Kline v. Eyrich’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (9) prior advertisements or statements by the lawyer with respect to the fees the lawyer charges; and (10) whether the fee agreement is in writing.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chaffin v. Ellis · Shoughrue v. St. Mary's Medical Center, Inc.

2. “First, the doctrine prevents the beneficiaries of legal services from being unjustly enriched by requiring them to pay for those services according to the benefit received. Second, the doctrine serves to spread the costs of litigation proportionally among all of the beneficiaries so that the plaintiff does not bear the entire burden alone.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. House v. Estate of Edmondson · Shamblin v. Sylvester

3. “Any issue as to whether the common fund doctrine applies to spread an attorney’s fee among various parties is a question of law. See Kindred, v. City of Omaha Employees’ Ret. Sys., 252 Neb. 658 , 564 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1997). Accordingly, our standard of review on this issue is de novo, according no presumption of correctness to the trial court’s conclusions of law. See, e.g., Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tenn.2001). However, upon finding that the common fund doctrine is applicable, “[t]he allowance of attorney’s fees is [then] largely in the discretion of the trial court.” Cf. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn.1995). Consequently, we will uphold a trial court’s award of fees unless it has abused its discretion, see Fell v. Rombo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 853 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000), meaning that it either applied an incorrect legal standard or reached a clearly uni'easonable decision, thereby causing an injustice to the aggrieved party, see Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn.2001) (citing State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn.1999)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Shamblin v. Sylvester