69 N.H. 96
Marston v. Osgood
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · decided 1896-12-05
<p>A levying creditor’s conveyance of land with warranty is competent and sufficient evidence of his acceptance of seizin.</p> <p>One in possession of real estate under a bond for a deed is equitably entitled, upon performance of his part of the contract, to a conveyance from one-claiming under a levy on execution against the obligor; but as defendant in a writ of entry, his right to a deed is no defence to the legal title of the-levying creditor or those claiming under him.</p> <p>Writ of Entry. Trial by tbe court and verdict for tbe plaintiffs. May 12,1882, Charles Sanborn owned the demanded premises, and on that day gave the defendant a bond to convey the same to him at any time within three years, upon the payment of §1,500, together with interest thereon, to be paid every three months, and all taxes. By the terms of the bond, the defendant was entitled to take and took immediate possession of the premises, and has ever since remained in possession. lie paid the interest to May 12, 1883, and the taxes, but has paid nothing since. May 28, 1883, T. G. Sanborn caused the premises to be attached on his writ against Charles Sanborn; and having obtained judgment, caused the execution issued thereon to be levied on the premises, December 19, 1884. In April, 1886, he conveyed the same with warranty to George Marston, since deceased, whoso heirs-at-law the plaintiffs are. The officer returned that he delivered seizin to the creditor’s attorney. The defendant objected to the levy because the return does not show that the creditor accepted seizin. The court found that the creditor accepted seizin and overruled the objection, subject to exception. The defendant claimed that the levy was void as against him, but the court ruled otherwise, and he excepted.</p>
Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1927
2 district · 1 state decisions
Relies on Pritchard v. Brown · Ela v. Pennock · Cutting v. Pike
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1896-12-05