69 U.S.
Volume 69 — United States Reports
59 opinions
- 69 U.S. 1Dermott v. Jones (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
JoNES, a mason and house-builder, contracted, with Miss Dermott to build a house for her, the soil on which the house , was to be built being her own. The house was to be built. according to very detailed plans and specifications, which the u architect” of Misé Dermott had prepared, and which were made part of the contract.
- 69 U.S. 10Hawthorne v. Calef (1864)Held state or territorial law unconstitutionalSupreme Court of the United States
Held: to amount to a contract with creditors not to divert that fund from the payment of their debts.
- 69 U.S. 24Drury v. Foster (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that an appeal bond drawn in blank as to the recital of the judgment, and executed by the. appellant and his surety, the former giving parol authority to his surety to' ascertain from the justice the amount of the judgment, and fill up the blank accordingly, and deliver, the bond for both, and which was done, was a good bond.
- 69 U.S. 35Miles v. Caldwell (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: as compared with other species of property. But no doubt is entertained that in all of them the feeling is'far removed from that which formerly prevailed in England, or which prevails there even now.
- 69 U.S. 45Tool Company v. Norris (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
In July, 1.861, the Providence Tool Company, a corporation created under the laws of Rhode Island, entered into a contract with the ■ Government, through the Secretary of 'War, to deliver to officers of the 'United States, within certain stated periods, twenty-five thousand muskets, of a specified pattern, at the rate of twenty dollars a musket.
- 69 U.S. 56Gregg v. Forsyth (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that a writ of error would not lie to an order of the Circuit Court awarding a writ of restitution on motion, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The writ in the present case must be dismissed for the same reason. The order is not considered a final judgment within the meaning of the'•Judiciary Act. Dismissal accordingly. * Rex v. Leaven, 2 Salkeld, 558; Sympson v. Juxon, Cro.
- 69 U.S. 57Banks v. Ogden (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>1. A plat of an addition to a town, not executed, acknowledged, and recorded in conformity with the laws of Illinois, operates in that State as a dedication of the streets to public use, but not as a conveyance of the fee of the streets to the municipal corporation.</p> <p>2. A conveyance, by the proprietor of such an addition, of a block or lot bounded by a street, conveys the fee of the street to its centre, subject to the public use.</p> <p>8. When a street of such an addition is hounded on one side by Lake Michigan, the owner of the block on the other side takes only to the centre; while' the fee of the half bounded by the lake remains in the proprietor, subject to.the easement.</p> <p>4. When the lake boundary so limits the street as to reduce it to less than half its regular width, the street so reduced must still be divided by its centre line between the grantee of the lot hounded by it and the original proprietor.</p> <p>5. Accretion by alluvion upon a street thus bounded will belong to the original proprietor, in whom, subject to the public easement,-the Lee of the half next the lake remains.</p> <p>6. The limitation of the 8th section of the bankrupt, act of 1841 does not apply to suits by assignees or their grantees for the recoveryof real estate until after two years from the taking of adverse possession.</p>
- 69 U.S. 70Brooks v. Martin (1863)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Martin filed a bill in 'equity in tbe Federal Court of Wisconsin to set aside a contract of sale which he had made to Brooks of his interest in a partnership venture, and for an account and division of the profits; the ground of the prayer being his own alleged embarrassed condition at the time of the sale ; his .ignorance of .the partnership "business; fraud, on the part of the defendant, Brooks; concealment b.y Brooks 'of what he knew; misrepresentation in what ne…
- 69 U.S. 87Badger v. Badger (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: in the following words: “Even acquittances given to an executor, without full knowledge of all the circumstances, where information had been withheld by the executor, arc not bind *91 ing.” 'And this Court- set aside' and annulled a .decree in favor of one of the executors for a large amount, although there had been a judgment in his favor by a competent court, after a full trial before arbitrator’s, and an…
- 69 U.S. 96Brobst v. Brobst (1864)Certification to/from lower courtSupreme Court of the United States
Ik this case, in the court below, some questions had been disposed of finally by the Circuit and District Judges, and others were suspended by their inability to agree and a consequent division of opinion. An appeal was taken from the part covered by the final decree, and a certificate of division upon the residue of the case. No appeal bond had been entered.
- 69 U.S. 97Day v. Gallup (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that the cáse did “ involve a question of right and title to the property under the Federal process, which belonged to the Federal, and not State courts, to determine.” In this case there was no possession of the res by the marshal as marshal, unless on the assumption of the exclusive authority of the Federal court to decide the question of title.
- 69 U.S. 106Humiston v. Stainthorp (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
Stainthorp and Seguine had filed a bill in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of -New York, against Humiston, for infringing a patent for moulding candles; and had obtained a decree against him. The decree was that' the complainants were entitled to a permanent injunction, and for an account' of gains and profits, and that, the cause be referred to a master to take and state the amount and-report to the court.
- 69 U.S. 110Murray v. Lardner (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Laiidner was the owner of three bonds of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, for .$1000 each. They were coupon bonds of the ordinary kind, and payable to bearer. He resided in the country, about nine miles from Philadelphia, but had an office in that city, where he went to transact business .two dgys in the week, Wednesdays and Saturdays. He kept the bonds in a fire-proof in this office.
- 69 U.S. 123Heckers v. Fowler (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: imthe case of the Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swan, † that a trial by arbitrators, appointed by the court, with the" consent of both parties, was one of the modes of prosecuting a suit to judgment as well established and as fully war *129 ranted by law as a trial by jury, and, in tbe judgment of this court, there can be no doubt of the correctness of that proposition.
- 69 U.S. 134Ex parte Dugan (1864)No dispositionSupreme Court of the United States
On a petition for a certiorari to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to send up the record of their proceedings upon a habeas corpus issued from that court upon the application of the petitioner, it was stated by Mr. J. H. Bradley, counsel of the petitioner, that a copy of the record had been obtained; and he asked this court, upon the admission of the Attorney-G-eneral that the copy was-a correct one, to hear the case without a return from the court below.
- 69 U.S. 135The Circassian (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>The steamship Circassian, a merchant steamer under British colors, was captured with a valuable cargo by the United States steamer Somerset, for an attempted violation of the blockade established in pursuance of the proclamation of the President, dated 19th of April,. 1861. Both vessel and cargo were condemned as lawful prize by the District Court' for the Southern District of Florida; and the master, as representative of both, now brought the decree under the review of this court by appeal.</p> <p>The capture was made on the áth of May, 1862, — the date is important, — seven or eight miles off the northerly coast of Cuba, about- half way between Matanzas and Havana,- and about thirty miles from Havana; the ship at the time ostensibly proceeding to 'Havana, then distant but two or three hours’ sail. The main voyage was begun at Bordeaux. There she took a cargo, — no part of it contraband, — and was making her way to Havana when captured. Pearson & Co., of Hull*, British subjects, were her ostensible owners. The cargo was shipped by various English and French subjects, and consigned to order. The bills of lading spoke of the ship as “loading for the port of Havana/or orders;” and the promise of the bills wTas to deliver the packages “to the said port of Havana, there to receive orders for the final destination 'of my said steamer, and to deliver the same to Messrs. Brula-tour & Co., or their order, he or they paying me freight in accordance with the terms of my charter-party, which is to be considered the supreme law as regards the voyage of said steamer, the orders to be received for her and her final destination.” The master swore positively that he did not know of any destination after Havana; nor did the depositions directly show an intention to break the blockade.</p> <p>Tjio evidence of this intent rested chiefly on papers found on the vessel when captured, and in the inference arising from the spoliation of others. Thus while on her ivay from Cardifle to Bordeaux, the ship-had been chartered by Pearson & Co. to one J. Soubry, of Paris, agent for merchants loading her; the charter-party, containing a stipulation that she should proceed to Havre or Bordeaux as ordered, and then to load from the factories of the said merchants a full cargo, and “therewith proceed to Havana, Nassau, or Bermuda, as ordered on' sailing, and thence to proceed to a port of America, and to run the blockade, ij? so ordered'“by the freighters.”</p> <p>With this charter-party was the following:</p> <p> Memorandum of affreightment.- </p> <p>Taken on freight of Mr. Bouvet, Jr., by order and for account • of Mr. J. Soubry, on board of the . British .steamer Circassian, &c., bound to Nassau, Bermuda, or Havana, the quantity, &c. Mr. J, Soubry engages to execute the charter-party of affreight ment; that is to say, that the merchandise shall not be disem barked but at the port of New Orleans, and to this effect he engages to force the blockade, for account and with authority of J. Soubry.</p> <p>Laibert, Neveu.</p> <p>And on this was indorsed, by one P. Debordes, who was tbe ship’s husband or agent at Bordeaux, these words:</p> <p>Bordeaux, 15 February, 1862.</p> <p>Sent similar memorandum to the parties concerned.</p> <p>P. DESBORDES.</p> <p>Só, tdo, Bouvet wrote his correspondents in New Orleans, as follows, the letter being found on the captured vessel:</p> <p>Bordeaux, 1st April, 1862.</p> <p>Messrs. Brulatour & Co., New Orleans:</p> <p>Confirming my letter of the 29th ult., copy of which is annexed, I‘inclose herewith bills lading for 659 packages merchandise, and -92 small casks TJ. P.; also, copy of charter-party, and \private memorandum, per Circassian, in order that you may have no difficulty in settling the freight by that vessel.</p> <p>The Circassian has engaged to force the blockade, but should she fail in doing so,.you will act in this 'matter as you may deem best. I intrust this matter entirely to you.</p> <p>Accept, gentlemen, my affectionate salutations.</p> <p>E. Bouvei.</p> <p>In addition to these papers, various private letters, mostly, of course, in Drench, from' persons in Bordeaux to their correspondents at Havana and New Orleans, were found oh the vessel. One of these spoke of the steamer as “ loading entirely with our products for New Orleans, where, it is said, she has engaged to introduce them;” another describes her “ as arrived at Bordeaux, a month since, to take on board a fine cargo, with which to force the blockade a third, as “ a very fast sailer, loaded in our port for New Orleans, where she will proceed, after having touched.at Havana;” a fourth, as “about to try do enter -your-Mississippi, touching, previously, at Havana.” , So others,-.with similar expression's. A British house-of Belfast,■ sending--a- letter by her to Havana, “ takes it for granted that she will proceed with .her freight to New Orleans.” A French one of Bordeaux had a different view as to her getting there. ■ This one writes:</p> <p>“ We: are going to ■ have - a. -British; steamer- here of a thousand tons cargo for your port. We shall ship nothing by her, because the affair has been badly managed. Instead of keeping it a secret, it has been announeed-in -Paris,- laohdon, and Bordeaux. Of course, the-American Government is well informed as to all its details'; and if the steamer ever enters New Orleans, it will be because-the commanding officer, of the blockading squadron shuts his eyes. If .he does not,.she.must b.e'captured.”'</p> <p>In addition to this evidence, it appeared that a package of letters, which were sent on.board at Panillac, a-small place at the mouth-of the Gironde, after the Circassian had cleared from Bordeaux, and was- setting 'off> to sea,: were burned'after the vessel hove to, and -before .the‘officers of the Somerset came on board, :at the-time of capture.</p> <p>So faf with regard to-evidence-of intent to break the blockade. ■ .This case, however, presented a special feature.</p> <p>The1 capture, as already noted, took place on the 4th of May; 1862; at which date the city ,of New Orleans, for-whose port the lib.ellahts alleged that the vessel had been really about to run, was in possession, more or less defined and firm, of the United States. The history was thus:</p> <p>A'fleet of the United States, under Commodore Farragut, having captured -Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the 28d of April,* reached New Orleans on the 25th. On the 26th, the .commodore demanded of the mayor the surrender of the city. The.reply of the mayor was “ that the city was under martial law, and that he would consult General Lovell.” The rebel Lovell declared, in turn, that “ he would surrender nothing;” .but, at the same time, that he would retire, and leave the mayor unembarrassed.' On the 26th, the flag-officer sent a letter, No. 2, to the mayor, in which he says:</p> <p>“ I came here to reduce New Orleans to obedience to the laws, and to vindicate the offended majesty of the Government. The rights of persons and property shall be secured. I therefore demand the unqualified surrender of the city, and that the emblem ,of sovereignty of the "United States be hoisted upon the" City ■ Hall, Mint, and Custom House, by meridian of this day. And all emblems of sovereignty other than those of the United States must be removed from all public buildings- from that hour.”</p> <p>• To this the mayor' transmitted, on the same day, an answer, which' he says “ is the universal sense of 'my constituents, no less than the prompting of my owá heart.” After announcing that “ out of regard for the lives of the women and children who crowd this metropolis,” General Lovell had evacuated it with his troops, and “ restored to me the custody of its power,” he continues:</p> <p>“ The city is without the- means of-defenee. ' To surrender such a place were an idle and an unmeaning ceremony. The place is yours by the power of brutal force, not by any choice or consent of its inhabitants. As to hoisting'any flag other than the flag of our own adoption and, allegiance¿ let me say to you that the 'man lives not in our midst whose hand and heart would not he paralyzed at the mere thought of such an act; nor can I find in my entire constituency so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspirations. Your occupying the city does not transfer* allegiance from the government of their choice to .one which they have deliberately repudiated, „and they yield the obedience which the conqueror is entitled to extort from the conquered.”</p> <p>At. 6 a. M. of the 27th, thé National flag was hoisted, under directions of Flag-officer Farragut, on the Mint, which.building lay under the guns of the Government fleet; but at 10 a. m. of the same day an attempt to hoist it on the Custom House was abandoned; “ the excitement of the. crowd was so great that the mayor and councilmen thought that it would produce a conflict and cause great loss of life.”</p> <p>On the 29th, General Butler reports that he finds the city under the dominion of the mob. “ They have insulted,” he says, “ our flag; torn it down with indignity.I send a marked copy of a New Orleans paper containing an applauding account of the outrage.”</p> <p>On the same day that General reported thus:</p> <p>“ The rebels have abandoned all their defensive works in and around New Orleans, including Forts Pike and Wood on Lake Pontchartraiu, and Fort Livingston on Barataría Bay. They have retired in the direction of Corinth, beyond Manchac Pass, and abandoned everything in the river as far as.Ponaldsonville, some seventy miles beyond New Orleans.”</p> <p> </p> <p>To tbe reader who does not recall these places in their relations to New Orleans, the diagram on the page preceding will present them.</p> <p>A small body of Federal troops began to occupy New Orleans on the 1st of May. On the 2d, tho landing was completed. The rebel mayor and council were not deposed. There was no armed resistance, but tho city was bitterly disaffected, and was kept in order only by severe military discipline, and the rebel army was still organized and in the vicinity.*</p> <p>The blockade in question, as already mentioned, was declared by proclamation of President Lincoln in April, 1861; and was a blockade of the whole coast of tho rebel States. No action to terminate it was taken by the Executive until the 12th of May, 1862, when, after the success of Elag-offi'cer Earragut, the President issued a proclamation that the blockade of the port of New Orleans might be dispensed with, except as to contraband of war, on and after July 1 si following.</p> <p>Tbe ease thus presented two principal questions</p> <p>1. Was tbe port of New Orleans, on tbe 4tb of May, under. blockade' ?'</p> <p>2. If it was, was tbe Circassian, with a cargo, destined to tbat place, -then sailing witb an intent to violate it ? •</p> <p>Supposing tbe cargo generally guilty, a minor question was,-as., to a particular part of it, asserted to bave been’ shipped by’Leech & Co., of Liverpool, British subjects, and of which a' certain William Burrows was really, or in appearance, “ supercargo.”</p> <p>Burrows himself swore — bis own testimony being the only evidence on the subject — tbat be did not know of any charter-party for tbe voyage; tbat he received the bills of lading. (which, like all tbe bills, were in French) from Messrs. Des-bordes Co., the ship’s agents at Bordeaux; tbat be knew nothing -about any papers relating to other portions of tbe cargo; tbat'be was going to Havana to sett this merchandise, shipped by Leech,Harrison f Co., and was to return to Liverpool, either by the way of St. Thomas or New York; tbat be knew of no instructions■ to break''the 'blockade; bad. heard nothing about tbe vessel’s entering or breaking, tbe blockade of any port, either before, sailing or on tbe voyage, from any person as owner, or agent, or connected- witb tbe vessel or cargo. No letters or other papers were found compromising this portion of tbe cargo other than as above stated.</p> <p>The statutory port of New Orleans, as distinguished from the city of New Orleans itself, it may here be said, includes an extended region along the Mississippi above tbe city, parts of which were, at this date and afterwards, in complete possession of the rebels. ■</p> <p>I. A blockade is an interruption, by one belligerent, of-communication, by any persons whatever, with, a place occupied by another belligerent. No right exists-in a belligerent-,. as against a neutral, to blockade bis own ports-. That would be war upon the neutral. ■ Blockade is a right of war against the enemy, arid affects the neutral only incidentally, and from the necessity of the case. It is a right burdensome to neutrals, and is strict in its character. It is one which is claimed by the belligerent and yielded by the neutral, so long, and 1 only so long, as a blockade is maintained which is in accordance with and recognized by the law of nations. The blockade of his own ports would be an embargo, an act of war against the neutral, thereby made-and treated as an enemy. The embargo draws after it belligerent rights, and of a character entirely different from those that belong to a blockade; which are peaceful.:</p> <p>Now, was New Orleans,-on the 4th of May, an enemy’s port ? Plainly not. The United States y. Mce,* in this court, some years .since,.is in point.. In A.D. 1814, a place called Castine, on the south coast of the State of Mairie,- was captured by the British, then at war with us; and remained under the control of their military arid naval, forces .until peace, in 1815. They established a custom-house under -ordinary British laws.. Certain goods were imported into the place during this interval; and, on the repossession of the place by the American Government, the question was, whether the goods were liable to duty under the laws of the United States. This court held that they were not. “By the conquest and military" occupation of Castine,” say the court, “ the enemy' acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise!' the fullest rights of sovereignty over the place. The sovereignty of .the United States was, of course, suspended, arid the laws of the United States could- no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory on the inhabitants,! who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender, the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British Government, and were bound by such laws,. and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose.” Our case is stronger than this. In the case just cited, the port was an American port, which fell under really foreign rule.. This rule was an unnatural', exceptional, and temporary one. It was never regarded by any party as otherwise, or' other than as an occupation during war, .to be relinquished when peace should come. Great Britain, of course, never expected to hold permanently an isolated point in our country. "With peace, the port was surrendered to us. Here, however, New Orleans had been seized by an insurrectionary faction only; certain Americans in temporary and mad revolt. We never ceased to regard New-Orleans as a city of the United States.- We never acknowledged her as belonging to any State but a State of this Union; a State then, as now, part of our one common country. In due time, and in a short time, the mob was brought, by the power of the Government, under its actual control, as - the Government has always considered-it to be under its constitutional right. The people were, at all times, American citizens; and at any moment, had they laid down their arms, these rights would have been conceded to them. With the suppression of the insurgent organization, law and order resumed the throne; the place became, in fact and in form, what, it was always in law, — a port of the United States. Everything wa.s remitted to its former condition. The case is one where the fiction of postliminy happens to be a fact; the just and benignant fiction of the Homan law, quce fingtt eum qui capius est in civitate semper fuisse.</p> <p>Very likely the presence of the Federal army was odious enough to both mob and gentry of New Orleans, to men and women alike, “neutrals” and rebels,as well. The population ‘ may have been all hostile, bitter, defiant, explosive. Still, the Federal army did keep its possession there, and with no other opposition than that of offensive words, gestures, and looks. Probably it was never in any danger; for if it had been insufficient, the Federal fleet lay beside the town, -and could have destroyed it- in a day. Here is the-fact. From the hour that General Butler landed till this day, New Orleans has been under the Government control. That the fleet and .army were not welcome'd by tbe popnla tion witb open hearts and arms, has nothing to do with the question.</p> <p>The Government, then, was re-established, and everything was remitted. If this position be true, the right to capture was gone, no matter how guilty the design of the Circassian. “When the blockade is raised’, a veil is thrown over everything that has been done, and the vessel is no longer taken in ddicto. The delictum may have been completed at one period, hut it is, by subsequent events, entirely done away.”*</p> <p>II. As to intent to run the blockade, the'only evidence tending to show this is derived from the documents found on board ; and from these, the following are the most unfavorable in-, ferences for the vessel and cargo.which could be drawn:</p> <p>1st. By the charter-party, the vessel was to proceed “ to Havana, Nassau, or Bermuda, as -ordered on sailing, and thence to proceed to a port of America, and to run the blockade, IE SO ORDEREn BY FREIGHTERS.”</p> <p>2d. ■ By a paper found, signed “ Laibert, Neveu” (nephew), Laibert engages, on behalf of Soubry, that the merchandise should not be disembarked but at the port of New Orleans, and, to this effect, he- engages to force the'blockade for' account and with authority of Soubry.</p> <p>3d. The bills of lading contain an engagement by the master to convey the cargo to the. port of Havana, there to “ receive orders for the final destination of the steamer, and there to deliver the same to • — —, they paying freight in accordance with the terms of the charter-party; which was to be considered the supreme law as regarded the voyage, the-orders to be received for her, and her final destination.”</p> <p>4th. There are letters from various, shippers to their, correspondents in Havana and New Orleans, showing their belief that she was going to New Orleans.</p> <p>This, we say, is all the evidence. Apart, therefore, from the memorandum signed'“Laibert, Neveu,” of the genuineness of which, and of whose authority there is no proof, how does thfe case stand ? The Circassian was not, at the time of capture, and never had been, sailing to New Orleans, nor indeed to any port contiguous thereto; Havana and New .Orleans are distant 650 miles. Then the controlling document is the charter-party; and, according to that, the eventual running of the blockade was dependent upon an optl-m to be exercised by the charterer .on arriving at Havana: the bills of lading were expressly made subject to the charter-party. Her voyage was, therefore, to Havana for orders — by the terms of the charter-party — by her bills of lading — and by the fact. At Havana there was a “locus penitentice.” The orders might, never be given. Indeed, it is quitfei certain they never-would have been given under the change of circumstances by the capture of Newr Orleans.</p> <p>'Authority supports the view‘that this change of purpose; if effected at Havana, would avoid the capture.</p> <p>In The Imina* Sir "William Scott decided, that where the vessel had-originally sailed for Amsterdam, a blockaded port, under circumstances ■which would have subjected her to condemnation before changing her course; but the master, in consequence of information received at Elsinore, altered her destination, and proceeded towards Embden, she .was not ‘taken in delicto on a subsequent capture.</p> <p>What difference exists between a guilty purpose forborne by the master, without the Imowledge of the owners, and one not yet fully matured, out resting in contingency, merely, at the time of capture ?</p> <p>TIT. As respects the portion of the cargo under the care of Bur"rows. The evidence of this person, the supercargo, exculpates-the owners, and the portion'of the. .cargo owned, by them, from all participation in even an intention to violate the blockade. The bills of lading were ip French, which it does not appear that he understood. If he did, they, as do those for all the rest of the cargo, contain an express stipulation for the delivery of the goods to order, at Havana, on payment of the freight, according t.o' the charter-party; • and the reference to the latter .instrument would neither autho-. rize the carrying of the goods beyond that port,- nor was it of a nature to awaken any uneasiness on-the part of a supercargo bound only thither.</p> <p>fV". The weight of American authority denies the right of capture, even where ■ the vessel is proceeding directly to the blockaded port, before an approach near enough, to actually attempt an'entry; nor has that right been established in this court as mistakenly stated by some American authors; and the decisions in other courts of this country are decidedly against it. So also is the concurring testimony of the later Continental writers.. The practice of the American Government has.also'been against it. The “ Columbia,” the earliest English case maintaining the doctrine, was decided in 1799, after the Revolution, and is not binding, here.*</p> <p>V. The doctrine of continuous voyages is not applicable 'to a case of simple breach of blockade disconnected from contraband, the rule of 1756, or illegal trade -between the subjects of the opposing belligerents.' All the cases cited below are of one or the other of these'classes. The “ Maria” and'“Charlotte Sophia”* are not exceptions; for the voyage was really a direct one from the blockaded port in each case. This vessel could not be captured, therefore, while proceeding to Havana, for an intent afterwards to break the blockade o'f New Orleans.</p> <p>VI. The Proclamation of May 12, 1862 (after this capture), founded on the 5th section of the act of July 13, 1861, did not retro-act; nor could either continue the blockade of our recovered port against neutrals. They apply only to trade between our own citizens.</p>
- 69 U.S. 160Freeborn v. Smith (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: to interfere with vested rights.” *165 We do not question the validity of retrospective statutes that are purely remedial, that give a remedy without disturbing or impairing rights. Whenever they attempt to interfere with a right, however, the legislature has passed .the bounds of its authority, and the acts are void.
- 69 U.S. 177Sheets v. Selden's Lessee (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
• The State of Indiana, being owner of tbe Northern Division of tbe.'Central Canal, and of certain adjacent lands, an-1 thorized its Board of Internal Improvement, to cause any surplus water, of which there was some, along “with such portions of ground belonging to the State as might he necessary to its use, to he leased.” Under this act leases were made in 1889-4'0, — one to Yandes & Sheets, another to Sheets; each for the term of thirty years. • The leases reserved certain…
- 69 U.S. 191Chittenden v. Brewster (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
This was an appeal from a decree of tbe Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The suit was a creditor’s bill filed against .a judgment debtor and his assignees, the defendants in the case, to set aside an assignment made by the debtor tó hinder and delay creditors.
- 69 U.S. 198Campbell v. Read (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
The act of Congress of April'2d, 1816,† regulating appeals and writs of error from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to this court, limits,them to cases in which the matter in dispute is of the value of $1000 or upwards.
- 69 U.S. 200Bank Tax Case (1864)Held state or territorial law unconstitutionalSupreme Court of the United States
A statute .of the State of ‘New York, passed in 1857, making some modifications of previous acts of 1823, 1825, and 1830, enacted that the capital stock of the-banks of the State. These corporations are created by the State, and endowed by it with valuable franchises. That the corporations should pay the StateYor these is obvious. To make them pay is the' purpose of the act. The tax is imposed upon corporations directly and specifically.
- 69 U.S. 210Florentine v. Barton (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: in one case, that a resolvo of the State legislature, authorizing an individual, whose claim was barred by the statute of limitations, to bring a suit for its recovery, was void. They say it is “ clear that the court in which the action may be pending, must determine it according to law.
- 69 U.S. 218Cooke v. United States (1864)No dispositionSupreme Court of the United States
In this case tbe United States had obtained adjudgment for $3796,80 against Cooke, who to the same took a writ of error.
- 69 U.S. 219Smith v. United States (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that the burden of proving when and • by whom the alteration was made under the state of facts alleged in the plea, was properly cast upon the defendants. But the court admitted that a party claiming under an instrument, which appears on its face to have been altered, was bound to explain the alteration, and show that it had not been'improperly made.
- 69 U.S. 237Miller v. Sherry (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Sherry had obtained a judgment iu ejectment for some lots- and a House on them, in Illinois, against Miller, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of that State, and this was a writ of error ,to reverse it. It appeared, on the trial below, that W. & W. Lyon Had obtained a judgment against Miller in October, 1858, and sued out a fi. fa.; on which nulla bona was' returned.
- 69 U.S. 252Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>In the spring of 1861, the Fulton Bank, of New York, sent for collection to the Marine Bank, Chicago, two notes, one of Cooley & Co., for $2000, and one of Hunt & Co., for $1037; both due May 1-4, in that year. The currency at Chicago had become at that time somewhat deranged, and consisted exclusively of bills of the Illinois banks. The Marine Bank, just afterwards, addressed a circular to its correspondents, informing them that, in the disturbed state of the currency, it would be impossible to continue remittances with the usual regularity, and that until further notice it would be compelled to place all funds received in payment of collections to the credit of its correspondents in such currency as was received in Chicago, — bi’ls of the Illinois Stock Banks, — to be drawn for only in like bills.</p> <p>On the 1st May, the cashier of the Fulton Bank thus addressed the cashier of the Marine Bank:</p> <p>“Please hold the avails of the collections I have sent you, subject to my order, and advise amount credited/'’</p> <p>The two notes were collected by , the Marine Bank, in Illinois currency, at that time from Jive to'ten, per cent, below par. Immediately after the notes were collected, the Chicago bank, in reply to ah inquiry from the Fulton Bank how the account stood, advised the latter bank thus :</p> <p>•‘Mayl. You have credit as follows: Cooley & Co., . ,. . $2000.”</p> <p>‘May 6. Y>ur account bas credit as follows: Hunt & Co., . . 1037.”</p> <p>On the 21st April, 1862, that is to say, about a year after the collection made, the New York bank made a demand of payment from the Chicago bank, which was refused, unless the former bank would accept Illinois currency, now sunk fifty per cent, below par.</p> <p>The Marine Bank was a bank engaged, like other banks, in receiving deposits, lending money, buying and,, selling exchange, and the money collected on the two notes in question was not retained in any separate or specific form.</p> <p>On suit brought in the Northern Circuit for Illinois by the Fulton-Bank, the court charged that the said bank was entitled to recover the value of the Illinois currency at the time the money was received by the defendant, and judgment went accordingly. The question in this court was, whether this was right, and whether the court below ought not to have charged, as it was requested but refused to do, 'that the Fulton Bank was “ only entitled to recover of the defendant the value, in coin, of such currency so received by the defendant at the time of demand made by plaintiff for payment with interest, and from that date,” — the only instruction asked for by the defendant’s counsel.</p> <p>A question was also raised in this court as to the form of action below, — trespass on the case for having wrongfully received the depreciated paper;' but this point had not been raised in the court below.</p> <p>contended that this bank, in receiving the money and passing it to the credit of the Fulton Bank, was acting as the plaintiff’s agent. If this was so, and it obeyed instructions and acted in good faith, it could not be held responsible for the depreciation of the currency while in its hands; a position for which the counsel relied on the American Leading Cases.* The Marine Bank had of course mixed the currency it received with other like currency, and perhaps used a part or the whole in its 'ordinary banking business. In this, however, it did but follow the only course possible among banks. No depositor, correspondent, or customer, when dealing with a bank, ever expects that anything else will be done. This being the settled and only practicable course of business, the plaintiff understood that when the notes were collected and the proceeds placed to his credit, they would pass into the general funds of the bank, and be used till drawn for. This intermixture, having been made in the usual course of business, the counsel contended was proper, and did no wrong to the principal. The ordinary rules of law, with regard to confusion of goods, applied, and the proprietors had an interest in common in the entire fund, in proportion to their respective shares.</p> <p>The counsel also called, attention to the form of action,— case'for negligence in receiving the depreciated paper. In ■sueb form of action nothing was before the court but the question, whether the Marine Bank was liable for having received the paper; and to that question the bank’s circular was a complete reply. The question, whether the Chicago bank was liable for one rate or for ..another did not arise on the pleadings; judgment had been given below on a thing not at all in issue; and was, accordingly, to be reversed.</p>
- 69 U.S. 258The Venice (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
The schooner Venice, with a cargo of cotton, was captured in Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, by the United Stat’es ship-of-war Calhoun, on the 15th of May, 1862; was taken to Key West, libelled as a prize of war in the District Court, but was restored, with her cargo, to the claimant, Cooke, by its decree. The United States appealed.
- 69 U.S. 279Pico v. United States (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>When a claim to land in California is asserted as derived through the Mexican Land System, the absence from the archives of the country, of evidence supporting the alleged.grant, creates a presumption against the validity of such a grant so strong that it can-be overcome, if at all, only by the clearest proof of its genuineness, accompanied by open and • continued possession of the'premises.</p>
- 69 U.S. 283Bronson et al. v. La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company et al. (1863)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Bronson and Souter filed their bill in the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin, to foreclose a mortgage made on the 17th August, 1857, by the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company, a corporation of Wisconsin, covering a portion of a railroad made by the said company in that State, — the portion being between Milwaukie and Portage City, about ninety-five miles, and called the Eastern Division.* The mortgage was made to the said Bronson and Souter as trustees, to…
- 69 U.S. 313Ransom v. Williams (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Ransom brought ejectment against Williams, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Both parties claimed title from Galbraith. The plaintiff relied upon a sheriff’s deed, made pursuant to a sale under an execution upon a judgment against Galbraith and others, obtained in the. State court of Ogle County, on the 27th of March, 1841.
- 69 U.S. 320Case v. Brown (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Among the inventions of our country that have assumed great value — especially in the regions of the West, where Indian corn is largely produced — are those known as Corn-PtANTEES. The machine consists of a mechanism resembling somewhat, in external appearance, and in-section view, a high plough on wheels. It is drawn by a horse, while a man walks behind and manages it. The object is to plant corn at spots, which spots shall be both equidistant and in rows.
- 69 U.S. 328Harvey v. Tyler (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
- 69 U.S. 350The Slavers (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
- 69 U.S. 366The Slavers (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, or to be held to service or labor. 3 4 2.
- 69 U.S. 375The Slavers (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, &c. The libel was served October 28, I860. On the 30th, John Morris, “ intervening for the interest of himself as owner of the vessel and carrier of the cargo, appears before the honorable court, and makes claim to the said vessel, &c.,” and averred himself to be true and bond fide owner, &c. The District Court condemned the vessel.
- 69 U.S. 383The Slavers (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves, &c., contory to the provisions of the second section of the act of 20th April, 1818, ‡ &c. On the 28th of August, 1861, one Gregorio Tejedor, said to be a Spanish subject, residing at Havana, and alleging himself to be owner of the cargo and charterer of the bark, intervened, averring that he was the bona fide owner of the cargo and charterer of the vessel.
- 69 U.S. 403Albany Bridge Case (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
- 69 U.S. 404Mrs. Alexander's Cotton (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: and a new Constitution formed for that State.
- 69 U.S. 423Tobey v. Leonards (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
This ivas a suit relating to certain transactions of a man of advanced years, and of somewhat marked characteristics and temper, named Jonathan Tobey, a farmer and old resident, as his father, whose name he bore, had been before him, of the neighborhood of New Bedford, in Massachusetts..
- 69 U.S. 440Milwaukie and Minnesota Railroad Company and Fleming v. Soutter, Survivor (1865)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
A decree had been made some time since in this court, against the La Crosse and Milwaukie, and the Milwaukie and Minnesota Railroad Companies, the road being then in the hands of a receiver,, on a bill in equity, filed in the Federal court of Wisconsin, to foreclose a mortgage, given by the former company on its road, &c., to two persons, named Bronson and Soutter (of whom the former was now dead), to secure certain bonds which the former road had issued, on which the…
- 69 U.S. 444United States v. Billing (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
. The Board of Land Commissioners, established by act of Congress of March 3, 1851, to settle private land claims 'in California, confirmed, in 1851, to Billing and others, a tract of land granted in 1839 by the Mexican Government to one Felis.
- 69 U.S. 450Steamship Company v. Joliffe (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that while on a writ of error, the case must be decided on the record as made in the court below, the question of error or no error must be determined by the law as it stands at the time the case is heard in the Court of Appeal.
- 69 U.S. 474The Baigorry (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that a blockade once established, and duly notified, must be presumed to continue until notice of discontinuance, in the absence of positive proof of discontinuance by other evidence; and we do not think that the testimony of the master and mate that they saw no blockaders when entering or leaving Calcasieu Pass, supplies such ■proof.
- 69 U.S. 481The Andromeda (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: never appeared there during the proceedings in prize, never manifested any concern in the result beyond the mere signing of a power of *489 attorney, authorizing Ashby to claim in their name. The court below very properly gave much consideration to this circumstance.
- 69 U.S. 491Kutter v. Smith (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Link demised, on the 1st of May, 1857, to Sherman, a lot in Chicago, for twelve years from that date. The lessee covenanted to pay all the taxes and assessments levied on the premises during the term.
- 69 U.S. 501Levy Court v. Coroner (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: but allowed his disbursements to jurors and witnesses in the same cases. If the inquests were illegally held, so that the coroner could not claim compensation for his services, how could his disbursements upon these illegal inquests give him a legal claim for money laid out and expended? If his time and labor were given at the risk of lósing them, so must his payments have been made at his own risk.
- 69 U.S. 510Milwaukie and Minnesota Railroad Company and Fileming v. Soutter Survivor (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>1. Tnough a court below is bound to follow the instructions given to it by a mandate from this, yet where a mandate has plainly been framed, as regards a minor point, on a supposition which is proved by the subsequent course of things to be without base, the mandate must not be so followed as to work manifest injustice. On the contrary, it must be construed otherwise, and reasonably.</p> <p>2. The appointment or discharge of a receiver is ordinarily matter resting wholly within the discretion of the court below. But it is not always and absolutely so.</p> <p>Thus, whore there is a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage given by a railroad corporation on its road, &c. — a long and actively worked road— (a sort of property to a control of which a receiver ought not to be appointed at all, except from-necessity), and the amount due on the mortgage is a matter still unsettled and fiercely contested, the appointment or discharge of a receiver is matter belonging to the discretion of the court in which the litigation is pending.</p> <p>But when the amount due has been passed on and finally fixed by this court, and the right of the mortgagor to pay the sum thus settled and fixed is clear, the court below has then no discretion to withhold such restoration; and a refusal to discharge the receiver is judicial error, which this court may correct, supposing the matter' (not itself one in the nature of a final decree) to he in any way fairly before it otherwise.</p> <p>If other parties in the case set up claims on the road, which they look to the receiver to provide for and protect, these other claims being disputed, and, in reference to the main concerns of the road, small, — this court will not the less exercise its power of discharge. It will exercise it, however, under conditions, such as that of the company’s giving security to pay those other claims, if established as liens.</p>
- 69 U.S. 525United States v. Stone (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: by deed from them, the estates granted. The patents ail recited the promises of the treaty of 1860 to grant land to the chiefs, and went on to grant the particular tract, “ in conformity with the provisions, as above recited, of the aforesaid treaty.” In 1862, the Secretary of the Interior decided that the patents had been issued without legal authority, and he declared them void and revoked.
- 69 U.S. 538The Ann Caroline (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
This was an appeal in admiralty from tbe decree of tbe Circuit Court for tbe Southern District of New York, in a ease of collision,at sea, — the case being thus: Tbe owner of tbe schooner J. C. Wells filed a libel in admiralty in the Southern District of New York against tbe schooner Ann Caroline, to recover damages for a collision occurring on the eastern shore of the Delaware Bay.
- 69 U.S. 550The Morning Light (1864)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
the Southern District uf‘New York. About the 6th of August, 18.55, the brigs Jerry Fowler and Morning Light, in a dark and rainy night, were pursuing a voyage off the coast of Rhode Island through Buzzard’s Bay and-Martha’s Vineyard, eastward, with the wind from the northeast, the Jerry Bowler being the head vessel and the Morning Light in her rear, both vessels running on 'their starboard tacks on about a common course.
- 69 U.S. 561Gordon v. United States (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
<p>M o appeal lies to this court from the Court of Claims.</p>
- 69 U.S. 562The Sutter Case (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: in that case of ■Ferris v. Coover, that Sacramento City and the eastern mar-t gin of Feather Fiver were both included within the grant to Sutter. The early colonists introduced by Sutter, composing the families for whose benefit the grant was, In part, issued, were.settled by him all along upon the east bank of Feather Fiver. TV". The lands which are reserved by the terms of the grant are tide or marsh lands.
- 69 U.S. 587United States v. Pacheco (1865)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
' The decree of the District Court confirming the claim of the grantees under the grant, described the land as “known by the name of Potrero de los Cerritos, and bounded ..on the side of the Mission of San José by the Sanjon de los Alisos (Ravine of the Willows), on the north by the creek of the Alameda (Arroyo de la Alameda), and on the west by the bay, containing about three square leagues.” The ravine and the creek here referred to as' boundaries connect with each other,…
- 69 U.S. 591Read v. Bowman (1865)AffirmedSupreme Court of the United States
Read & Whitaker were inventors of four improvements in reaping and. mowing machines, the principal one being what was called- a “ tubular finger-barand in 1856 were in partnership, under the name of Lloyd, Whitaker & Co., with two persons named Lloyd & Bowman; these last-named persons using the improvements with them, though not in any way inventors.
- 69 U.S. 605Hogan v. Page (1865)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Louis, for the purpose of settling imperfect French and Spanish claims.
- 69 U.S. 609Minnesota Company v. St Paul Company (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that a purchaser or bidder at a master's sale, subjected himself quoad hoc to the jurisdiction of the court, and became so far a party to the suit by the mere act of making a bid, that he could appeal from any subsequent order of the court affecting his interest. 12 104 The objection to the jurisdiction must therefore be OVERRULED. 105 We next proceed to inquire whether the bill makes a case calling for relief. 106…
- 69 U.S. 649The Fossat or Quicksilver Mine Case (1864)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
About fifteen miles south from the southern end of the Bay of San Francisco, and separated from it by irregular mountain slopes, lies a vale, called the’ Cañada de los Capí-tañedlos, or Valley of the Little Captains.* The northern limit of this valley is an elevation called the .Pueblo Hills ; hills picturesque enough; with nothing else, however, as yet, specially to mark them. Descending or turning these, the traveller is in the vale.
- 69 U.S. 728Lowber v. Bangs (1865)Reversed and remandedSupreme Court of the United States
Held: that unless the delay was so great as to frustrate the object of the charterers in making the contract, it was not material to the rights of the parties. In two of them the delay was produced by the deviation of the vessel from the direct course to the port where she was to receive her lading. The authorities relied upon in behalf of the plaintiffs in error are equally cogent.
- 69 U.S. 759Ex parte Fleming (1864)Petition denied / appeal dismissedSupreme Court of the United States
The La Crosse and Milwaukie Kailroad Company, a railroad company of Wisconsin, had mortgaged its road and other property to secure certain negotiable bonds which it had issued. The bonds not being paid, a bill of foreclosure was filed in the District Court of the .United States for the Wisconsin district, the only Federal court then in that State, and which- court had at that time Circuit Court powers..