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69 So. 3d 225

State v. ROFFLER

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided December 22, 2010

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 2010-12-22

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently July 2020

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““In the 21st century, however, the various mediums of exchange represent the same standard of value for the dollar. The medium of exchange involved — whether cash, check, debit-card transaction, credit-card transaction, electronic funds, etc. — does not determine the value of the amount of funds. Whether the dollar amount is in the form of cash, check, multiple-party check, credit-card transaction, debit-card transaction, or electronic funds, businesses, banks, and financial institutions recognize that the dollar has a standard value; consequently, the medium of exchange does not determine the value of a monetary amount. This acceptance of the various mediums- of exchange as interchangeable and representing equivalent values for the dollar makes describing the medium of exchange immaterial when describing the funds over which a defendant allegedly has exercised unauthorized control. The material concern is the • monetary amount. Therefore, we conclude that an indictment charging the offense of theft of a certain monetary amount, in violation of one of the provisions of § 13A-8-1 et seq,, Ala.Code 1975, but that does not identify the medium of exchange is legally sufficient. Section 15-8-25, Ala. Code 1975, provides: “ ‘An indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and with that degree of certainty which will e”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hall v. State

““[T]hat the requirements of § 15-8-25, Ala.Code 1975, are satisfied even if the indictment stating the monetary amount over which the defendant is allegedly exerting unauthorized control does not identify the medium of exchange. Identification of the monetary amount alone provides the defendant adequate notice of the theft to prepare his or her defense and to avoid double jeopardy.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 69 So. 3d 233 - State v. ROFFLER

Relies on 477 So. 2d 979 - Ex Parte Airhart · 488 So. 2d 44 - Shubert v. State · 686 So. 2d 1283 - Delevie v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2010-12-22

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

COBB, Chief Justice

¶1(concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).

¶2To the extent that the majority holds that indictments charging theft satisfy the requirements of § 15-8-25, Ala.Code 1975, without explicitly stating with the dollar amount allegedly stolen the additional language “in lawful United States currency,” I concur in the result. I concur in the result on this point because the only rationale supporting the majority opinion is that “times have changed” and that, therefore, it is now necessary to discard approximately 100 years of legal precedent that required the State to specify the value of what has been allegedly taken in a theft by reference to “lawful United States currency.” See, e.g., Shubert v. State, 488 So.2d 44 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), and the cases cited therein. Although I believe the result is correct, I do not believe that this Court should discard its precedent without a more thorough analysis of facts and authorities from other American jurisdictions that support such action.

¶3With regard to the further holding that the medium of exchange is now essentially irrelevant to the validity of an indictment charging a crime of theft, I must respectfully dissent. This holding also reverses many years of established precedent3 without authority, and I am not persuaded that simply specifying a dollar amount in charging theft without specifying the medium of exchange sufficiently informs an individual under § 15-8-25, Ala.Code 1975,4*233of the offense. I do not believe that the theft of cash money is necessarily equivalent with the theft of a check or the theft of funds by unauthorized electronic transfer, or the theft of a credit card or a debit card, and the failure to provide an accused with such information, i.e., the medium of exchange, can be substantially prejudicial under § 15-8-25. Further, I do not believe it is unduly burdensome on the State to specify the medium of exchange before it undertakes to deprive a person of his or her liberty in a prosecution for a felony. Because I do not believe that the majority opinion is required to make the further holding that all mediums of exchange are equal in order to properly resolve this case, I respectfully dissent from that holding.

¶4. See, e.g., Ex parte Airhart, 477 So.2d 979 (Ala.1985), Delevie v. State, 686 So.2d 1283 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), and Henderson v. State, 520 So.2d 169 (Ala.Crim.App.1987).

¶5. "An indictment must state the facts constituting ' the offense in ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment. In no case are the *233words ‘force of arms’ or ‘contrary to the form of the statute’ necessary.”

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