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690 F.2d 1186

Docket No. 81-3649.

Buttrey v. United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Nov. 8, 1982.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1982-11-08

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently July 1993

3 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The work that you have performed in connection with the placement of fill and dredged material into the wetlands adjacent to Gum Bayou, during the construction of a sewage treatment plant and excavation of drainage ditches, in the Magnolia Forest Subdivision Sections 19 and 30, T. 8S., R. 15E., Slidell, St. Tammany Parish, LA is regulated by the Federal permitting authority of this office. Initiating the work without first obtaining a permit is in violation of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 USC 1344). In essence, Section 404 prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States” unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army pursuant to a permit. “Waters of the United States”, as defined administratively, include all coastal and fresh water wetlands both above and below the mean high or ordinary high water line or those adjacent to other navigable waters of the United States and their system of tributaries You are hereby directed to cease and desist all activities of this nature immediately and to notify this office in writing within 10 days of receipt of this letter as to why the work was commenced without a permit.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 573 F. Supp. 283 - Buttrey v. United States

Applies 10 U.S.C. § 3013 · 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Alternative Water Sources Act of 2000) · 33 U.S.C. § 1344 · 33 U.S.C. § 403

Relies on M'Culloch v. State of Maryland · Laird v. Tatum · Reid v. Covert

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-11-08

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Charles K. Reasonover, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

¶2Alfred P. Holmes, Jr., U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Ala., Kay Richman, Anne S. Almy, Appellate Section, Land & Natural Resources Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellees.

¶3Before CLARK, Chief Judge, POLITZ and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

¶4*1187RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

¶5Plaintiffs-Appellants John Buttrey and John Buttrey Developments, Inc., are developers of a subdivision in Slidell, Louisiana, known as Magnolia Forest. On May 5, 1980, the United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a cease and desist order advising Buttrey that his placement of a fill in a wetland area was regulated by the Corps and that initiating such work without a permit violated section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV 1980).1 On November 21, 1980, the Corps issued another cease and desist order advising Buttrey that his construction of a levee and dredging in a wetland area adjacent to the Morgan River were similarly regulated by the Corps and that initiating such work without a permit violated section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976), and section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

¶6In response to these cease and desist orders, and to alleged Corps surveillance, unannounced inspections and presence, But-trey filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on January 21, 1981. Count I of the complaint alleged that “Congress’ grant of jurisdiction to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, over the private property and private activities of United States citizens is in violation of the United States Constitution” and that “the United States Army’s entry onto plaintiffs’ property and surveillance of plaintiffs activities, under the circumstances described herein, violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” Counts II and III related to the merits of the specific cease and desist orders, count IV challenged the legality of the Corps’ inspection of Buttrey’s property and surveillance of his activities, and count V alleged unlawful refusal by the Corps to make its files relating to Buttrey available to him.

¶7On August 14, 1981, Buttrey filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the Corps’ lack of jurisdiction under section 404 and the illegality of the cease and desist orders issued. The Corps, on August 20, 1981, filed a motion for summary judgment on count I and a motion to dismiss counts II through V. Following an oral .hearing on these cross-motions, the district court granted the Corps’ motion for summary judgment on count I,2 denied the Corps’ *1188motions to dismiss counts II through IV and dismissed count V as moot.3

¶8On October 13, 1981, the district court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), ordered that the clerk of the court enter a final judgment upon the order dismissing count I of the complaint, certifying that there was no just cause for delay. Buttrey appeals that judgment.4 The single issue on appeal is the constitutionality of Congress’ delegation of the authority embodied in section 404 of the Clean Water Act to the Corps of Engineers, a part of the United States Army.

¶9Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the Secretary of the Army, through the Chief of Engineers, to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material into the nation’s navigable waters. See note 1 supra. Buttrey contends that section 404 of the Clean Water Act unconstitutionally permits the military to assert authority and control over civilians. He contests neither Congress’ power to pass legislation under the commerce clause aimed at curbing the nation’s pollution problems, nor the delegation of authority to the Corps under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).5 He challenges only the fact that section 404 delegates jurisdiction to “a part of the military,” as a regulatory agency- .

¶10Buttrey argues that Congress’ total power with regard to the military can be found in article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution. Nowhere, he argues, is Congress given the power to use the Army to enforce compliance with laws or regulations not essential or necessary to the purpose of an Army. In addition, he argues that such legislation is contrary to what Justice Earl Warren once referred to as “the American tradition of the separation of the military establishment from, and its subordination to, civil authority.” Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 183 (1962).

¶11The provisions of article I, section 8, of the Constitution give Congress the power “to provide for the common defense, to declare war, to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to raise and support armies.” See Warren, supra, at 185. Buttrey cites several cases limiting the authority which Congress can extend to the military under these “war power” provisions of the Constitution.6 The authority of the Corps to reg*1189ulate the discharge of dredged or fill material into the nation’s navigable waters, however, is not found in these war power provisions, but in the commerce clause.7 The necessary and proper clause, U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, “authorizes Congress ‘to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government,’ ... and ‘avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances,’ ” Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1061 (Ct.Cl.1977) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-20, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). Buttrey has conceded for purposes of this appeal that the end of this legislation — “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” — is legitimate. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976). He has also conceded the appropriateness of the means, except to the extent that it employs the Corps of Engineers in the administration of the program. Recognizing the Corps’ expertise and existing administrative machinery, Congress chose administration by the Corps as the means to achieve its legislative end.8 The end being legitimate and the means being plainly adapted to that end, we are left only with the question whether the administration of the permit program by the Corps comports with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

¶12Two facts distinguish this case from those relied on by Buttrey to argue that Corps jurisdiction is unconstitutional. The first is that the constitutional authority for this legislation is the commerce clause, not the war power clauses; the second is that administration by the Corps does not infringe upon any other provisions of the Constitution. Because we find that the delegation of authority attacked here has a source in the Constitution independent of the war powers clauses and does not infringe upon any constitutional interests, we conclude that it is constitutional.

¶13Most of the cases Buttrey cites address the military’s court-martial jurisdiction. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955), for example, the government argued that a 1950 Act of Congress allowing the trial of ex-servicemen (for certain offenses committed while in the service) by courts-martial was a valid exercise of the power of Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, as supplemented by the necessary and proper clause. The Supreme Court, however, held that the power granted Congress to make rules to regulate the land and naval forces restricts court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed forces. Id. at 15, 76 S.Ct. at 4. The Court stated:

There is a compelling reason for construing the clause this way: any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals.

¶14Id.In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957), the Supreme Court similarly held that the wives of servicemen overseas could not be tried by military authorities. The Court held that the power granted in article, I, § 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution does not extend to civilians. Here, again, the Court stressed the encroachment on other provisions of the Constitution:

*1190Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional protections. Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of Clause 14.

¶15Id. at 21, 77 S.Ct. at 1233. The two considerations referred to above — the constitutional source of the delegation and its infringement on constitutional protections— distinguish these cases from the one before us.

¶16Another case Buttrey heavily relies upon, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), is also distinguishable. There, the respondents had sought declaratory and injunctive relief on their claim that their rights were being invaded by the Department of the Army’s alleged surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity. The Supreme Court held that there was no justiciable controversy where the first amendment chilling effect was allegedly caused not by any specific action of the Army against respondents, but only by the existence and operation of the intelligence gathering and distributing system, which was confined to the Army and related civilian investigative agencies. While recognizing that Laird was dismissed for lack of a justiciable controversy, Buttrey argues that language in the majority opinion, and in Justice Douglas’ dissent, is particularly important. While the majority did refer to the “traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs,” id. at 15, 92 S.Ct. at 2326, nothing in the opinion suggests that the type of extension of authority involved in this case would come within that tradition. Justice Douglas spoke of the extension of the military’s war powers to military surveillance over civilians, id. at 17, 92 S.Ct. at 2327, and the purpose and effect of the system of surveillance to deter the exercise of rights of political expression, protest, and dissent, id. at 25, 92 S.Ct. at 2331. Again these factors distinguish the case before us. Buttrey has pointed to no constitutional protections infringed upon by the administration of the program by the Corps. The Corps’ activities do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of Article III courts, and But-trey does not allege that they chill first amendment rights or any other constitutionally protected interests.

¶17We refuse to ignore the unique nature of the Corps, described by the district court as the civil arm of a military agency, and the expertise of the Corps developed in its performance of civil functions relating to the preservation and development of the nation’s water resources for over 150 years. The Corps is limited in its authority to that which Congress provides and remains subject to revocation of that authority at any time at the will of Congress. Judicial review is available in the civil courts under the same standard of review that would apply to any other agency administering such a program. Civilian control is also effected by 10 U.S.C. § 3013, which requires that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, whose principal duty is supervision of Army functions relating to water resources conservation and development, “be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

¶18Our holding is of course limited to the particular facts of this case — the delegation of the dredge and fill permit authority of section 404 of the Clean Water Act to the Army Corps of Engineers. In stressing that fact, we repeat the words of the Supreme Court found at the close of the majority opinion in Laird v. Tatum, supra, at 15-16, 92 S.Ct. at 2326-27:

[W]hen presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation’s history or in this Court’s decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.

¶19AFFIRMED.

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