ordering Marshall, as administrator of Crippen, to pay over to Hood, as administrator of Lawrence, any balance in his hands belonging to-the estate of Lawrence, of whose estate in his lifetime Crippen was administrator. Facts found by the court. The appeal was taken in good faith by Hood, who assigned, as reasons for his appeal, insufficiency and ambiguity in the decree.
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1899-06-05
How this case has been cited
Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently July 1950
3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
¶1
In analogy to the right of a plaintiff to become nonsuit before opening' his case to the jury, it is the right of an appellant from the decree of the probate court to have , his appeal dismissed at any time before trial.
Doughty
v.
Little,
61 N. H. 365,
366; Simpson
v.
Gafney,
66 N. H. 477.
¶2
So far as appears, there was no error in denying the sureties’ motion that they be allowed to prosecute the appeal. Their interests are understood to be adverse to those of the appellant, and their reasons of appeal to be different from Kis ; and, if this be so, the granting of their motion would not subserve their purpose, because the only reasons of appeal before the court would be those assigned by the appellant in conformity with the statutory requirement. P. S.,
c.
200,
s.
2. Under these circumstances, neither law nor the furtherance of justice would require the granting of the motion.