690 So. 2d 1201 - State v. Hill’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

133 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hen the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment.”

   35 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. H.N.P. v. State · State v. Hale

2. ““The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), held that ‘a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.’ 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 . The standard for allowing a Terry stop is whether there is a reasonable suspicion that ‘the person being stopped has engaged in some type of criminal activity.’ Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 500 So.2d 1282 (Ala.1986).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Muse v. State · 28 So. 3d 827 - State v. White

3. “"Information provided by a reliable informant can provide the reasonable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In Alabama v. White, supra, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the same considerations relevant in determining whether an informant's tip gives rise to probable cause are also `relevant in the reasonable-suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to meet that standard.' White, 496 U.S. at 328 -29 , 110 S.Ct. at 2415 . Under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), in order for an informant's tip to form the basis of a probable cause finding the prosecution had to satisfy a two-pronged test of proving (1) an informant's `veracity' or `reliability' and (2) the informant's `basis of knowledge.' See, e.g., Ex parte Meeks, 434 So.2d 844 (Ala. 1983); Knight v. State, 346 So.2d 478 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 483 (Ala. 1977); see also H. Maddox, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure § 3.9 (1990). But in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted a more flexible `totality of the circumstances' approach, under which an informant's `veracity' or `reliability,' and `basis of knowledge' are highly relevant factors in determining whether probable caus”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 783 So. 2d 74 - Warren v. State