¶1 Christopher Frank, federal prisoner # 01160-748, seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his sentence to life imprisonment for conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. A jury convicted Frank of that offense and two firearms charges in 1999, and he received a concurrent five-year prison sentence and a consecutive ten-year prison sentence for the firearms offenses. His life sentence resulted from the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 and the cross-reference found at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; the district court found that various murders committed in furtherance of the conspiracy constituted relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing.
¶2 Frank argues that authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion is warranted in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which established a new rule of constitutional law that was made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review in Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736-37, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). He contends that Miller renders his life sentence unconstitutional because (1) he was sentenced under a mandatory scheme to life in prison without the possibility of parole; (2) he was a juvenile— between the ages of 14 and 17 — when four of the murders in question were allegedly committed, and he was a “young adolescent” — ages 18 and 19 — when the other murders were committed; and (3) the district court did not make an individualized sentencing decision. We will grant authorization if, as relevant here, Frank makes a prima facie showing that his proposed claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review. § 2255(h)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (3)(C).
¶3 Regardless of whether the guidelines-derived mandatory life sentence fell within the Supreme Court’s limitations, Miller is unhelpful to Frank. The relevant conduct that formed the basis for the cross-reference to § 2A1.1 included murders that occurred after he had attained age 18. Thus, Frank has not demonstrated that Miller entitles him to authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. See § 2255(h)(2).
¶4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion is DENIED. Frank’s motion for the appointment of a neuropsychological expert is also DENIED.