Lingenfelter v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Plaintiff Lingenfelter was employed as a laborer by Defendant Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., from September 25, 1968, until he was drafted for military service on June 24, 1969. He was honorably discharged from the United States Army on February 17, 1971, because of physical disabilities. The physical evaluation report read: “Epilepsy, grand-mal, severe, uncontrolled by medication, at least 1 major seizure in the last 6 months.” Lingenfelter receives monthly disability payments from the Army based upon a finding of 20 percent disability.

¶6In March 1971, Lingenfelter applied for reinstatement with Keystone. His application was denied. The evidence conflicts on whether reinstatement was denied based upon Lingenfelter’s physical condition or his lack of seniority. However, that issue is not material to this court’s decision.

¶7After learning of Keystone’s decision not to rehire him, Lingenfelter contacted the Veteran’s Administration for assistance. Later, in March 1973, Lingenfelter requested help from the United States Department of Justice. Neither agency was able to resolve Lingenfelter’s claim. On November 23, 1973, the Regional Solicitor of the labor department advised the Acting Assistant Attorney General that Lingenfelter’s claim was “not meritorious.” Moreover, on February 25, 1974, the United States Attorney for the (then) Southern District of Illinois wrote to Lingenfelter, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice, advising them that he would not file an action on Lingenfelter’s behalf. In that letter, the United States Attorney told Lingenfelter of his right to pursue a claim through private counsel and suggested that he consult a lawyer.

¶8Although Lingenfelter seemingly had exhausted all other avenues available to him for reinstatement with Keystone no later than February 1974, this action under the Veteran’s Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976), was not filed until May 20, 1980. Discovery progressed through September 1981. Defendant Keystone moved for summary judgment on September 23, 1981, and Plaintiff Lingenfelter filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on October 8, 1981. On December 2,1981, the district court granted the defendant’s motion, declaring that because the plaintiff had inexcusably delayed filing this action, and because that delay prejudiced the defendant, the suit was barred by laches. We affirm.

¶9I

¶10A. The doctrine of laches.

¶11Laches is principally a question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced. It is unlike limitation, which is based merely on time. Rather, laches is based upon changes of conditions or relationships involved with the claim. Galliher v. Gadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373, 12 S.Ct. 873, 875, 36 L.Ed. 738 (1892). In order to support a defense of laches, there must be a showing of both a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and prejudice to the defending party. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S.Ct. 534, 543, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961).

¶12This court has held consistently that under the two-prong test for laches the plaintiff bears the burden of explaining its delay in bringing suit. See Baker Manufacturing Co. v. Whitewater Manufacturing Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1011-15 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 956, 91 S.Ct. 978, 28 L.Ed.2d 240 (1971); Boris v. Hamilton Manufacturing Co., 253 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1958). If the delay is inexcusable, then the defendant must show prejudice. In Baker, the court concluded that an unreasonable, inexcusable delay raises a presumption that the defendant suffers damage and prejudice. 430 F.2d at 1009-11. The plaintiff here vigorously asserts that such a presumption is improper, and that the defendant must establish prejudice. We need not analyze that issue in this case, however, because we believe that the district court *341did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Keystone had shown actual prejudice.

¶13B. Plaintiff’s claims.

¶14We note at the outset that a decision on the issue of laches rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Baker, 430 F.2d at 1009. Although the trial court’s discretion is not “unfettered by appropriate standards or shielded from thorough appellate review,” Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980), we will not disturb its findings on appeal “unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of discretion.” Baker, 430 F.2d at 1009; Boris, 253 F.2d at 528-29.

¶15The plaintiff first claims that his failure to commence an action until more than nine years after it accrued, and more than six years after exhausting other courses of action, does not bar a claim under the doctrine of laches. In his brief at page 12, the plaintiff states: “The fact that the Plaintiff waited one year or eleven years is irrelevant and immaterial to bar the Plaintiff under the doctrine of laches.” This is clearly incorrect. In order for laches to apply, the plaintiff must have unreasonably and inexcusably delayed bringing suit. Obviously the length of the delay in filing suit stands at the core of that issue. The cases cited by the plaintiff are inapposite to the issue of delay here. In each of them, either the courts found that the delays were excusable or the length of time was not even at issue.1

¶16Lingenfelter delayed filing suit for at least six years. He offers no excuses for his delay. We believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that an unexplained delay of nine years between accrual of the cause of action and filing suit satisfied the first prong of the laches defense.

¶17The controlling issue, therefore, is whether Keystone suffered any prejudice as a result of Lingenfelter’s delay. The district court’s finding that Keystone was prejudiced is well supported by the record. Keystone hired a replacement for Lingenfelter, and hired, promoted, and paid many other workers during the nine-year period. Keystone argues that its employment scheme would be greatly upset, and its monetary losses substantial, if the appellant prevailed here. The plaintiff, however, cites Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980), in support of his proposition that the payment of wages to another worker does not consti*342tute prejudice under the doctrine of laches.2 We agree with the basic proposition that without a greater showing of prejudice than the mere payment of wages to another worker it is difficult to support a laches defense. However, such payments clearly damage the defendant unfairly when they continue for many years in the absence of any claim against it. Therefore, the district court properly considered wages paid and promotions awarded to alternate employees as elements of prejudice to the defendant.

¶18We do not believe that this position is inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Goodman in which that court “rejectfed] the contention that the cost of litigation or the payment of lost wages by itself could constitute prejudice within the contemplation of a laches defense.” Goodman, 606 F.2d at 808.3 Pecuniary losses of many types may be considered in weighing the prejudice to a defendant. See Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1974) (defendant’s payment of employee wages to another to do plaintiff’s work for more than nine years is a “very real factor” in determining whether prejudice exists); Sworob v. Harris, 451 F.Supp. 96, 102 (E.D.Pa.), affd, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089, 99 S.Ct. 871, 59 L.Ed.2d 55 (1979) (United States Government’s monetary losses including litigation expenses constitute prejudice within the purview of the laches defense).

¶19The defendant also argues that its potential witnesses cannot remember key events surrounding Lingenfelter’s application for reemployment. One witness admits that his memory has faded. Another claims to remember the events, but his testimony in a recent deposition apparently conflicts with facts recorded when the hiring procedure transpired. Even though Lingenfelter argues with some support that most testimony and evidence is available for trial, we will not disturb the district court’s decision absent so clear an error as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We cannot find any error in the district court’s ruling on this point.

¶20II

¶21The loss of important testimony and the monetary damages amply support a finding of prejudice and the application of laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim. We need not consider the defendant’s other claims of prejudice. In addition, we need not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim under the Veteran’s Reemployment Rights Act.4

¶22*343None of the many cases cited by the plaintiff suggest that the district court erred. Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

¶23Affirmed.