¶1(dissenting in part).
¶2I respectfully dissent. The statute under examination in this case can easily be interpreted to be consistent with the constitution, and we are obligated to declare the statute constitutional. See, e.g., Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 688 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 2004) (“When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, ‘we presume the statute is constitutional and “give it any reasonable construction necessary to uphold it.” ’ ” (quoting State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001)); In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 2002) (“If a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we are obliged to adopt the construction which will uphold it.” (citing Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa 2001)).
¶3If we restrict the meaning of “intent” under the statutory inference in section 710.10(4) to apply only to the “intent to commit an illegal act” element of the crime under section 710.10(3), section 710.10(4) is not unconstitutional. It is not unconstitutional because the inference does not establish all the elements of the crime. The state must still establish that the person made an attempt to entice away the minor. See Iowa Code § 710.10(3). Thus, the inference, unlike the inference in Black, does not permit the state to convict a person based solely upon engaging in protected speech.
¶4The majority rejects this approach by interpreting “intent” under section 710.10(4) to apply not only to the “intent to commit an illegal act” element but also to the “attempt to entice” element. It points out that enticement necessarily considers a person’s state of mind. That may be true, but it does not transform an “attempt” element into an “intent” element. An attempt also requires some act. The statute does not permit a conviction based solely on a person’s intent.
¶5The majority ultimately relies on the legislative amendment to the statute to reject any interpretation that limits the *413inference to the “intent to commit an illegal act” element. It concludes it is not possible to restrict the “intent” aspect of the statutory inference to the “intent to-commit an illegal act” element of the crime because there otherwise would have been no reason for the legislature to amend the statute in 2001. However, the majority overlooks a very logical reason for the amendment that would render the statute constitutional.
¶6The legislature amended the statute in 2001 by changing “intent to commit an illegal act” to “intent to commit á violation of this section.” What the majority overlooks is that the crime of enticing a child was also expanded by the legislature to provide three means to commit the crime, now defined in the first three subsections of section 710.10. Subsection (4) of section 710.10 then, of course, sets forth the inference. Although subsections (2) and (3) of section 710.10 utilize the “intent to commit an illegal act” element (the exact language contained in the statutory inference prior to the 2001 amendment), subsection (1) utilizes an “intent to commit sexual abuse or sexual exploitation” element., Thus, the statutory inference was changed by the legislature to “intent to commit a violation of this section” so as to make the inference applicable to all three sections of 710.10. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the legislature had a rational and yalid reason to amend the statute, and we are obligated to give the legislature the benefit of this reasoning.
¶7For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the opinion of the majority that declares the statute to be unconstitutional.
¶8LARSON, J., joins this dissent.