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← 691 So. 2d 959 - Wiley v. State

691 So. 2d 959 - Wiley v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

53
cited by 53 later decisions
1
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 43 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently May 2017 · most notably Gray v. State (1998), 805 So. 2d 452 - Simmons v. State (2001)

1 federal appellate · 43 state decisions

330199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Patterson v. McLean Credit Union · Woodson v. North Carolina

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A review of other cases indicates that, considering the crime and the defendant, the death penalty in this case was proportionate. A review of other cases indicates that, considering the crime and the defendant, the death penalty in this case was proportionate. See Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 350 (Miss. 1985) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant strangled and robbed business owner); Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1982) (death penalty was proportionate where defendant waited 30 minutes for business to be free of customers before robbing and shooting store attendant); Booker v. State, 449 So.2d 209, 222 (Miss.1984) (death penalty was proportionate where defendant shot and robbed business owner); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1265 (Miss.1993) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant had intelligence quotient “on the low side of ‘average’ ”, evidence was contradictory as to whether defendant was schizophrenic amnesiac); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 492 (Miss.1988) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant was mildly mentally retarded, suffered hallucinations, and had been institutionalized twice for alcoholism and drug abuse). Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 763 (Miss.1984) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant had troubled childhood and was institutionalized at age 10 due to family and learning difficulties and was severely retarded with mental ability of 8-year-old child). Therefore, Wiley’s claim that the death sente”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Most of the cases dealing with this issue have arisen in the context of closing arguments, jury instructions, or witness's testimony. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 553 (Miss.1990); Jessie Derrell Williams, 544 So.2d at 798; Williams, 445 So.2d at 813 . The State argues that these cases should be distinguished, because the trial court in the case sub judice: ... steadfastly maintained that the sentencing statute stated that life in prison was the punishment. He further told the jury not to speculate about what would be done in the future as that was not their concern in considering sentence. This situation is totally different than the prosecutor making an argument that a defendant should be given the death penalty because a sentence of life imprisonment would result in parole. The State would submit that this is not an error requiring reversal of this third death sentence. The trial court gave accurate information to the three prospective jurors who asked questions regarding parole eligibility, and those three jurors did not serve on the jury. The jury was never instructed to consider parole eligibility in determining the sentence to be imposed. This Court is persuaded by the State's reasoning, and finds that the case sub judice is factually distinguishable from Williams and its progeny; for this reason, the analysis expressed in those cases will not be extended to apply to this factual situation. See Williams, 445 So.2d at 813 ; Griffin, 557 So.2d 542 ; Jessie ”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Berry v. State, 703 So.2d 269 (Miss. 1997). Booker v. State, 699 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1997). Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246 (Miss. 1996). [*] Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887 (Miss. 1989), Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 , 111 S.Ct. 313 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) reversing, in part, and remanding, Shell v. State 595 So.2d 1323 (Miss.1992) remanding for new sentencing hearing. [*] Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 (Miss.1989), Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075 , 110 S.Ct. 1800 , 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990) vacating and remanding, Pinkney v. State, 602 So.2d 1177 (Miss. 1992) remanding for new sentencing hearing. [*] Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354 (Miss.1988), Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , 110 S.Ct. 1441 , 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) vacating and remanding, Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004 (Miss. 1992) remanding for new sentencing hearing. [*] Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295 (Miss. 1987), Jones v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 1230 , 108 S.Ct. 2891 , 101 L.Ed.2d 925 (1988) vacating and remanding, Jones v. State, 602 So.2d 1170 (Miss.1992) remanding for new sentencing hearing. Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107 (Miss. 1992). Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848 (Miss. 1991). Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss. 1991). Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991). Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16 (Miss. 1990). Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1990). Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1990). State v. Tokman, 564 So.2d 1339 (Miss.1990). Johnson v. State, 547 So.2d 59 (Miss. 1989). Williams v. State, ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.